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Decision-making in Autism Spectrum Conditions 
Summary 
 
Background:  The difficulties experienced by intellectually able adults with autism spectrum 
conditions (ASCs) have been hinted at in autobiographical accounts as well as in the clinical 
and neuropsychological research literature.  Little is known, however, about the nature of 
these putative difficulties, nor how people with ASCs might best be supported to make 
decisions for themselves.  The aim of this project is to improve understanding of the effects 
of ASCs on decision-making in a way that may be useful to the development of guidance for 
those who support decision-making in adults with ASCs. 
 
Method:  The project comprised two phases.  The first phase was a preliminary survey of the 
decision-making experiences of adults with ASCs (quantitative and qualitative data).  The 
second phase was an empirical investigation of decision-making in adults with ASCs, 
compared to a general population control group, which was matched for age, gender and 
verbal ability (quantitative data).  The experimental stimuli were a battery of established and 
adapted neuropsychological measures, which were selected to substantiate or explore some of 
the findings from the preliminary survey. 
 
Results:  The preliminary survey clearly showed that participants with ASCs perceive a 
number of difficulties in everyday decision-making.  When assessed in the experimental 
study, the participants with ASCs reported experiencing several problems in decision-
making, including avoiding decisions, more frequently than the control group.  The behaviour 
of the ASC group on some of the laboratory tasks of decision-making were consistent with 
the experiences they reported. 
 
Conclusions:  The findings suggest that decision-making can be particularly difficult for 
adults with ASCs and some possible reasons for these difficulties are identified.  The findings 
also suggest that adults with ASCs, who are intellectually able, may benefit from support 
when making decisions.  Specific recommendations on how to support adults with ASCs, as 
well as directions for future research, are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 What is decision-making? 
Decision-making is the mental process by which one of two or more possible options is 
selected in order to reach a desired goal (Edwards, 1954; Huitt, 1992).  The process can 
include the formation of preferences, searching for information, preparation to implement the 
chosen action, and the evaluation of outcomes (Ranyard, Crozier & Svenson, 1997; Ernst & 
Paulus, 2005).  We make decisions every day;  these range from decisions that carry very 
little consequence, such as which sandwich to buy, to decisions that can have significant 
consequences for our health, relationships, or finances.  Decision-making is, therefore, a vital 
skill and necessary for self-determination. 
 
1.2 Why study decision-making in autism spectrum conditions? 
People with autism spectrum conditions (ASCs) experience a number of difficulties in their 
everyday lives (Tantam, 1991).  However, the decision-making of people with ASCs has 
received relatively little scientific attention.  This is surprising given suggestions from a 
variety of sources that decision-making can be unusually difficult for people with ASCs.  
Moreover, there is increasing recognition that statutory frameworks seeking to empower and 
protect adults at risk of lacking capacity for making one or more decisions autonomously (for 
example, the Mental Capacity Act (England and Wales) 2005) are relevant to some people 
with ASCs (Butcher, 2007).  At present, there is very little guidance available for clinicians 
and carers of adults with ASCs about the ways in which decision-making may be affected by 
the condition, or suggestions for ways in which these adults could be supported.  Current 
guidance is instead weighted heavily towards clinical conditions for which decision-making 
has been well studied (for example, intellectual disabilities or dementia, see the Mental 
Capacity Act (England and Wales) 2005: Code of Practice).  Understanding more about the 
impact of ASCs on decision-making is essential for improving the support offered to people 
with ASCs. 
 
This thesis presents an investigation of decision-making in ASCs.  In this first chapter, the 
literature on decision-making in the neurotypical population is summarised, providing an 
overview of the different approaches available to study decision-making, as well as the 
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developing models grounded in standard human capabilities.  The characteristics of ASCs are 
then discussed before the literature relating to decision-making in ASCs is reviewed in detail. 
 
1.3 Previous research in decision-making 
1.3.1 Legal aspects 
The legal systems in most democratic countries approach decision-making as a functional 
ability; assessment of decision-making is focused on whether a person has the ability, or 
‘capacity’, to make one or more specific decisions (see Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995; Wong, 
Clare, Gunn & Holland, 1999).  The decisions considered within legal frameworks tend to 
relate to health and social care, as well as financial decisions (see Guardianship and 
Administration Act (South Australia) 1993; Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000; 
Mental Capacity Act (England and Wales) 2005, MCA).  Under the MCA, an adult is 
considered to lack the capacity to make one or more specific decisions only if he or she is 
demonstrably unable, due to an ‘impairment of mind or brain’ (s. 2(1), MCA), to: a) 
understand the information relevant to the decision; b) retain that information; c) use or 
weigh that information as part of the decision-making process; or d) communicate, by any 
means, his or her choice (s. 3(1), MCA).  These are referred to as ‘functional abilities’ for 
decision-making capacity. 
 
The definition of incapacity used in the MCA (and in the legislation of other countries) 
requires that the person has, first, an ‘impairment of mind or brain’, and secondly that this 
impairment affects the functional abilities required for decision-making.  Research on 
decision-making in this context has, therefore, focused on people with a range of clinical 
conditions.  Numerous studies, using standardised, legally-relevant decisions, such as consent 
to medical treatment or participation in research, have investigated the capacity of men and 
women with: intellectual disabilities (for example, Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995; Arscott, 
Dagnan & Kroese, 1999; Wong, Clare, Holland, Watson & Gunn, 2000; Suto, Clare, Holland 
& Watson, 2005a), dementia (for example, Marson, Chatterjee, Ingram & Harrell, 1996; 
Wong et al., 2000; Moye, Karel, Gurrera & Azar, 2005), physical illness (for example, 
Casarett, Karlawish & Hirschman, 2003; Raymont et al., 2004), and mental health problems 
(for example, Grimes, McCullough, Kunik, Molinari & Workman, 2000; Wong et al., 2000; 
Palmer & Jeste, 2006; Candilis, Fletcher, Geppert, Lidz & Appelbaum, 2008). 
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For the most part, these studies have demonstrated that the capacity to make a particular 
decision can be affected by the condition in question.  At the same time, they emphasise that 
a diagnosis alone is not a sufficient basis for concluding that a person lacks the capacity to 
make a specific decision.  A particular theme of the legally-relevant research is the 
identification of cognitive, medical, and other personal characteristics that can help 
practitioners to identify those who are at an increased risk of lacking capacity, and how they 
might best be supported when making decisions.  Important predictors of decision-making 
capacity are cognitive functions, such as attention, working memory, semantic memory, 
processing speed, planning (see Murphy & Clare, 1995; Marson et al., 1996; Dymek, 
Atchinson, Harrell & Marson, 2001; Murphy & Clare, 2003; Palmer & Jeste, 2006) as well as 
age and education (see Casarett et al., 2003).  These factors have all been shown to affect one 
or more of the functional abilities required for decision-making capacity. 
 
Legally-relevant studies have also focused on the psychological factors present in specific 
conditions that can compromise weighing in the decision-making process more or less 
independently of the other functional abilities.  A phobia, for example, may compromise 
decision-making capacity in situations involving the object of fear.  This was demonstrated in 
the leading case of a pregnant woman, Re MB (medical treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426, who, 
prior to going into labour, had given consent to delivery by Caesarean section.  However, she 
then withdrew her consent at the point of labour because of her phobia of needles.  It was 
established by the court that, although Ms MB adequately understood the need for the 
operation, her ‘panic fear of needles dominated everything at the critical point [and] she was 
not capable of making a decision’ (Re MB, p427).  Similarly, cognitively able patients with 
anorexia nervosa may lack the capacity to consent to feeding treatment due to their intense 
fear of weight gain and/or their perception of the seriousness of their condition, which, again, 
may affect the thought processes specific to the decision (Tan, Hope & Stewart, 2003). 
 
1.3.2 Thought processes in decision-making 
The earliest theories of decision-making attempted to describe how decisions should be made 
by proposing formal models of normative social and economic behaviour (see Fishburn, 
1988).  Central to these normative models is the notion of rational choice. This notion 
assumes that decisions are taken only after the benefits and costs of each action have been 
weighed at which point the action with the highest value (subjective or material) is selected 
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(Pascal, 1660, translated in Krailsheimer, 1966; Zey, 1998).  One of the most important 
models of rational choice is the Subjective Expected Utility theory (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1947), which assumes that decisions can be reached by quantifying the personal 
utility of each outcome and weighting them by the subjective probabilities of their 
occurrence.  However, normative theories of decision-making are limited in their ability to 
predict human behaviour (Simon, 1957).  First, the requirements for making a rational choice 
(such as having full knowledge about the available actions and their likely consequences, as 
well as stable preferences about the outcomes that can be used to rank actions) are not always 
met (Hickson & Khemka, 1999).  Secondly, the cognitive processes believed to underpin 
decision-making, such as memory and attention, are limited in their capacity (see Miller, 
1956; Broadbent, 1958; Waugh & Norman, 1965; Baddeley, 1996).  These limitations may 
potentially compromise the ability to undertake a rational analysis.  Acknowledgement of 
these limitations has lead to the development of modified models, such as Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and Bounded Rationality (Simon, 1957), which attempt to 
identify the human limitations and biases for carrying out complex analyses and making 
rational choices. 
 
The strategies employed by decision-makers to overcome their limitations have been the 
focus of much research.  The pioneering studies of Kahneman and Tversky and their 
colleagues indicated that people use a number of heuristics (mental ‘short-cuts’) to simplify 
some of the complex mental processes involved in decision-making (see for example, 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman, 2002; Kochler & Harvey, 
2004).   Most of the time, heuristics facilitate adaptive and efficient decision-making; in some 
situations, however, their use can result in systematic biases towards particular response 
options (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982).  Demonstrations of the use of heuristics 
typically involve presenting people with questions constructed to offer a ‘rational’ choice, 
and an ‘incorrect’ choice that follows naturally from the heuristic-led thought process.  The 
most well-known heuristics include the representativeness heuristic, which describes the 
tendency for people to evaluate the probability of an event by the degree to which the event 
resembles their experiences in real life.  Specifically, events that appear more representative 
of reality are judged as more likely to occur than events that are less representative 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972).  Other well-known heuristics include the availability heuristic, 
which is a tendency to evaluate the probability of an event by the ease with which examples 
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of that event can be brought to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), and the anchoring-
adjustment heuristic, which is the tendency to make judgments using one value as a reference 
point (an ‘anchor’) and adjusting that value to produce an estimate (see Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  Less well-known heuristics and biases include: the Peak-end rule, 
whereby past experiences are judged most on the peak of the experience and how that 
experience ended (Kahneman, Diener & Schwarz, 1999), and Escalation of Commitment, in 
which people tend to continue to commit resources to a project in which they have already 
invested, despite new evidence suggesting the continued investment is not cost-effective 
(Staw, 1976).  In real life contexts, it has been shown that heuristics can play a role in 
judgements about population sizes (Wilson, Houston, Etling & Brekke, 1996), inferences 
about people (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), evaluation of salary offers (Neale & Bazerman, 
1991), and can even influence sentencing decisions in court (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001). 
 
Another major theme in psychological research on decision-making concerns the 
identification of individual differences.  Scott & Bruce (1995), for example, proposed that 
people rely to different extents on five, non-mutually exclusive, decision-making styles, 
defined as ‘the learned habitual response pattern exhibited by an individual when confronted 
with a decision situation’ (Scott & Bruce, 1995, p820). The styles proposed are: i) a rational 
style, characterised by comprehensive searches for information and logical evaluation of 
alternatives; ii) an intuitive style, characterised by attention to salient details and feelings; iii) 
a dependent style, characterised by a tendency to search for advice and support from others; 
iv) an avoidant style, characterised by a tendency to avoid decision-making whenever 
possible; and v) a spontaneous style, characterised by a tendency to complete the decision-
making process as quickly as possible.  These styles of decision making correlate with 
measures of performance and personal characteristics. The rational style, for example, is 
associated with positive ratings of managerial performance (Russ, McNeilly & Comer, 1996), 
and an internal locus of control (Biacco, Laghi & D'Alessio, 2009).  The avoidant style is 
associated with negative stress, indexed by higher levels of the stress hormone, cortisol, 
during decision-making (Thunholm, 2008).  Similar styles of decision-making have been 
proposed by Janis & Mann (1977).  However, their model of decision-making styles assumes 
that people approach decision-making with a vigilant (rational) style wherever possible, and 
use less adaptive strategies, such as passing the responsibility to another person, only where a 
rational style cannot be adopted. 
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1.3.3 Cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes involved in decision-making 
The roles of basic cognitive, emotional and motivational processes in decision-making have 
been assessed in an extensive literature.  Cognitive processes enable mental representation 
and manipulation of the information upon which decisions are based, emotional processes 
can contribute to an evaluation of the personal significance of the information, and 
motivational processes determine the goals of the decision-maker (Hickson & Khemka, 
1999). 
 
The cognitive processes receiving the most attention in decision-making are categorised as 
‘executive functions’.  These are higher cognitive processes that enable complex, goal-
directed behaviour and are believed to be mediated by the frontal lobes (Russo et al., 2006; 
Suchy, 2009).  These include: a) working memory, which is the ability to actively store 
information needed for further processing or reasoning (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974); b) 
planning, which is the ability to model a sequence of actions in order to carry out a specific 
task, and to monitor the planned sequence of actions and update it as required (Shallice, 
1982; Morris, Miotto, Feigenbaum, Bullock & Polkey, 1997; Hill, 2004b); c) attentional 
flexibility, which is the ability to shift back and forth between multiple tasks or mental sets 
(Head, Bolton & Hymas, 1989; Miyake et al., 2000); d) response inhibition, which is the 
ability to suppress behaviour that would otherwise interfere with the process of achieving a 
goal (Dempster, 1992; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008); and e) generativity (also known as 
ideational fluency), which is the ability to generate novel ideas and/or multiple responses to 
stimuli (Milgram & Arad, 1981; Wilson, Gilley, Tanner & Goetz, 1992).  During decision-
making, these cognitive processes facilitate mental representation of situational features and 
potential consequences, recall of similar decision-making experiences, categorisation of 
alternatives, recall of declarative information, and the selection of a problem solving-strategy 
(Brand, Labudda & Markowitsch, 2006).  Several studies have shown that impairments of 
executive function (for example, in populations with frontal lobe injury, or dementia) are 
associated with impairments in decision-making in laboratory-based tests (Manes et al., 2002; 
Brand et al., 2005; Brand, Recknor, Grabenhorst & Bechara, 2007; Sinz, Zamarian, Benke, 
Wenning & Delazer, 2008).  However, the relationship between executive function and 
decision-making is complex and decision-making may be impaired even in the absence of 
cognitive impairments (see Mimura, Oeda & Kawamura, 2006). 
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The influence of emotion in decision-making has been demonstrated through several different 
strands of research.  The influential somatic marker hypothesis proposed by Bechara and his 
colleagues (see Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1996; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & 
Damasio, 2005) provides an account of how emotions may guide choice.  In their research, 
decision-making was stimulated using the specially developed Iowa Gambling Task (IGT, 
see Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Anderson, 1994).  In the IGT, participants make repeated 
selections from four decks of cards in order to win as much money as possible.  
Unbeknownst to the participants, two of the decks are weighted with large wins and large 
losses in such a way that repeated selection leads to a net loss of money (disadvantageous 
decks).  The other two decks are weighted with smaller wins but fewer losses so that repeated 
selections from these decks leads to a net gain of points (advantageous decks).  Bechara et al. 
(1996) found that, prior to making disadvantageous choices, neurotypical participants 
developed anticipatory skin conductance responses, reflecting increased autonomic arousal 
even before they reported conscious awareness of the presence of advantageous and 
disadvantageous decks.  In contrast, patients with prefrontal ventromedial brain damage, who 
presented risky decision-making in real life, failed to develop these anticipatory markers.  
Bechara et al. proposed that affective (emotional) somatic states are unconsciously associated 
with potential response options and form emotional markers that guide the reasoning process.  
Reasoning may, therefore, be biased against response options associated with negative 
somatic markers.  This would, Bechara and colleagues argue, adaptively aid decision-making 
in situations where response options are too numerous or complex to be processed adequately 
by conscious reasoning alone.  This hypothesis has, however, been criticised on the basis that 
participants have more conscious knowledge of the risks than originally assumed (Dunn, 
Dagleish & Lawrence, 2005; Maia & McClelland, 2004; Brand et al., 2007). 
 
Other research has shown that decision-making may be adversely affected by emotion.  High 
levels of anxiety may affect decision-making by altering the patterns of autonomic arousal 
that reflect somatic markers (Ernst & Paulus, 2005; Miu, Heilman & Houser, 2008).  In a 
review of the literature, Etzioni (1988) concluded that elevated anxiety can reduce capacity 
for abstract thinking and bias the evaluation of significant and trivial information.  Low mood 
is also associated with disadvantageous decision-making on the Iowa Gambling Task (see de 
Vries, Holland & Witteman, 2008). 
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Motivation can also affect decision-making by influencing the extent to which people engage 
in decision-making tasks (Hickson & Khemka, 1999).  Janis and Mann (1977) proposed that 
a fully motivated decision-maker engages in a number of stages required for decision-making 
(the proposed stages are: canvassing alternatives, canvassing objectives, careful evaluation of 
consequences, searching for information, unbiased assimilation of new information, planning 
for implementation and contingencies), whereas less motivated decision-makers engage in 
only some of these processes.  Motivation is itself influenced by a number of factors, which 
include confidence in decision-making abilities (Janis & Mann, 1977; Scott & Bruce, 1995), 
a sense of agency (Radford, Mann, Ohta & Nakane, 1993; Bacanli, 2006), and the extent to 
which the decision-maker is interested in the content of the decision (McGuire & McGuire, 
1991).  Within the decision-making process, motivation is believed to play a particularly 
important role in the selection of goals that determine the decision-maker’s evaluation of the 
different courses of action (Hickson & Khemka, 1999).  Recently, a computational model of 
decision-making performance on the IGT (the Expectancy-Valence Learning model) has been 
developed to quantify differences in a specific motivational process between individuals 
(Busemeyer & Stout, 2002).  The model provides a parameter estimate of the extent to which 
decision-makers are motivated by immediate wins or motivated to avoid loss.  The model has 
been applied to several clinical groups.  For example, chronic illegal drug users have been 
found to have a motivational bias for immediate wins, which is consistent with the theory that 
signals of positive reward carry more weight than signals of risk and may be a maintaining 
factor in substance misuse (Stout, Busemeyer, Lin, Grant & Bonson, 2004; Yechiam, 
Busemeyer, Stout & Bechara, 2005).    
 
1.3.4 Neurobiology of decision-making 
Neurobiological studies of decision-making have indicated the involvement of several brain 
regions in decision-making that are consistent with the involvement of cognitive, emotional 
and motivational processes as outlined above.  These studies involved clinical groups with 
defined lesions, as well as neuroimaging paradigms with healthy volunteers.  For example, 
patients with damage to the prefrontal cortex (PFC) demonstrate impairments in decision-
making on the IGT: they make fewer selections from the advantageous decks compared to 
controls (Manes et al., 2002). Since the PFC is associated with several executive functions 
(see for example, Owen, Sahakian, Semple, Polkey & Robbins, 1995; Stuss et al., 2000) this 
observation is consistent with the hypothesised importance of executive function.  Other 
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research has demonstrated activity in regions that are associated with memory (the 
hippocampus and posterior cingulate) in informed decision-making, while the amygdala is 
involved in ‘guessing’ decisions that are made without all the relevant information (Ernst et 
al., 2002; Ernst et al., 2004).  The amygdala is believed to be important in evaluating the 
emotional significance of information, and can also play a role in motivation (Ernst & Paulus, 
2005).  Another important neural region in decision-making appears to be the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), which is believed to play a role in processing uncertain information 
and generating arousal in decision-making (Critchley, Mathias & Dolan, 2001), as well as 
integrating information about success and errors (Carter, Botvinick & Cohen, 1999).  A novel 
study of decision-making, carried out by Braeutigam and colleagues (Braeutigam et al., 
2001), identified activity in Broca’s area (language function) during deliberative, quasi-
naturalistic choice-making.  The authors proposed that activity in this region showed that 
silent vocalisation may be part of the decision-making processes in situations where a clear 
preference is not present.  These studies provide a useful starting point for understanding 
some of the processes and abilities involved in decision-making.  However, their 
interpretation can be affected by the complex connectivity of the brain, as well as individual 
differences, especially in lesion pathology (for review, see Fellows & Farah, 2005). 
  
1.3.5 Conclusions 
In summary, the study of decision-making has been a major research theme in several 
disciplines: law, economics, social psychology, psychology, and neuroscience, reflecting the 
paramount importance of decision-making as a life skill.  Although decision-making is a 
complex process, involving both conscious and unconscious processes, the research just 
surveyed has contributed to an understanding of the abilities required for decision-making, 
the nature of individual differences, and the specific processes through which decisions can 
be made.  An important finding, drawn particularly from the psychological research, is that 
human decision-making is not perfect, but is capable of selecting good courses of action most 
of the time.  The next section presents a summary of the characteristics of ASCs; the 
literature relating to decision-making in ASCs is then considered in detail. 
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1.4 Autism spectrum conditions (ASCs) 
1.4.1 Introduction to ASCs 
Autism spectrum conditions (ASCs) are characterised by life-long behavioural abnormalities 
in: i) reciprocal social interaction; ii) communication; and iii) restricted, repetitive and 
stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests and activities (World Health Organisation, 1992; 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  The autistic condition was first characterised by 
the psychiatrist Leo Kanner in 1943, who identified eleven boys each with an impairment in 
relating to other people, an insistence on sameness in their routine or environment, and with 
some special abilities (Kanner, 1943).  Soon after Kanner’s description was published, the 
physician Hans Asperger independently described a group of intellectually able adolescents 
with similar traits to the children described by Kanner.  Asperger proposed that an ‘autistic 
psychopathy’ was common to the young people he described, despite wide individual 
differences in the presentation of symptoms (Asperger, 1944).  Several decades later, autistic 
disorders have been conceptualised as Pervasive Developmental Disorders (PDD) and are 
believed to form a continuum of social and communication impairments: the autism spectrum 
(Wing, 1991).  Along this spectrum, specific diagnoses of ASCs include: autism, high-
functioning autism (HFA), Asperger syndrome (AS), and Pervasive Developmental Disorder 
Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS). 
 
The distinction between the specific diagnoses is a source of some debate.  According to the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, fourth edition (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) and the International Classification of Diseases, tenth edition, (ICD-10, 
World Health Organisation, 1992), AS is characterised by the same features as autism, but 
without a delay in language and cognitive development within the first three years of life.  
However, Gillberg and Gillberg’s criteria for AS (Gillberg & Gillberg, 1989), which is also 
in clinical use, includes subtle problems in language such as use of formal or pedantic 
language, and literal rather than communicative interpretation.  Gillberg and Gillberg’s 
criteria also include motor clumsiness, which are not included in the DSM-IV and ICD-10 
core criteria.  PDD-NOS is generally considered a milder ASC (see Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath & 
Boomsma, 2008), and may be diagnosed when the defining characteristics of autism have 
become apparent only after 3 years of age.  Alternatively, PDD-NOS may be diagnosed when 
some or all of the traits presented are borderline for a diagnosis of autism or AS (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
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The intellectual functioning of adults with ASCs varies widely; approximately 15% of people 
with an ASC are believed to have an intellectual disability (see Gillberg & Soderstrom, 
2003), although, by definition, adults with HFA and AS have IQ scores in the normal range 
(or above) as well as relatively well-developed language skills (see Frith, 2006; Mackinlay, 
Charman & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006).  A recent estimate of the prevalence of ASCs suggested 
that they affect 1.2 in every 100 people (Baird et al., 2006).  Note, however, that estimates of 
the prevalence of ASCs vary considerably, reflecting differences in study methodologies (for 
review, see Williams, Higgins & Brayne, 2006).  
 
1.4.2 Aetiology of ASCs 
1.4.2.1 Genetic evidence 
ASCs are highly heritable, as indicated by the twin study carried out by Bailey and colleagues 
(Bailey et al., 1995).  They found that 60% of monozygotic twins were concordant for a 
diagnosis of autism, while no dizygotic twins were concordant for autism.  Consistent with 
this finding, features of the broader autism phenotype (which will be discussed below), such 
as enhanced attention to detail, impaired understanding of the beliefs of others, and superior 
intuitive understandings of physics have been found in the relatives of people with ASCs 
(Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 1998).  The genetic underpinnings of 
ASCs appear to involve a complex combination of rare mutations and polymorphisms 
common in the general population (for review, see O'Roak & State, 2008).  Specific genes 
implicated in the pathology of ASCs are currently being identified, and include genes 
contributing to sex hormones and neural growth (Chakrabarti et al., 2009). 
 
1.4.2.2 Psychological theories 
Several current psychological theories provide an account of the cognitive and behavioral 
characteristics of ASCs.  Three of the major theories, Weak Central Coherence, Executive 
Dysfunction and Empathising-Systemising Theory, are summarised here.  
 
Weak Central Coherence (WCC), first proposed by Frith (1989), proposes a weakness in 
people with ASCs to extract the global meaning of information.  Instead, information is 
perceived in a more fragmented fashion.  This weakness, which can be seen at different levels 
of processing (Happé, 1996, 1997), may contribute to the social and communication 
impairments of people with ASCs.  For example, WCC can affect the ability to use semantic 
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context to infer meaning from language (for example, Happé, 1997; Catarino et al., in press) 
and to perceive meaning in facial expressions and non-verbal language (see Plaisted, Saksida, 
Alcántara & Weisblatt, 2003).  An enhanced attention to detail may also underpin the 
circumscribed interests observed in ASCs (see Ozonoff, Pennington & Solomon, 2006).  
Recently, however, a modified theory has been proposed, suggesting that attention to local 
details reflects a superiority of local processing mechanisms, rather than a general deficit in 
global processing mechanisms (see Mottron, Dawson, Soulières, Hubert & Burack, 2006). 
 
Executive Dysfunction refers to impairments in the executive functions, which were described 
in the earlier section summarising the cognitive processes in decision-making (Section 1.3.3).  
Impairments in specific executive functions have been observed in people with HFA 
(Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991; Hughes, Russell & Robbins, 1994).  This broader 
phenotype is also observed in the relatives of people with ASCs (Hughes, Leboyer & Plumet, 
1999).  In general, these impairments provide an account for the behavioural rigidity and 
insistence on sameness that characterises ASCs.  Furthermore, impairments in planning can 
affect participation in social interaction, which requires constant monitoring and updating 
(see Hill, 2004a).  However, the theory does not explain the superior abilities sometimes 
demonstrated by people with ASCs (see for example, Baron-Cohen, 2009), nor is executive 
dysfunction demonstrated in all individuals with ASCs (see Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007).  
Nevertheless, given the relevance of these associated impairments in ASCs to decision-
making, specific difficulties in executive function are discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
The final theory to be summarised here is the Empathising-Systemising (E-S) theory proposed 
by Baron-Cohen (2002; 2009).  Consistent with the view that ASCs lie on a continuum, this 
theory proposes that ASCs can be explained by a discrepancy between empathising and 
systemising abilities, which themselves lie on a continuum in the general population.  
Empathy is the ability and tendency to produce an appropriate emotional response to another 
person’s thoughts and feelings, while systemising is the drive to understand and construct 
rule-based systems (Baron-Cohen, 2006).  The E-S theory proposes that ASCs arise when the 
ability to empathise is low and the ability to systemise is high.  This two-factor theory 
provides an account that explains both the social difficulties observed in ASCs and the 
strengths, such as the ability to become an expert in a highly specialised area. 
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The psychological theories provide useful frameworks for understanding and predicting the 
behaviours and abilities of people with ASCs.  A great deal of research is concerned with 
refining these theories and understanding the relationships between them (for example, 
South, Ozonoff & McMahon, 2007).  However, they are not complete models of ASCs, either 
because they are unable to explain all of the behaviours or impairments demonstrated by 
people with the condition, or because more research is required to test the predictions that 
they make. 
 
1.5 Literature review of decision-making in ASCs 
There is little systematic information about the extent to which decision-making may be 
affected by ASCs.  There are, however, four sources which suggest that, in some situations, 
decision-making may be problematic for people with ASCs: i) autobiographical accounts 
written by people of exceptional talent, such as Temple Grandin; ii) clinical accounts of 
specific situations in which decision-making appears to be compromised; iii) evidence of 
cognitive, emotional and neurobiological abnormalities that are relevant to decision-making; 
and iv) a small number of published studies looking at specific decision-making processes in 
people with ASCs.  In this section, the state of the literature is summarised by considering 
each of these source types in turn. 
  
1.5.1 Autobiographical accounts of decision-making difficulties in ASCs 
The autobiographical accounts of several well-known people with ASCs provide some 
insight into the types of difficulties that can be experienced.  Temple Grandin, for example, 
described how the tendency for people with ASCs to think in pictures can cause the decision-
making process to become ‘locked up and overloaded with pictures coming in all at once’ 
(Grandin, 2000, p2).  Claire Sainsbury has described how having to choose food ‘on the spot’ 
can be very difficult (Sainsbury, 2000, p104), while Wendy Lawson, when describing the 
effects of anxiety, wrote that ‘even the smallest decision, for example, what to eat or what to 
wear can seem like an impossible task.  As individuals with an autism spectrum disorder we 
feel this way most of the time!’ (Lawson, 2001, p104).  Finally, Jen Birch has described how 
even simple decisions that involve choosing between only two options (in this case, which of 
two calendars to purchase) can be enormously difficult: ‘I have never been 'normal' in this 
respect, needing more time than the average person in order to weigh up my options, come to 
a decision, cope with the sudden change of options (in this case, changing my decision at 
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rapid-fire pace - which can be a very difficult thing for me to do), and mentally process data 
in general…it is the moment of decision-making which is (often) the difficulty for me’ (Birch, 
2003, p213).  These accounts suggest that difficulty with decision-making can be a frequent 
occurrence and can affect several aspects of everyday life for people with ASCs.  They are 
consistent with the reports of a teacher who has observed that even simple choices can be 
stressful and take a long time for children with AS (Winter, 2003).  These reports are also 
consistent with parental reports of greater indecisiveness in adolescents and young adults 
with AS, compared to the general population, which were quantified using the Indecisiveness 
Scale (Frost & Shows, 1993; Johnson, Yechiam, Murphy, Queller & Stout, 2006).  The 
accounts presented above provide some vivid descriptions of the difficulties that people with 
ASCs can experience.  They are, however, limited in that they are the personal accounts of 
only a few people. 
 
1.5.2 Clinical accounts of the impact of characteristic features on decision-making 
Clinical case studies suggest ways in which some of the characteristic features of ASCs may 
impact upon decision-making.  In particular, these case studies describe how intense 
circumscribed or ‘special’ interests may bias decision-making in favour of options that allow 
an individual to pursue that interest, regardless of its consequences.  Howlin (2004) for 
example, describes a man who spends all his time and money on computer magazines and, as 
a result, cannot pay his bills (p139); a man who collected so much electrical equipment that 
he was eventually unable to enter his house (p142); and a man whose fascination with 
washing machines caused him to trespass into other peoples’ houses to watch their machines 
(p304).  In the same vein, Woodbury-Smith et al. (2010) described a number of individuals 
whose pursuit of unusual, but not illegal, ‘special’ interests has resulted in criminal offending.  
Given this wealth of anecdotal evidence it seems possible that special interests in ASCs, due 
to their pathological intensity, may dominate the normal weighing of relevant information 
and compromise capacity in a manner analogous to a phobia (see Section 1.3.1).  These 
accounts do not, however, include an assessment of the individual’s capacity to make these 
particular decisions.  As a result, it is unknown whether these individuals experience a 
conflict when making these particular decisions or whether they do not understand that there 
is a decision to be made. 
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1.5.3 Cognitive, emotional, motivational, and neurobiological abnormalities 
ASCs are associated with a number of impairments in executive functions (for a review see 
Happé & Frith, 1996).  As discussed earlier, executive functions are cognitive abilities that 
enable complex, goal-directed behaviour and are involved in decision-making.  The specific 
impairments identified in people with ASCs and their possible effects on decision-making are 
sunmarised below. 
 
 Attention shifting and focusing impairments (see Goldstein, Johnson & Minshew, 2001).  
These may limit a person’s ability to focus on relevant information and switch between 
different mental representations of the possible actions and outcomes. 
 
 Working memory impairments (see Joseph, Steele, Meyer & Tager-Flusberg, 2005).  
Specifically, there is evidence that adults with HFA are impaired in tests of spatial 
working memory, rather than verbal working memory (Williams et al., 2005; Luna et al., 
2006).  Furthermore, it appears that impairments in spatial working memory reflect 
reduced capacity, rather than impaired function (Steele et al., 2007).  Reduced working 
memory capacity may affect decision-making by impeding the temporary storage and 
manipulation of goal-related information (Joseph et al., 2005; Russo et al., 2006).  As a 
result, people with ASCs may have particular difficulty making decisions in which there 
are several factors to consider, consistent with the account provided by Grandin (2000).  
However, evidence of impaired spatial working memory in ASCs is mixed: Ozonoff & 
Strayer (2001) found no impairment in children and adolescents with HFA across five 
different tests of working memory (including spatial span); instead, working memory 
performance was correlated simply with age and IQ. 
 
 Inhibitory control impairments (see Minshew, Luna & Sweeney, 1999; Luna, Doll, 
Hegedus, Minshew & Sweeney, 2006; Christ, Holt, White & Green, 2007).  Inhibitory 
control refers to the ability to suppress behaviour or cognition that would otherwise 
interfere with the process of achieving a behavioural or cognitive goal (Christ et al., 
2007).  Unsurprisingly, impaired inhibitory control is associated with poorer decision-
making on the neuropsychological tasks of decision-making (for example, Quednow et 
al., 2007), where choices appear to be made too early for a full consideration of available 
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information.  Evidence of impaired inhibitory control in ASCs is, however, inconsistent 
(see Ozonoff & Strayer, 1997; Hill, 2004b).   
 
 Planning impairments (see Ozonoff et al., 1991; Hughes et al., 1994; Ozonoff et al., 
2004; Mackinlay et al., 2006).  Planning is a complex, dynamic mental process in which a 
series of actions are sequentially organised, constantly monitored, evaluated and updated 
as necessary (Hill, 2004a).  Planning abilities enable prospective consideration of 
response options (Manes et al., 2002), and evaluation and adjustment for mistakes in 
reasoning (Welie & Welie, 2001).  Although the relationship between impairments in 
planning and decision-making has not been studied in ASCs, impaired planning is 
associated with riskier decision-making in adults with dorsomedial lesions (Manes et al., 
2002), and in healthy volunteers taking Diazepam (Deakin, Aitken, Dowson, Robbins & 
Sahakian, 2004). 
 
 Generativity impairment (see Hill, 2004b; Turner, 1999).  Generativity, or fluency, refers 
to the capacity to generate novel ideas or multiple responses to stimuli.  Impairments in 
generativity demonstrated in ASCs may translate into difficulty generating available 
courses of action and prospectively considering their possible consequences.  The 
importance of generativity in decision-making has been recognised for people with 
intellectual disabilities and forms the basis of several interventions to improve their 
decision-making skills (Hickson & Khemka, 1999). 
 
Among people with ASCs, the impact of these cognitive difficulties may be further 
exacerbated by high levels of anxiety (Tantam, 2000; Gillott, Furniss & Walter, 2001).  
Motivation for decision-making may also be affected in a number of ways by ASCs: 
decision-making may be affected by an associated lack of self-confidence (see Murray & 
Lesser, 2006), and the ‘monotropic’ tendency associated with the condition (Murray, Lesser 
& Lawson, 2005) may mean that adults with ASCs are simply not interested in the content of 
many decisions (outside of any special interest). 
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Neurobiological abnormalities identified using neuroimaging techniques have been found in a 
number of studies investigating brain bases for the impairments in social cognition, language 
function, and repetitive and restricted behaviour and interests that characterise ASCs 
(DiCicco-Bloom et al., 2006).  Several of the brain regions implicated in ASC 
psychopathology are also associated with decision-making processes (Johnson et al., 2006).  
For example, there is evidence from both fMRI and PET studies of people with ASCs that 
reduced amygdala, prefrontal medial, and anterior cingulate activity are associated with 
deficits in emotion perception and theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Castelli, Frith, 
Happé & Frith, 2002; Kana, Keller, Minshew & Just, 2007; Ke et al., 2008).  Reduced 
activity in Broca’s area has also been associated with autistic deficits in semantic and 
language processing and is believed to be a region with abnormal neurodevelopment in 
intellectually able adults with ASCs (Harris et al., 2006).   
 
At the microscopic level, there is evidence of numerous neuronal abnormalities in ASCs that 
are likely to impact upon cognition (for a review, see Schmitz & Rezaie, 2008).  For example, 
abnormalities in the organisation and width of frontopolar cortical modules, known as 
‘minicolumns’, have been observed in both post-mortem and recent stereological studies of 
people with autism (Casanova et al., 2006).  These abnormalities may impede normal 
information processing and integration by altering functional GABAergic systems and lateral 
inhibition of neuronal activity (DiCicco-Bloom et al., 2006; Schmitz & Rezaie, 2008).  There 
is also a theoretical account suggesting that Von Economo neurones (bipolar cells located in 
the anterior cingulate cortex), which may aid decision-making under uncertainty (Allman, 
Hakeem & Watson, 2002), may be abnormally developed in ASCs (Allman, Watson, 
Tetreault & Hakeem, 2005).  Allman and his colleagues proposed that abnormal development 
of Von Economo neurones may “cause poor intuitive decision-making in situations involving 
considerable uncertainty, especially in social contexts” (Allman et al., 2005, p371).  They 
proposed this hypothesis on the basis that functional abnormalities in the anterior cingulate 
cortex are observed in ASCs, and abnormal perceptions of social stimuli in ASCs may impact 
upon the post-natal, experience-dependent development of Von Economo neurones.  Allman 
et al. concluded that people with ASCs may lack the benefit of intuition in rapid decision-
making under uncertainty, and therefore require greater deliberation time. 
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Together, these studies provide evidence of abnormalities in ASCs that may affect decision-
making.  This evidence is, however, based upon indirect links between abnormalities 
observed in ASCs and similar abnormalities in other clinical groups that are associated with 
impaired decision-making.  The literature relating to impairments in executive functions in 
ASCs is also not clear cut, although there is a general consensus that ASCs are associated 
with deficits in planning ability and attention shifting (Hill, 2004b).   
 
1.5.4 Previous studies of decision-making by people with ASCs 
The final source of literature to be considered is a small number of laboratory-based studies 
that have investigated specific decision-making processes in ASCs.  The earliest of these 
(Johnson et al., 2006) used a version of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) to examine 
motivational processes in children and adolescents with AS compared to participants from the 
general population.  Compared to the control group, they found that the participants with AS 
demonstrated a more erratic pattern of choices, which could result in disadvantageous 
decision-making (Yechiam et al., 2005).  However, the difference in performance between 
the groups (AS group: 6% improvement; Control group: 18% improvement) was not 
significant, and the authors concluded that their sample size may have been too small to 
detect a significant difference (n = 15 and 14, respectively). 
 
Johnson et al. examined motivational processes in decision-making using the Expectancy-
Valence Learning model, EVL, Busemeyer & Stout, 2002).  The EVL is a computational 
model that quantifies the separate contributions of: i) a learning and memory factor (the 
tendency to be influenced by recent outcomes and to forget or discount past outcomes); ii) a 
motivational factor (the tendency to be attracted to wins and indifferent to losses); and iii) a 
response consistency factor (the tendency to make choices erratically).  They found that the 
participants with AS appeared to learn the contingencies associated with each deck in a 
similar way to the control group.  However, compared to the control group, the participants 
with AS demonstrated a non-significant trend towards increased sensitivity to loss.  Again, 
the authors suggested that their sample size was too small to detect this difference (i.e. their 
study lacked power).  There was, however, a significant difference between the groups in the 
response consistency factor. This finding is consistent with the initial observation that the 
participants with AS made choices more erratically.  Johnson and colleagues concluded that 
the participants with AS were less influenced by the motivational properties (expectancies 
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about the outcome) that they assigned to the different decks.  This conclusion should, 
however, be interpreted cautiously, as, for almost half the participants (45%), the EVL model 
did not fit the data better than a control model (the Bernoulli model), which takes no account 
of learning from previous choices. 
 
The second laboratory-based study (Minassian, Paulus, Lincoln & Perry, 2007) examined the 
flexibility of decision-making by adults with high-functioning autism (HFA) using a two-
choice prediction task.  In this study (HFA group: n = 16, Control group: n = 14), participants 
were asked to predict over a series of trials whether a picture of a car would appear to the left 
or right of a computer screen while the researchers covertly manipulated the error rates (low, 
medium and high) of the participants’ choices.  They found that the participants with HFA 
demonstrated some flexibility in their choices by changing their prediction after guessing 
incorrectly (the so-called ‘win-stay/lose-shift’ strategy).  However, they also found that, 
compared to participants from the general population, their use of the ‘win-stay/lose-shift’ 
strategy was more pronounced when the pre-determined error rate was low.  This finding 
indicates that the decision-making of participants with HFA was influenced more by errors 
when errors were rarely experienced than when they were experienced frequently.  Consistent 
with the non-significant trend observed by Johnson et al., this suggests that people with ASCs 
may be influenced differently by the gains and losses of previous choices. 
 
The third study (De Martino, Harrison, Knafo, Bird & Dolan, 2008) examined the effects of 
‘framing’ on monetary decisions for adults with ASCs.  The ‘framing effect’ describes the 
influence of the format in which different options are presented (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981).  For example, people in the general population tend to prefer a probabilistic loss over a 
certain loss, but prefer a certain gain over a probabilistic gain, even if the expected loss or 
gain of the two choices is equivalent.  The framing effect is believed to be mediated by the 
affect heuristic, in which an emotional response to the language of the frame guides the 
choice (De Martino, Kumaran, Seymore & Dolan, 2006).  In this study (ASC group: n = 14; 
Control group: n = 15), the participants were presented with a series of two-choice decisions.  
At the beginning of each trial, they were informed about the amount of money that they 
would receive to play that trial (for example, ‘you receive £50’).  They were then told that 
they would not be able to keep the whole amount, but would need to choose between a 
certain option (for example, ‘you keep £20’) and a gamble option (showing a probability that 
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they would keep all of the starting amount, and a probability that they would lose all of the 
starting amount).  For each trial type, the certain option was presented in a ‘gain’ frame, 
which stated the amount of money that participants could keep (for example, ‘you keep £20’), 
and a ‘loss’ frame, which stated the amount of money that participants would lose (for 
example, ‘you lose £30’).  They found that, compared to participants from the general 
population, the adults with ASCs showed less susceptibility to the framing effect, making 
more logical choices.  Furthermore, the participants with ASCs did not demonstrate 
autonomic responses (measured using the galvanic skin response) indicating a lack of 
emotional involvement in the task.  The authors proposed that ASCs confer enhanced logical 
consistency.  However, this emotional detachment may take place at the expense of 
integrating emotional information, which can be beneficial in everyday situations where 
information is often ambiguous and/or incomplete.  This finding suggests a reduced reliance 
on the affect heuristic (see Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2002). 
 
The fourth study (Yechiam, Arshavsky, Shamay-Tsoory, Yaniv & Aharon, 2010) examined 
the frequent switching behaviour demonstrated by the participants in Johnson et al. (2006).  
Using the IGT, they found that children and young adults with ASCs (n = 15) demonstrated 
shifting patterns similar to participants in Johnson et al (2006).  Yechiam et al. also found that 
the EVL model did not provide a good fit of the data for half the participants with ASCs.  
They therefore developed a new cognitive model, which assumes that deck choice on the IGT 
is influenced by the exploratory value of the response option, rather than its outcome value 
(as in the EVL).  This model was more successful in predicting the choices of the participants 
with ASCs and concluded that, in contrast to controls (n = 28), decision-making in ASCs is 
motivated more by a tendency to explore outcomes, rather than a tendency to maximise 
profit. 
 
The final study (South, Dana, White & Crowley, 2010) examined risk-taking in children and 
adolescents with ASCs (n = 40).  Risk-taking was assessed using the Balloon Analogue Risk-
Taking Task (Lejuez et al., 2002).  In this task, participants are asked to pump up a virtual 
balloon without making the balloon burst.  They select how many pumps they would like to 
give the balloon, earning a point for each pump if the balloon does not burst.  Risk-taking is 
therefore indexed by the number of pumps that participants choose to give the balloon.  The 
maximum number of points available (i.e. the number of pumps before the balloon bursts) is 
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randomised for each trial.  They found no significant difference in the overall risk-taking 
scores of the participants with ASCs compared to the control participants (n = 37).  However, 
they did find that, in the ASC group only, risk-taking increased as levels of anxiety increased.  
This finding was unexpected since there is a large literature suggesting that risk-taking 
decreases with anxiety, as was the case in their control group.  They also found that risk-
taking increased with behavioural inhibition in the ASC group, and behavioural activation in 
the control group.  On the basis of these findings, they proposed that risk-taking in ASCs is 
motivated by a fear of failure, whereas risk-taking in the control group is motivated by 
sensitivity to reward.  These findings are limited, however, by the difference in levels of 
anxiety between the participants with ASCs and the control group; the participants with 
ASCs had much higher levels of anxiety and it is difficult to know whether the relationship 
with risk-taking is specific to ASCs, or is a product of higher anxiety overall. 
 
Despite their various limitations, these studies suggest that decision-making processes may be 
different for people with ASCs, compared to those in the general population.  The studies of 
Johnson, Minassian, Yechiam and South and their colleagues all suggest differences in 
motivational processes, which affect the goals of the decision-maker (Hickson & Khemka, 
1999).  The study by DeMartino and colleagues suggests that people with ASCs are more 
logical in their decision-making, but that, in everyday contexts, they may find decision-
making more difficult.   
   
1.5.5 Summary from the literature on decision-making in ASCs 
The literature suggests that a small number of people with ASCs (those with published 
autobiographical accounts, see Section 1.5.1) experience decision-making as particularly 
difficult, perhaps reflecting the known impairments and abnormalities in cognitive, 
emotional, motivational, and neurobiological processes that are involved in decision-making.  
The experiences reported in the autobiographical accounts may also reflect differences in 
motivational and emotional processes in decision-making that are suggested by the 
laboratory-based studies of decision-making in ASCs.  Finally, the clinical accounts suggest 
that decision-making capacity may, in some situations, be compromised by characteristic 
features of the condition, such as special interests. 
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1.6 Rationale for the thesis 
Decision-making is an essential skill in everyday life; decision-making abilities, and how 
they can be maximised, are an important consideration in current policy and clinical practice.  
There are suggestions from a variety of sources that decision-making may be affected (often 
adversely) by ASCs.  However, little is known about the extent to which people with ASCs 
experience difficulties in everyday life, and only a small number of studies have investigated 
how specific decision-making processes may differ for people with ASCs, compared to the 
general population.  This means that there is little information available for clinicians about 
ways in which people with ASCs might be supported with decision-making. 
 
1.7 Aims 
The aims of this thesis are: i) to investigate whether people with ASCs experience particular 
difficulties with decision-making; and ii) if so, to assess empirically some of the possible 
ways in which decision-making may be different for them, compared to the general 
population.  The overall aim is to improve understanding about the effects of ASCs on 
decision-making in a way that may be useful in the development of appropriate guidance for 
those who support decision-making in adults with ASCs. 
 
1.8 Summary of thesis presentation 
The first aim of the thesis is addressed by an exploratory survey of the decision-making 
experiences of adults with ASCs.  The findings from this study are presented in Chapter 2.  
The survey identifies a number of areas for potential research, leading to the formulation of 
seven specific research questions and hypotheses for an experimental study, which involved 
laboratory experiments investigating people with ASCs as well as a control group.  The 
questions selected for further study and the methods used to test them are described in 
Chapter 3.  The participants of the experimental study are described in Chapter 4.  The 
research findings for each of the specific research questions are presented in Chapters 5 – 11 
(the research hypotheses are presented at the beginning of each of these results chapters).  
The final discussion, bringing together the findings and their implications for clinical 
practice, is presented in Chapter 12 together with a discussion of the limitations of the present 
study and the possibilities for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF DECISION-
MAKING EXPERIENCES IN ASCS 
 
Chapter 1 comprised an introduction to the literature suggesting that decision-making may be 
affected by autism spectrum conditions (ASCs).  Since empirical studies require a great deal 
of resources, an initial aim of the research was to evaluate whether an empirical study of 
decision-making in ASCs would be worthwhile, and, if so, which aspects of decision-making 
should be the focus for such a study.  To this end, an initial survey of decision-making 
experiences was carried out.  The findings from this survey, and their implications for the 
research subsequently carried out, are presented here. 
 
2.1 Background 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 1 suggested that some people with ASCs may have 
difficulty with decision-making, compared to those in the general population.  The 
autobiographical accounts describe general problems in everyday situations (see Section 
1.5.1), while clinical accounts describe problems in specific situations that are related to core 
features of the condition (i.e. decisions involving a person’s special interest, see Section 
1.5.2).  The neuropsychological literature suggests that there may be differences in the 
cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes that are involved in decision-making (see 
Sections 1.5.3 and 1.5.4). 
 
The aim of this preliminary survey was to collect information about the decision-making 
experiences of adults with ASCs and thereby highlight areas of potential interest for future 
research.  A questionnaire was designed specifically for this research and comprised both 
quantitative and qualitative items.  The quantitative items covered areas identified in the 
literature as potentially significant for people with ASCs, while the qualitative items were 
included to allow for any unanticipated insights.  As the survey was only an exploratory 
study, there was no control group.  Instead, the survey questionnaire was also completed by 
family members and support workers of adults with ASCs.  These people were included to 
obtain an objective perspective on the decision-making experiences of people with ASCs and 
how they believed the presence of an ASC could impact on decision making. 
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2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
The survey was completed by 189 people, 133 of whom described themselves as adults with 
ASCs (participants).  The remaining 56 respondents were family members or support 
workers of men and women with ASCs (informants).  Thirteen participants were excluded 
from the final analysis because they reported a self-recognised diagnosis of an ASC, rather 
than a diagnosis made by a relevantly qualified practitioner (n = 10), or because they did not 
provide information about the profession of the person who had made their diagnosis (n = 3).  
Four informants were excluded for the same reasons.  The data presented are therefore based 
on the responses of 120 participants and 52 informants, who reported a diagnosis of an ASC 
that had been made by a relevantly qualified practitioner (for example, a psychologist).  All 
participants (including those who were reported on) were aged 16 years or more since this is 
the definition of an adult in the UK legislation (i.e. Mental Capacity Act (England and 
Wales) 2005) to which the research is relevant. 
 
As participants were able to complete the questionnaire anonymously, it is not known how 
many of the family members and support workers were related to, or supported, the 
participants with ASCs; for this reason, the responses from the two groups were analysed 
separately.  Information about the two groups of participants is shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Information about the two groups of participants in the initial survey 
 
 
Participants with ASCs 
People with ASCs (reported on by 
a family member or 
support worker) 
N 120 52 (46 family members) 
Mean age 37 years (16 – 74 years) 28 years (16 – 65 years) 
% male 52% 79% 
Types of ASCs 
84% Asperger syndrome 
9% High-functioning autism 
6% Other ASD or ASC 
1% Autism 
64% Asperger syndrome 
15% High-functioning autism 
4% Other ASD or ASC 
17% Autism 
Reported method 
of diagnosis 
98% Medical doctor or  psychologist 
2% Other relevantly qualified 
practitioner 
94% Medical doctor or psychologist 
6% Other relevantly qualified 
practitioner 
% reporting 
higher education 
qualifications 
53% 27% 
 
Participants were recruited via advertisements in Communication and Asperger United, two 
publications produced by the National Autistic Society (NAS), and to members of locally-
based autism support organisations in the UK.  The participants were recruited between June 
and November 2008. 
 
2.2.2 Design 
A questionnaire, to be completed online or by post, was designed and piloted with two 
national experts (one with a diagnosis of AS) employed by the NAS.  The questionnaire was 
modified in response to their suggestions and comments, and the final version was approved 
by the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee.  To restrict access, the survey was 
password protected with a password supplied in the advertisements. 
 
The survey appeared in two versions: one for participants with an ASC and the other for 
family members and support workers of adults with an ASC (reproduced in Appendix A and 
B).  The questionnaire for adults with an ASC presented closed questions about: 
a) demographic information, including age, gender, and details of diagnosis;  
b) the extent of perceived difficulties in relation to particular types and features of 
decisions (for example, decisions that need to be made quickly); 
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c) the frequency with which particular problems are experienced in decision-making (for 
example, difficulty remembering the information); 
d) the extent to which participants believed that their own decision-making was 
enhanced or disrupted by their ASC; and  
e) the extent to which any ‘special’ or circumscribed interest interfered with making 
decisions. 
 
These questions were presented using multiple choice options, Likert-type scales, and visual 
analogue scales, which have been successfully used in previous studies with adults with 
ASCs and intellectual disabilities (see Dagnan & Ruddick, 1995; Berthoz & Hill, 2005).  The 
questionnaire also provided the opportunity for participants to provide unstructured accounts 
of their decision-making experiences and the perceived effects of ASCs. 
 
The questionnaire items for family members and support workers were similar to those above 
but asked for their perspective on the decision-making of the person they knew and whether 
they had any concerns about the person’s decision-making.   
 
2.2.3 Data analysis 
2.2.3.1 Quantitative data 
The quantitative data were anlysed using descriptive statistics and non-parametric tests where 
applicable.  As this was an exploratory study, two-tailed tests of significance (α = 0.05) were 
used.   
 
2.2.3.2 Qualitative data 
The written accounts (provided by 99 (83%) participants and 38 (73%) informants) were 
analysed to a level of detail consistent with the overall aims of the study.  Thus, rather than 
seeking to document features such as the construction of external and constraining moral 
norms (Silverman, 1987), or interpretive repertoires (Potter, 1996), the analysis presented 
takes respondents’ answers as essentially truthful and straightforward representations of the 
participants’ experiences.  The analysis itself was guided by the principles of Thematic 
Analysis (see Braun & Clarke, 2006), which is a flexible approach used to summarise the key 
features of data.  The process of analysis was as follows: i) familiarisation with the entire data 
set (LL); ii) production of a summary of the views and experiences reported (LL); iii) 
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discussion of the summary findings within the research team and organisation of the findings 
into themes that captured the common features of the data (LL and the supervisors); iv) 
independent review of a sub-sample of the data by another researcher (MR) to check the 
interpretive validity of the chosen themes; v) review and refinement of the chosen themes 
(LL, the supervisors, and MR); vi) re-analysis of the entire data set for features relevant to the 
chosen themes (LL, see Figure 2.1); and vii) final check of the coherence of the themes with 
a selection of extracts (LL and the supervisors).  The data were analysed using the qualitative 
software package, Atlas.ti (Muhr, 2004).   
 
Figure 2.1 Coding guidelines for the qualitative data 
 
The written responses of each participant were examined for the following features: 
 indications of a general dislike of and/or difficulty with decision-making; 
 reasons for disliking decision-making or finding it difficult; 
 whether the person reported only positive or negative effects of ASCs on decision-
making, or both? 
 advantages of ASCs for decision-making; and 
 ways in which decision-making has been/could be supported. 
 
2.3 Results 
Contrary to expectations, the written accounts provided by the participants were very 
detailed.  For this reason, the findings presented here focus on the thematic component of the 
analysis.  The data provided by informants, as well as the responses to the closed questions, 
are presented alongside the findings from the written accounts of the participants with ASCs.  
A complete summary of the responses to the closed questions is presented in Appendix C. 
 
2.3.1 Dislike of, and/or difficulties with, decision-making 
Overwhelmingly, the participants with ASCs reported that they disliked decision-making and 
experienced difficulties in a range of contexts.  Semantic features indicative of these 
experiences were prominent (27 participants) and included general reports of dislike or 
difficulty (e.g. ‘I find it hard to make decisions’, 25 year old woman), as well as references to 
feelings of limited confidence, anxiety, exhaustion and fatigue, during, or as a result of, 
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making decisions.  In addition, several participants reported that they tried to avoid making 
decisions (9 participants).  Extracts illustrating some of these features are presented in Figure 
2.2.  This material was not addressed in most of the closed questions.  However, consistent 
with the reports of anxiety, 87% of participants reported that they ‘sometimes’ (43%) or 
‘often’ (44%) became anxious when making decisions (3% ‘never’, 9% ‘rarely’). 
 
The accounts of participants with ASCs were corroborated by the informants.  Several reports 
indicated that the person with an ASC disliked and/or found decision-making difficult (11 
informants), with particular features of this difficulty/dislike being anxiety (5 informants) and 
a lack of confidence (5 informants).  
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Figure 2.2 Extracts indicative of general dislike of, and/or difficulty with, decision-
making 
 
Outright report of difficulty/anxiety/lack of confidence 
‘Until doing this survey I didn’t really think about how many everyday decisions I find difficult.  I do 
find many decisions difficult, which is possibly one of the reasons I feel constantly stressed – also 
knowing that no matter how hard I try, I am so often wrong in the decisions I make.’  
- 59 year old man  
 
Lack of confidence 
I find it hard to make decisions on my own without asking other people about it.  Due to Asperger’s 
syndrome giving me low self-esteem it means that I have to have reassurance from other people that 
what I am doing is right.  This has prohibited me from making bold decisions.  
- 20 year old man 
   
Avoidance/exhaustion 
If I am shopping, I find that I try to consider every variable before choosing.  This frequently results 
in choosing not to make a choice as the effort becomes exhausting. 
- 49 year old man  
 
Anxiety/lack of confidence 
Being worried about the decision being wrong.  Lack of confidence in own ability.  Being used to 
relying on others making decision on their [her] behalf.   
- Parent of a 20 year old woman 
 
Slow/avoidance 
If there are too many choices with no obvious superior choice, that slows down decision making. (She 
avoids decisions in supermarkets by buying all the possible choices for an item she wants.)  If there is 
a way to escape making a decision (e.g. delaying until the all but one shop has shut), she'll find a way 
to do that.  
- Partner of a 36 year old woman 
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2.3.2 Reasons for dislike of, and/or difficulties with, decision-making 
Where participants with ASCs provided explanations for their dislike of, and/or difficulties 
with, decision-making, these could generally be placed into one of three broad, but not 
necessarily distinct, categories: 1) problems engaging in decision-making; 2) problems in 
reaching a decision; and 3) fears of adverse judgements about the decision made. 
 
2.3.2.1 Problems engaging in decision-making 
Problems engaging in the decision-making process were described by 18 (18%) participants.  
These were characterised as difficulties obtaining and understanding relevant social 
information (11 participants), having a tendency to act on the basis of rules or previous 
actions (8 participants), and having a tendency to act impulsively, especially when feeling 
pushed or overloaded with information (5 participants). 
 
Difficulties similar to these were described by 14 (37%) of the informants providing written 
responses.  Consistent with these, 75% of informants reported that the person with an ASC 
‘sometimes’ (29%) or ‘often’ (46%) did not understand relevant information, while 81% 
considered that he or she ‘sometimes’ (37%) or ‘often’ (44%) did not know what the different 
choices were. 
 
2.3.2.2 Problems in reaching a decision 
Reports of difficulties in reaching decisions were identified in 50 (51%) of the written 
accounts.  These appeared to relate to problems in cognitive and affective processes, and 
were characterised as follows:   
 problems caused by easily becoming stressed (10 participants); 
 problems becoming overloaded or overwhelmed by the information (9 participants); 
 over-thinking about the decision or ruminating on minor details (9 participants); 
 problems in working with unknown or missing information (8 participants); 
 difficulty with mental organisation of relevant information (6 participants); 
 slowness in processing information (6 participants); 
 problems imagining abstract concepts and projecting consequences (5 participants); 
 problems staying focused on the decision to be made (3 participants);  
 problems considering emotions, which were either under- or over-weighted (3 
participants); and 
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 a tendency to spend too much time gathering information (3 participants). 
 
Extracts illustrating some of these problems are presented in Figure 2.3.  Consistent with the 
reports of difficulties in the cognitive processes that underlie decision-making, 71% of 
participants reported that they ‘sometimes’ (28%) or ‘often’ (43%) had difficulty 
remembering the relevant information, while 83% reported that they ‘sometimes’ (35%) or 
‘often’ (48%) did not know what the consequences of their choice would be.  
 
Biases in reasoning caused by features of the condition also seemed to cause particular 
problems.  Two participants reported that they felt unduly influenced or distracted by their 
‘special’ interest, while others reported that their decision-making was affected by a strong 
desire to avoid social interaction (7 participants), changes in routine or environment (4 
participants), and/or outcomes associated with uncertainty (4 participants).  An extract 
illustrating one of these problems is presented in Figure 2.3. 
 
The problems reported by the informants were similar to those reported by the participants.  
However, the only interference described by the informants related to decisions made in the 
pursuit of ‘special’ interests (6 informants).  Their assessment of the impact of such interests 
(based on responses to a closed question) was more extreme than those of the participants 
with ASCs: 15% family members or support workers reported that the level of interference 
was ‘extremely severe’, compared to only 4% of the participants with ASCs.   
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Figure 2.3 Participants’ reasons for disliking decision-making and/or finding it difficult 
 
1.  Problems engaging in the decision-making process 
Making decisions by rules or on the basis of previous actions  
‘‘If the exact type of food I buy is not available I don’t know what to do – do I go without or do I ask 
someone or go to a different place, but then I will get lost or will they also not have it – have they 
stopped making it or have they changed the ingredients or packaging… I think is not the worries 
others have … but they seem not to have so many rules to follow.’  
- 48 year old woman 
 
2.  Problems in reaching decisions 
Overload 
‘The greater number of factors involved, the more likely I am to ‘freeze’.  If that happens I may 
postpone deciding until the problem goes away, or it becomes so urgent that I abandon rational 
analysis and make a reactive, even random, choice.’ 
- 49 year old man 
 
Biases in reasoning associated with features of the condition 
‘I feel that my condition gets in the way of pretty much all decisions I make as everything depends on 
whether or not I will have to be around people.’ 
- 28 year old woman 
 
Taking a long time to make decisions/gathering information 
‘[it is difficult] when there isn’t much time to make a decision in.  He needs lots of time, reassurance 
and information before he can even think of making a decision.  He will spend hours researching 
things making it look as if he is putting off making a decision’.  
- Parent of a 24 year old male  
 
3.  Fear of adverse judgements about the decision made 
‘I worry what others will think about the decision I make.  I want to be treated fairly and equally and 
so try to think about how the decisions would be presented to a non-autistic person and what they 
would choose and how those options and choices would be viewed by others and then I want to 
choose the option that as closely as possible matches the options the other would have and make; this 
however normally confuses me and just makes the decision harder!’  
- 29 year old woman 
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2.3.2.3 Fears of adverse judgments about the decision made 
Statements suggesting a fear of (negative) judgments from others were identified in 20 (20%) 
of the written accounts.  For some people, these fears were related to concerns about 
appearing ‘autistic’.  As the extract in Figure 2.3 illustrates, attempts to conceal their ASC 
sometimes greatly complicated the decision-making process.   
 
2.3.3 The benefits and disadvantages of ASCs on decision-making  
The responses to two closed questions about the frequency with which ASCs might help and 
interfere with decision-making are shown in Figure 2.4 .  For both groups, the difference 
between the ratings for the two questions was significant (participants: z = -5.96, p<0.001; 
informants: z = -5.23, p<0.001), indicating that ASCs were perceived more often as a 
hindrance to, rather than a help with, decision-making.  There was a difference between the 
two groups, however, with a greater proportion of informants rating the condition as ‘often’ 
or ‘always’ a hindrance compared to the participants (77% and 48%, respectively, χ2 (1, 
N=166) = 13.00, p<0.001).  Consistent with this finding, 61% of the informants were entirely 
negative in their written accounts, compared with only 31% of the participants.  The 
responses of those with the condition were more nuanced than those of the informants: they 
were more likely than the informants to present ‘mixed’ responses, identifying both benefits 
and disadvantages in relation to decision-making (62% and 29%, respectively). 
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Figure 2.4 Perceived interference and benefits from ASCs on decision-making 
 
a) Participants with an ASC (n = 120) 
 
 
b) Family members and support workers of adults with an ASC (n = 52) 
 
____________________ 
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of responses to two questions about how often ASCs can help and interfere 
with decision-making.  The distribution of responses indicates that both groups perceived that ASCs were more 
often a hindrance than a help with decision-making.   
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Despite the generally negative view of the effects of ASCs on decision-making, a number of 
benefits were identified.  Participants with ASCs described how their condition assisted them 
in developing strategies for decision-making (8 participants), applying logic (15 participants), 
considering details and gathering information (15 participants), and choosing options without 
concern for the opinions of others (5 participants).  It was also thought that the strong values 
they held as people with ASCs helped to guide their decision-making (21 participants).  The 
same benefits were also identified, albeit less frequently, by the informants. 
 
Some of these benefits, however, were also perceived as disadvantages.  For example, the 
tendency to adhere rigidly to strategies could be detrimental in situations where rules could 
not be applied (4 participants, 2 informants), while attempting to apply logic could frustrate 
decision-making in situations where information was missing (4 participants).  In addition, 
the tendency to analyse information thoroughly was associated with reports that decision-
making could be slow and overwhelming (4 participants), while strong values could impede 
the consideration of other factors and frustrate decision-making when involving other people 
with different values (3 participants).  For some participants (10 with ASCs, 3 informants), 
the advantages described were specific to particular situations and were presented alongside 
more widespread difficulties with decision-making. 
 
2.3.4 Support with decision-making 
A few of the participants described ways in which their ability to make decisions had been, or 
could be, supported.  These were: having patience and understanding from those around them 
(2 participants); making decisions in an environment with minimal distractions (1 
participant); and discussing decisions with trusted people (1 participant).  Successful 
strategies reported by informants were: presenting the person with an ASC with clear, narrow 
options (2 informants), providing plenty of time for the decision (1 informant), and providing 
reassurance that he or she would be able to make the particular decision (3 informants). 
 
2.4 Summary of findings 
The findings from this exploratory study suggest that decision-making is perceived as 
difficult and burdensome by many of the participants with ASCs.  While some benefits are 
identified, these are, in certain situations, ‘double-edged’.  The responses of the informants 
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were in general consistent with the responses of the participants with ASCs.  However, the 
informants tended to view the impact of ASCs on decision-making more negatively than the 
participants with ASCs. 
 
2.5 Discussion   
This exploratory study was carried out to establish whether an empirical study of decision-
making in ASCs would be worthwhile, and, if so, which aspects of decision-making could be 
the focus for such a study. 
 
Consistent with the literature reviewed in Chapter 1, the findings from this study suggest that 
decision-making can be particularly difficult for some adults with ASCs.  Decision-making 
was associated with anxiety, feelings of limited confidence, exhaustion and fatigue, and a 
tendency to avoid decision-making.  Specific difficulties related to: i) problems engaging in 
decision-making, for example having a tendency to make choices on the basis of previous 
actions, and: ii) problems in reaching decisions, for example, being unduly influenced by a 
desire to avoid uncertainty, slowness in decision-making, and a tendency to excessively 
gather information.  In addition, a significant number of participants reported that they found 
decision-making difficult because they were fearful of being judged negatively by others.  In 
some cases, these difficulties appeared to be extreme.  The phrase ‘analysis paralysis’, used 
by one participant to describe a complete breakdown of the decision-making process, 
appeared to capture the experiences of many.  While some benefits of the condition were 
identified (for example, a tendency to apply logic and to thoroughly analyse information), 
these benefits could be ‘double-edged’ and in other situations frustrate decision-making. 
 
The difficulties reported are consistent with previous autobiographical accounts, known 
features of the condition, and previous studies of decision-making in ASCs.  For example, the 
reports of mental ‘freezing’ and taking a long time to make decisions are consistent with 
Temple Grandin’s description of the decision-making process becoming ‘locked up’ 
(Grandin, 2000).  Problems in foreseeing consequences, remembering information, and 
staying focused on the decision are consistent with known impairments in executive functions 
(Hill, 2004a), while reports of bias from special interests are consistent with clinical accounts 
(Woodbury-Smith et al., 2010).  Finally, the reports of exhaustion are consistent with the 
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finding that people with ASCs demonstrate reduced reliance on a heuristic normally used to 
reduce the cognitive demands of decision-making (De Martino et al., 2008). 
 
The difficulties reported by the informants were generally similar to those reported by the 
participants with ASCs themselves, but were more negative (for example, identifying fewer 
benefits of the condition).  Such differences may simply reflect the different perspectives of 
the two groups of participants, but may also reflect variations in the sample populations: a 
greater proportion of the participants with ASCs had achieved higher education qualifications 
and had diagnoses of higher-functioning ASCs (HFA and AS) rather than autism.  
Consequently, the insights from the two groups are not directly comparable, and, for this 
reason, they were analysed separately.  From a methodological perspective, the study would 
have been improved by obtaining matched responses from family members of the participants 
with ASCs.  However, the recruitment of independent groups permitted us to obtain a larger 
sample size than would otherwise have been possible.  
 
There are other limitations of this study.  First, it was not possible to confirm the diagnoses of 
the participants.  To resolve this as best as possible, only participants reporting diagnosis by a 
relevantly qualified practitioner were included in the study.  Secondly, given the known ratio 
of men to women with ASCs (see Hill, 2004b), a disproportionately large number of the 
respondents were women.  An equal gender ratio, however, is not unique to this study (see, 
for example, Barnes, Lombardo, Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen, 2009).  Thirdly, the survey 
was limited by its self-report nature.  However, the use of self-reported information is 
commonplace in psychological research, and has been found to provide valuable insights into 
the experiences of people with ASCs (for example, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
Martin & Clubley, 2001; Hill, Berthoz & Frith, 2004).  Furthermore, the broad agreement 
between the participants and informants provides some evidence of the reliability of the 
perceptions reported by the participants with ASCs.  Finally, since there was no control 
group, the study does not provide information about whether the experiences reported are 
unique to people with ASCs; the specificity of the experiences reported is indicated only by 
the perceptions of family members and support workers. 
 
Despite these limitations, the findings from this exploratory study are consistent with 
fragmentary evidence from the literature relating to decision-making for people with ASCs, 
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and suggest that further research on decision-making in ASCs would be worthwhile.  
Moreover, they highlight a number of areas for future research, which include:  
 
 the experiences of decision-making of people with ASCs; 
 speed of decision-making; 
 anxiety levels during decision-making; 
 flexibility in decision-making; 
 tendency to gather information and avoid uncertainty 
 avoidance of decision-making; 
 the effects of special interests on decision-making; 
 logic in decision-making; 
 reliance on heuristics in decision-making;  
 confidence in decision-making; and 
 the relationship between executive functions and decision-making performance in 
ASCs. 
 
The methods available for empirical assessment of decision-making, and the selection of 
research areas for the subsequent experimental study, are discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
This chapter reviews the main approaches used in the study of decision-making and considers 
the areas of decision-making that will form the focus of this research.  The specific research 
questions and methods used in this thesis are then described in detail. 
 
3.1 Current approaches to the study of decision-making 
Previous research in decision-making has led to the development of at least four distinct 
paradigms.  The first of these involves the use of questionnaires to identify personal 
characteristics (e.g. cognitive styles) that can influence decision-making (e.g. Frost & Shows, 
1993; Scott & Bruce, 1995; Mann, Burnett, Radford & Ford, 1997).  Typically, questionnaire 
items describe behaviours or feelings that may be experienced during decision-making and 
these are rated by the respondent using Likert or Likert-type scales.  This approach has 
provided information about the broad strategies that people tend to rely on to make different 
types of decisions (e.g. The Melbourne Decision-Making Questionnaire, Janis & Mann, 1977, 
and the General Decision Making Style inventory, Scott & Bruce, 1995), as well as patterns 
of individual differences in decision-making (e.g. Shiloh, Koren & Zakay, 2001).  The 
advantages of this approach are that questionnaires are feasible for use with large samples 
and provide insight into real-life experiences across a range of contexts; clear limitations of 
the approach are that the use of questionnaires depends upon participants’ ability to self-
report, which may, among other things, be influenced by the perceived social desirability of 
the response options, memory, or a bias towards extreme responses (see Paulhus & Vazire, 
2007; van de Mortel, 2008).  It is also difficult to determine the validity of the responses 
without observing the behaviours in the context they were reported (Kagan, 2007).  
 
A second approach involves the use of vignettes to present specific decision situations.  
Typically, participants are asked to imagine themselves in the situation and describe the 
action that they would take.  This approach has proved valuable in the study of decision-
making capacity (e.g. Grisso, Appelbaum, Mulvey & Fletcher, 1995; Marson et al., 1996; 
Wong et al., 2000; Suto, Clare, Holland & Watson, 2005b), where participants’ 
understanding, retaining, and weighing of the information has been assessed.  The main 
strengths of this approach are that the decisions have a ‘real’ context and can capture the 
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complexity encountered in real life.  It is also possible to tailor the vignettes to resemble 
closely a particular situation faced by the participants at the time (e.g. consent to treatment, 
Wong et al., 2000).  A disadvantage of this approach is that vignettes can require an ability to 
imagine being in the situation, unless they have been constructed to resemble a situation 
actually faced by the person.  Another disadvantage is that the decisions presented are very 
specific, which can make it difficult to generalise the findings to other situations (although 
this specificity is crucial in research assessing decision-making capacity).  In addition, the 
decisions can usually be presented only once, and this limits the potential of the approach for 
use in studies assessing neuropsychological and biological processes in decision-making, in 
which the measurement of multiple responses is often required. 
 
A third approach is the use of laboratory-based tasks, which have been developed to study the 
cognitive and neurobiological processes involved in decision-making.  The decisions are 
often presented visually on a computer and participants are asked to make choices involving 
explicit or implicit probabilistic information.  The use of these tasks has contributed greatly 
to understanding of the neuropsychological basis of decision-making deficits in different 
conditions (for example, frontal brain damage, Bechara et al., 1994; Manes et al., 2002), and 
a number of tasks have been developed to assess specific processes in decision-making.  
These include the Iowa Gambling Task  (IGT, Bechara et al., 1994, 1999), which was 
developed to assess learning and emotional processing in decision-making, and the 
Information Sampling Task (IST, Clark, Robbins, Ersche & Sahakian, 2006), which was 
developed to assess the tendency to gather and evaluate information prior to making a 
decision.  The number of tasks has increased in recent years as researchers modify existing 
tasks for new investigations (for example, the Hungry Donkey Task, Crone & Van der 
Molen, 2004, which is a version of the IGT adapted for children), or create novel tasks (for 
example, Delay Discounting Tasks, Steinberg et al., 2009) to assess different processes in 
decision-making.  Mathematical models of component processes that may contribute to 
decision-making on these tasks are also burgeoning, such as the Expectancy-Valence 
Learning model (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002), which attempts to quantify the separate 
influences of learning and motivation on the Iowa Gambling Task, and the Utility-Caution 
model (Zhao & Costello, 2007), which attempts to quantify the development of perceived 
utility of the options and an emotional response to the outcomes of consecutive choices.  The 
main advantages of this approach are that the tasks may be presented visually, thereby 
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reducing the requirement for imagination, and the simple decisions can be manipulated to 
capture generic features of real-life decisions (for example, risk, delay-based reward, or 
uncertainty, see Cavedini, Gorini & Bellodi, 2006; Salmond et al., 2006).  The ease of 
manipulation also makes it possible to present the decisions multiple times, and as a result 
they can be suitable stimuli for investigating biological processes in decision-making, and for 
obtaining reliable measures of latency.  The main disadvantages of this approach are that the 
decisions lack ecological validity and that motivation can decrease when several trials are 
required. 
 
A fourth approach involves the use of quick, quiz-type questions, constructed to identify 
systematic deviations from ‘rational’ decision-making.  This paradigm has provided 
information about specific psychological strategies that are commonly used to tackle complex 
decisions encountered in real life (for example, the use of heuristic short-cuts to make 
decisions, Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman et al., 1982).  The advantages are that the 
questions are feasible for use with large samples and a number of questions assessing 
different strategies have been developed.  A disadvantage is that large samples are required to 
assess group differences. 
 
3.2 Research areas and methods for the experimental investigation 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 1 and the findings of the initial survey identified a number 
of areas that may be relevant for understanding decision-making in ASCs.  It was therefore 
necessary to select a number of research areas that might feasibly be explored within a PhD 
project. 
 
The first area selected considered experiences of decision-making.  Since the initial survey 
did not involve a control group, it was important that the experimental study should include 
an assessment of whether the profile of self-reported experiences of decision-making was 
different for people with ASCs compared to those in the general population. 
 
Other research areas were selected to establish whether the experiences reported in the initial 
survey were consistent with behaviour and psychophysiology measured on established 
laboratory tests of decision-making.  The choice of areas to study is then influenced by the 
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range of standardised tests of decision-making that are available.  Since a number of tests are 
able to assess: i) flexibility and risk-taking in decision-making; ii) tendencies to gather 
information prior to making decisions; and iii) the speed of decision-making, these aspects of 
decision-making were selected for the experimental study.  Assessment of anxiety in 
decision-making was also considered important, given the prominence of anxiety in the 
survey reports. 
 
Finally, two other research areas were selected because of their potential to account for some 
of the particular difficulties described by the survey participants with ASCs.  The first area 
was motivation in decision-making.  This relates to one of the few previous studies of 
decision-making in ASCs (Johnson et al., 2006, see Section 1.5.4), which suggested that 
differences in motivational processes exist.  However, the result found by Johnson et al. only 
approached significance and the authors concluded that their sample size had been too small 
to detect a significant difference.  The findings of their study indicated that people with ASCs 
may be influenced more by negative outcomes than those in the general population.  If this is 
the case, increased attention to negative outcomes in ASCs could account for the decision-
related anxiety reported by participants with ASCs (see Fowles, 1987), as well as their dislike 
of uncertainty (see Yechiam et al., 2005). 
 
The second of these additional research areas concerns whether the reports of exhaustion and 
mental overload in the initial survey can be attributed to a reduced reliance on heuristics in 
decision-making.  Heuristics are general strategies (‘short-cuts’) that are used to simplify 
some of the complex mental processes involved in decision-making (see Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  Reduced reliance on a particular heuristic was demonstrated in a previous 
study of decision-making in ASCs (De Martino et al., 2008, see Section 1.5.4), although 
reliance on other types of heuristics is unknown.  
 
The specific research questions are presented in the following section. 
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3.3 Specific research questions 
This thesis aims to develop our understanding of the effects of ASCs on decision-making by 
addressing seven main research questions.  The questions below define the scope of this 
investigation.   
 
Compared to participants from the general population: 
 
1. Do participants with ASCs experience decision-making differently? 
2. Do participants with ASCs demonstrate different flexibilities and greater caution in 
their decision-making? 
3. Do participants with ASCs gather more information prior to making a decision?  
4. Do participants with ASCs take longer to make decisions? 
5. Are participants with ASCs more aroused when making decisions? 
6. Do participants with ASCs demonstrate differences in motivational processes in 
decision-making? 
7. Do participants with ASCs demonstrate reduced reliance on heuristics to make 
decisions? 
 
Together, these questions address: i) whether the profile of self-reported experiences 
distinguishes participants with ASCs from control participants; ii) whether the experiences 
reported are consistent with behaviour measured by established neuropsychological tests of 
decision-making; and iii) whether there are differences in the decision-making processes of 
people with ASCs that can account for some of the difficulties they described.   
 
3.4 Methods used in this investigation 
The measures used in this investigation are summarised in Table 3.1.  Each measure is then 
described in detail. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of measures and the research areas they address 
 
3.4.1 Adapted questionnaire of decision-making experiences 
The questionnaire used in the initial survey was adapted by removing the items requesting 
unstructured accounts and by introducing three additional Likert-type questions.  These 
changes significantly reduced the time required to complete the questionnaire and provided 
an opportunity to explore three issues identified as particularly problematic by the 
participants of the initial survey.  These were: a) mental ‘freezing’ during decision-making 
(‘analysis paralysis’); b) taking a long time to make decisions; and c) feeling exhausted by 
decision-making.  This version of the questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix D. 
 
3.4.2 General Decision Making Style Inventory (GDMS) 
The General Decision Making Style Inventory (GDMS) is a measure of five different, but not 
mutually exclusive, styles of decision-making.  The measure was developed by Scott & 
Bruce (1995), and has good construct validity (Loo, 2000, Thunholm, 2004).  Decision-
making style is considered to be a habitual response pattern to a decision situation but also 
depends on cognitive abilities such as information processing, self-evaluation and self-
regulation (Scott & Bruce, 1995; Thunholm, 2004).  The five styles of decision-making 
indexed by the measure are shown in Table 3.2.  This measure of decision-making style was 
selected over the questionnaire developed by Mann et al. (1997) because it provides a 
Research area Measures Type of measure 
Self-reported 
experiences 
Adapted questionnaire of decision-making 
experiences 
Questionnaire 
General Decision Making Style inventory (GDMS) Questionnaire 
Behaviour and 
physiological 
characteristics 
Cambridge Gamble Task (CGT) Laboratory task  
Information Sampling Task (IST) Laboratory task  
Adapted Risky Choice Task (RCT) Laboratory task  
Decision-making 
processes 
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) Laboratory task  
Heuristic demonstrations Quiz-like questions 
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measure of the tendency to avoid decision-making, which was identified as an issue in the 
initial survey. 
 
Table 3.2 Description of decision-making styles indexed by the GDMS 
 
General Decision 
Making Style 
Defining characteristics 
Rational Comprehensive search for information and logical evaluation of alternatives  
Intuitive Attention to salient details and reliance on feelings 
Dependent Search for advice and support from others  
Avoidant Avoidance of decision-making wherever possible 
Spontaneous Completion of the decision-making process as quickly as possible 
 
The questionnaire presents 25 statements about how people might go about making important 
decisions.  Participants indicate their agreement to the statements using a five-point Likert 
scale, ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’.  
 
3.4.3 Cambridge Gamble Task (CGT) 
The Cambridge Gamble Task (CGT, Rogers et al., 1999) assesses speed, risk-taking and 
flexibility of decision-making.  It is considered to be a task of decision-making ‘under risk’ 
(see Brand et al., 2007) because participants are presented with explicit information about the 
values of the choices and the expected probability of their occurrence.  This information is 
presented visually on a computer screen.  It is an established test of decision-making that has 
been used successfully with participants in a number of clinical groups (see Rahman, 
Sahakian, Hodges, Rogers & Robbins, 1999; Manes et al., 2002; Chamberlain et al., 2007; 
DeVito et al., 2008; Lawrence, Luty, Bogdan, Sahakian & Clark, 2009).   
 
The CGT is part of the Cambridge Neuropsychological Test Automated Battery (CANTAB) 
and is presented on a touch-screen computer (Paceblade Slimbook 110 series).  Participants 
are presented with a ten boxes, each of which is coloured red or blue.  The ratio of red to blue 
boxes differs on each trial (72 trials) from 9:1 to 1:9.  Participants are told that the computer 
has hidden a yellow token beneath one of the boxes and their task is to guess the colour of the 
box that is hiding the token.  Participants indicate their choice by touching the word ‘red’ or 
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‘blue’, which is displayed beneath the row of boxes.  Once they have chosen, they are then 
asked to bet a proportion of their points (5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, or 95%) on their choice being 
correct.  The available bets are presented 2.5 seconds apart in ascending or descending order, 
depending on the condition of the task (participants complete the task in both conditions, with 
the order of the conditions counterbalanced across participants).  Participants are asked to try 
to win as many points as possible.  The task display is shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1 Screen display for the CGT  
 
75
Blue Red
Points 100
 
Produced with permission from Cambridge Cognition Ltd. 
The four principal outcome measures of the CGT are: i) deliberation time, which is the time 
taken for the participant to choose which colour of box is hiding the token; ii) risk-
adjustment, which  quantifies the tendency of participants to bet a greater proportion of points 
in response to more favourable box ratios (a type of flexibility); iii) delay aversion, which 
quantifies the tendency to choose the bets presented earlier rather than later in the trial 
(another type of flexibility); and iii) risk-taking (i.e. the overall proportion of points bet). 
 
3.4.4 Information Sampling Task (IST) 
The Information Sampling Task (IST, Clark et al., 2006) is also part of the CANTAB.  This 
task provides a measure of the tendency to gather information prior to making a decision, as 
well as the time taken to make a decision.  Like the CGT, the IST is a task of decision-
making ‘under risk’, and is a well-established measure that has been used successfully with a 
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number of clinical groups (see Clark et al., 2006; Chamberlain et al., 2007; DeVito et al., 
2008; Clark, Roiser, Robbins & Sahakian, 2009; Lawrence et al., 2009).  The information 
relevant to the decisions is presented visually on the touch-screen computer screen.   
 
In the IST, participants are presented with a 5  5 array of grey boxes, behind each of which 
is one of two hidden colours.  The participants are instructed to open (by pressing) a box to 
reveal its colour, and to open as many boxes as they wish before deciding which of the two 
colours is in the majority.  Participants indicate their decision by pressing one of the two 
coloured panels at the bottom of the screen.  The task is presented ten times in each of two 
conditions: i) a Fixed Win condition, in which the total number of points available for a 
correct decision is 100, regardless of how many boxes are opened; and ii) a Decreasing Win 
condition, in which the total number of points available for a correct decision starts at 250 
and decreases by 10 points with every box that is opened.  In both conditions, the cost of an 
incorrect decision is 100 points.  The order of the two conditions is counterbalanced across 
participants.  The task display is shown in Figure 3.2. 
  
Figure 3.2 Screen display for the IST 
 
Win 200
Lose 100
 
Produced with permission from Cambridge Cognition Ltd. 
The principal outcome measures for the IST are: i) the mean number of boxes opened; ii) the 
mean probability that the decision made will be correct; and ii) the mean time taken to open 
the boxes and make the final decision.  
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3.4.5 Adapted Risky Choice Task (RCT) 
The Risky Choice Task (RCT, Rogers et al., 2003) assesses flexibility and risk-taking 
behaviour by presenting decisions with different probabilities of winning and losing.  The 
paradigm was first used to investigate the effects of tryptophan depletion on reward cue 
processing in healthy volunteers, and was subsequently adapted to investigate flexibility, 
risk-taking, and susceptibility to ‘framing’ (the affect heuristic) in adolescents with Conduct 
Disorder (Fairchild et al., 2009).  This task was selected because it provides an opportunity to 
measure behaviours identified as potentially significant for people with ASCs compared to 
the general population (see Section 1.5.4 and Section 2.3.2.1), and because the task could be 
modified to assess levels of arousal during decision-making.  For this project, the task was 
adapted by creating a new condition, in which participants were not required to make a 
choice, but were informed that the computer would make the decision on their behalf.  
Arousal related to decision-making (measured using the galvanic skin response) was then 
quantified by comparing levels of arousal in the two conditions. 
 
In the version of the task used in this project, participants are presented with two on-screen 
‘roulette’ wheels, each with eight segments showing the number of points that will be won or 
lost if a ‘spin’ of the wheel selects that segment (see Figure 3.3). 
 
Figure 3.3 Example of two ‘roulette’ wheels presented on the RCT 
-20
-20
-20
-20
-20
-20
+80
+80
+10
+10
+10
+10
-10
-10
-10
-10
 
Participants are then given four seconds to select, by key press, one of the wheels on which 
they wish to gamble.  This wheel is then ‘spun’ and the outcome (the number of points on the 
segment that the ticker lands on) is presented.  One of the wheels always functions as a 
‘control wheel’ with a 0.5 chance of winning 10 points and a 0.5 chance of losing 10 points 
(Expected Value = 0).  The other wheel, the ‘experimental wheel’, presents different 
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probabilities of winning and losing points. The number of points and probability of a win are 
such that the difference in Expected Value (EV) between the two wheels varies 
systematically across eight trial types.  The wins, losses and differences in EV of the trial 
types are shown in Table 3.3. 
 
Two additional trial types, where both wheels have equal EVs, are also included to assess the 
effect of a ‘frame’ upon decision-making.  One of these trial types (the ‘gain’ frame) presents 
a wheel with a certain gain of 40 points (EV = 40) and a wheel with 0.5 chance of gaining 80 
points and a 0.5 chance of gaining 0 points (EV = 40)).  The other trial type (the ‘loss’ frame) 
presents a wheel with a certain loss of 40 points (EV = -40) and a wheel with a 0.5 chance of 
losing 80 points and a 0.5 chance of losing 0 points (EV = -40).  The framing effect was 
described by Tversky & Kahneman (1981), who demonstrated that participants in the general 
population are moderately risk-averse when considering possible gains and moderately risk-
taking when considering possible losses.   
 
Table 3.3 The ten trial types used in the RCT 
 
Trial 
type 
Experimental wheel Control wheel Difference in EV 
(ΔEV) between 
the two wheels 
P(Win)
1
 Win Loss EV P(Win) Win Loss EV 
1 0.25 20 -80 -55 0.50 10 -10 0 -55 
2 0.25 80 -80 -40 0.50 10 -10 0 -40 
3 0.25 20 -20 -10 0.50 10 -10 0 -10 
4 0.75 20 -80 -5 0.50 10 -10 0 -5 
5 0.25 80 -20 +5 0.50 10 -10 0 +5 
6 0.75 20 -20 +10 0.50 10 -10 0 +10 
7 0.75 80 -80 +40 0.50 10 -10 0 +40 
8 0.75 80 -20 +55 0.50 10 -10 0 +55 
9 0.50 0 -80 -40 0.00 0 -40 -40 0 (loss frame) 
10 0.50 80 0 +40 1.00 40 0 +40 0 (gain frame) 
 
  
                                                 
1
 P(Win) denotes the probability of a win 
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3.4.5.1 Adaptation of the RCT to study arousal in decision-making 
For this investigation, the RCT was adapted to assess group differences in electrodermal 
arousal (a physiological correlate of anxiety) during decision-making.  Two conditions were 
introduced: one where participants were instructed to make their own decision (‘decision’ 
condition) and the other where they were informed that the computer would make the 
decision for them (‘no decision’ condition).  Changes in arousal were then compared between 
the two conditions.  A schematic of a trial in the two conditions is shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
   
 
Figure 3.4 Schematic of conditions in the adapted RCT  
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Participants were presented with four blocks of 20 trials each.  The order of the trials was 
pseudo-random, with each trial type presented twice in each block, once in the ‘decision’ 
condition, and once in the ‘no decision’ condition.  The framing trials were an exception to 
this and were always presented in the ‘decision’ condition to provide sufficient behavioural 
data to assess the effect of the frame (see Fairchild et al., 2009).  The order of presentation of 
the four blocks was controlled using a Latin Squares counter-balancing system to reduce 
potential order effects.  Participants also received five practice trials to check that they 
understood the task and to reduce the effects of novelty on electrodermal arousal.  The total 
testing time, with a short break between each block, was approximately 40 minutes.  The task 
programme was adapted by Dr Mike Aitken (Department of Experimental Psychology, 
University of Cambridge) and executed using the Whisker Control System (Cardinal & 
Aitken, 2001).  The task instructions are reproduced in Appendix E. 
 
3.4.5.2 Measurement and interpretation of arousal 
Arousal was measured using skin conductance (SC).  Briefly, SC is a measure of the 
electrical resistance of the skin, which is modulated by small changes in sweating associated 
with arousal.  SC is recorded by passing an electrical current between two electrodes placed 
on the surface of the skin, and the change in resistance is recorded.  Increases in SC to 
specific events are termed skin conductance responses (SCRs).  They are typically observed 1 
to 3 seconds after the event and have a half-recovery time ranging from 2 to 10 seconds 
(Dawson, Schell & Filion, 2000). 
 
SC increases during states of anxiety due to activation of the sympathetic nervous system 
(Geddes, Gray, Millar & Asbury, 1993; Court, Greenland & Margrain, 2008).  However, 
increases in SC may also reflect arousal associated with other cognitive and biological events, 
such as mental effort (e.g. Kahneman, Tursky, Shapriro & Crider, 1969).  For this reason, 
participants were asked to provide retrospective self-reports of anxiety and effort experienced 
during the task using visual analogue scales (see Appendix F) and pre-and post-test versions 
of the Spielberger State Anxiety Inventory (SSAI, Spielberger, Gorusch & Lushene, 1970).  
In the post-test version of the SSAI, participants were asked to complete the questions in 
relation to their feelings during the decisions (see Margrain, Greenland & Anderson, 2003), 
and the pre-test score was then subtracted from the post-test score (higher difference scores 
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indicating higher levels of anxiety during decision-making).  These measures were included 
to assist interpretation of changes in skin conductance.   
 
3.4.5.3 Task design implications for the measurement of SCRs 
The inter-trial interval was set at 9-seconds to ensure that event-related changes in SC were 
likely to have returned to normal before the start of the next trial.  Although half-recovery 
time for SCRs ranges from 2 to 10 seconds, this interval was chosen to allow substantial 
recovery of SC while creating a task of reasonable length to maintain participants’ interest 
(see, for example, Crone, Somsen, Van Beek & van der Molen, 2004). 
 
3.4.5.4 Skin conductance acquisition 
SC level was recorded continuously during the task using the MP150 system, SCL amplifier 
(GSR100C) and transducer (TSD203) (BIOPAC Systems Inc. Goleta, California) at a rate of 
200Hz.  The transducer was filled with isotonic electrode gel and attached to the distal 
phalanges of the index and middle fingers on the left hand.  Before the task, SC was recorded 
for 5 minutes while the participant rested.  This allowed the signal to settle and also provided 
information about each participant’s basal SC level.  During the task, the presenting computer 
sent digital markers to the acquisition computer to record the onset of events during each 
trial.  Data were analysed offline using AcqKnowledge 3.7.2 (BIOPAC Systems Inc.). 
 
3.4.6 Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) 
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT, Bechara et al., 1994) is a laboratory-based paradigm widely 
used to assess decision-making in people with clinical conditions (for review, see Section 
1.3.3).  Unlike the CGT, IST and RCT, it is a task of decision-making ‘under ambiguity’ (see 
Brand et al., 2007), because participants are not provided with explicit information about the 
values and expected probabilities of the response options.  The task was selected for use in 
this project because a previous study (Johnson et al., 2006, see Section 1.5.4) suggested that 
differences in motivational processes for decision-making on the IGT might be observed with 
a sufficiently large sample of participants with ASCs (for details of the power calculation, see 
Section 4.2.). 
 
In the IGT, participants make repeated selections from four decks of cards in order to win as 
much money as possible.  Unbeknownst to participants, two of the decks are weighted with 
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large wins and large losses in such a way that repeated selection from these decks leads to a 
net loss of money.  The other two decks are weighted with smaller wins but fewer and 
smaller losses so that repeated selections from these decks leads to a net gain of points.  
Successful performance on the IGT depends upon learning these contingencies and making 
more selections from the two advantageous decks.  The contingencies used in this version of 
the task are shown in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4 Contingency scheme for the IGT as used by Bechara et al. (1994) 
 
Deck Win Lose 
Net profit over 
10 trials 
A 
$50 every card 
$50 with probability 
1∕2 
+$250 
B $250 with probability 
1∕10 
C 
$100 every card 
$150, 200, 250, 300 or 350 each with probability 
1∕10 
-$250 
D $1250 with probability 
1∕10 
 
Performance is measured in five consecutive blocks of twenty trials each.  Overall 
performance on the IGT is measured as the change in the proportion of advantageous 
selections in each block during the course of the task. 
 
In this study, the IGT was presented on a computer and participants used a cordless optical 
mouse to select the cards.  The instructions read to participants were the same as those used 
by Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Lee (1999) and are reproduced in Appendix G.  In addition 
to these instructions, participants were informed that they would receive some real money at 
the end of the game depending on how well they had scored.  This was to maintain their 
motivation.  Due to ethical considerations, the payment schedule was designed so that both 
groups of participants had an equal chance of remuneration.  Scores of up to $5500 were 
rewarded with £2.00 and scores of over $5500 (an extremely unlikely score) were rewarded 
with £3.00.  Negative scores were remunerated with £2.00 for ‘having a good go’.  
 
3.4.6.1 The Expectancy-Valence Learning (EVL) model 
According to Busemeyer & Stout (2002), individual choice patterns on the IGT depend on at 
least three factors: a) a motivational factor (the tendency to be attracted by gains and 
indifferent to losses); b) a learning-rate (cognitive) factor (the tendency to be influenced by 
recent outcomes and to forget or discount past outcomes); and c) a response factor (the 
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tendency to make choices erratically due to factors such as fatigue or boredom).  These 
factors can be quantified using the Expectancy-Valence Learning (EVL) model (Busemeyer 
& Stout, 2002).  This is a mathematical model that yields estimates for three parameters, 
which relate to these three factors.  Comparison of the distributions of these parameters 
between groups may provide an explanation for any observed differences in performance on 
the IGT. 
 
Briefly, the model assumes that after each trial, the decision-maker experiences an affective 
reaction to the outcome, termed valence.  This is calculated as a weighted average of the 
salience of all of the wins and losses experienced up to that point.  The salience depends on 
an attention weight parameter (denoted w) that ranges from 0 to 1.  A value of 0 characterises 
a decision-maker greatly attracted to wins and indifferent to losses, and a value of 1 
characterises a decision-maker with a strong aversion to loss. 
 
In a second part of the model, decision-makers are assumed to develop expectancies about 
the valence that will be experienced by making a selection from each deck.  These 
expectancies depend upon a learning/memory parameter (denoted a), which also ranges from 
0 to 1.  A value of 0 reflects a small but persistent influence of information acquired over a 
long span of trials, whereas a value of 1 reflects strong recency effects and discounting of 
information from more distant trials. 
 
Finally, the model assumes that the participants’ choice of deck for each trial depends on the 
expectancies generated for each deck and the consistency with which they make use of these 
expectancies.  The response consistency parameter (denoted c) is estimated by assuming that 
the probability of choosing a given deck on trial t is determined by: i) the strength of the 
expectancy for that deck relative to the sum of those for the other decks, and ii) an additional 
variable controlling the consistency between choices and expectancies.  This additional 
variable is determined by assuming that response consistency increases with experience 
according to a defined power function.  The resulting estimate of the response consistency 
parameter ranges from –5 to +5.  A value of +5 reflects consistent application of the 
expectancies assigned to each of the decks, whereas a value of –5 reflects random selection. 
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In this investigation, estimates of the three parameters in the EVL model were calculated 
using a Matlab code provided by Dr Elad Yechiam (Technion, Israel Institute of 
Technology).   
 
3.4.7 Heuristics questions 
To assess the extent to which people with ASCs rely on heuristics to make decisions, six 
short, quiz-like questions, well established in psychological research, were presented to the 
participants.  The questions selected were demonstrations of reliance on the 
Representativeness, Availability, and Anchoring-Adjustment heuristics, which are three of the 
most well known cognitive biases in decision-making (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  In 
addition, susceptibility to the traditional ‘framing effect’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) was 
assessed, given recent evidence that the framing effect is underpinned by an Affect heuristic 
(De Martino et al., 2006), which is disrupted in ASCs (De Martino et al., 2008).  To ensure 
that the results would not be affected by the specific difficulties people with ASCs have with 
social understanding and mentalising (see Baron-Cohen, 1995), none of the questions 
involved making judgments about people.  The questions selected are reproduced in 
Appendix H; however, a brief description of the theory underlying each demonstration is 
presented here.  To control for possible order effects, the presentation order of the six 
questions was randomised. 
 
3.4.7.1 Demonstration of the Representativeness heuristic 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the Representativeness heuristic is a tendency to evaluate the 
probability of an event by the degree to which the event resembles the general population.  
Specifically, events that appear more representative of the general population are judged as 
more likely to occur than events that are less representative (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972).  
As a result, judgments made using the Representativeness heuristic are insensitive to 
information that should have an effect on judgment, such as the role of chance, and the size 
of the sample. 
 
The two questions selected to assess reliance on Representativeness were developed by 
Kahneman & Tversky (1972).  The first question asks participants to judge how many 
families of six children in a city have the birth order ‘Boy Girl Boy Boy Boy Boy’, given that 
72 families have the birth order ‘Girl Boy Girl Boy Boy Girl’.  Although both birth orders are 
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equally likely, they are not equally representative of the proportions of men and women in the 
population, and, as a result, most people judge that the number of families is less than 72.  
The second question asks participants to judge whether the number of days on which more 
than 60% of babies born are boys is greater in a small hospital (about 15 babies born each 
day), a large hospital (about 45 babies born each day), or equally likely in both.  Although 
variation about the mean reduces as sample size increases, most people erroneously judge the 
number of days to be equally likely in both hospitals.  This is because the judgment is made 
by attending to the wrong information: the similarity (representativeness) of the proportions 
(60% boys) to the corresponding parameter in the general population (50% boys).  The 
effects of the sample size on variation about the mean are not considered (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). 
 
To reduce the possibility of a response bias, the order of the response options for the small 
and large hospitals was counterbalanced across participants.  The response option for equal 
likelihood was kept in the third position, since it is analogous with the response option, 
‘neither of the above’.  
 
3.4.7.2 Demonstration of the Availability heuristic 
The Availability heuristic is the tendency to evaluate the probability of an event, by the ease 
with which examples of that event can be brought to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
While this is often a useful heuristic, its use can result in bias where the response options 
differ in their ‘imaginability’, or the effectiveness of a technique to search for examples. 
 
The two questions selected to assess reliance on this heuristic were developed by Tversky & 
Kahneman (1973).  The first question presented participants with a diagram of X’s and O’s in 
6x6 grid, and asks them to consider the number of paths of X’s and O’s that could be drawn 
by starting with a symbol at the top row, ending with a symbol on the bottom row, and 
passing through exactly one symbol (X or O) in each row.  The grid is shown in Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5 Tversky and Kahneman’s 1973 demonstration of the Availability heuristic 
 
X    X    O    X    X    X 
X    X    X    X    O    X 
X    O    X    X    X    X 
X    X    X    O    X    X 
X    X    X    X    X    O 
O    X    X    X    X    X 
 
Participants are asked to judge whether there are more paths containing five X’s and one O, 
or more paths containing six X’s and no O’s.  Since the diagram contains five times as many 
X’s as O’s, there are more paths containing six X’s.  However, most people judge that there 
are more paths containing five X’s and  one O as the only paths immediately visible (those 
going vertically from top to bottom) all contain five X’s and one O.  All other paths require 
the mental realisation that other paths may be constructed by linking symbols in different 
columns.  In this example, the wrong answer is often selected due to the ease of 
imaginability.  The order of response options was counterbalanced across participants. 
 
The second question asks participants to judge whether the letter ‘r’ appears more frequently 
in the first or third position of words (of three letters or more) in the English language.  The 
letter ‘r’ occurs more frequently in the third position; however, most people judge the letter 
‘r’ to occur more often in the first position.  This is because it is much easier to call to mind 
words beginning with a letter than words with the letter in the third position.  This is an 
example of a response bias due to the effectiveness of a search set.  The order of the response 
options was counterbalanced across participants. 
 
3.4.7.3 Demonstration of the Anchoring-Adjustment heuristic 
The Anchoring-Adjustment heuristic describes the tendency to make judgments using one 
value as a reference point (an ‘anchor’) and adjusting that value to produce an estimate.  
Estimates made in this way, however, are often biased towards the value of the anchor due to 
insufficient adjustment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  The demonstration selected for use in 
this study was developed by Bar-Hillel (1973).  It shows how insufficient adjustment from an 
initial reference point can result in bias in the evaluation of the probability of conjunctive and 
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disjunctive events.  Conjunctive events are events with an outcome that must occur at every 
stage of a process, and disjunctive events are events in which an outcome can occur at any 
stage of a process. 
 
In this task, participants are asked to choose between two gambles, one of which is a ‘simple’ 
gamble (e.g. drawing a red marble from a bag containing 50% red marbles), and the other is 
either a ‘conjunctive’ gamble (e.g. drawing a red marble seven times in a row, with 
replacement, from a bag containing 90% red marbles) or a ‘disjunctive’ gamble (e.g. drawing 
a red marble at least once in seven draws, with replacement, from a bag containing 10% red 
marbles).  Here, the probability of winning the simple gamble is 0.5 and the probability of 
winning the conjunctive gamble is 0.478.  Nevertheless, most people prefer the conjunctive 
gamble over the simple by insufficiently adjusting the 90% probability of the single event to 
the 48% probability of the event occurring four times in a row.  Conversely, most people 
prefer the simple gamble to the disjunctive by insufficiently adjusting the 10% probability of 
the single event to the 52% probability of the event occurring on any one of seven trials. 
 
In the original study, Bar-Hillel presented each participant with four trials (randomly selected 
from 20 different trial types) in the simple vs. conjunctive condition, and four trials 
(randomly selected from 10 different trial types) in the simple vs. disjunctive condition.  They 
found that the trial types eliciting the strongest bias were those with an extreme proportion 
(e.g. 90% or 10% red marbles) in one of the bags.  To reduce the length of task, participants 
in the present study were shown only the three trial types in each condition that had produced 
the most consistent bias in the original study (at least 75% of the participants demonstrating a 
bias).  Although the paradigm has not been adapted in this way before, the results presented 
by Bar-Hillel suggest that that each of these trials provide an independent demonstration of 
anchoring-adjustment, and single trials are often presented as an example of the heuristic 
(see, for example, Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  For each trial in the present study, 
participants were presented with a summary of the two gambles on two separate cards.  The 
cards provided information about: i) the number of red and white marbles in each bag; ii) the 
chance of drawing a red marble at each step (presented as a percentage), and; iii) in the 
compound and disjunctive gambles, the number of times needed to draw successfully.  The 
order of the trials and the two conditions were fully counterbalanced across participants.  The 
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left-right position of the cards was also counter-balanced to control for an effect of the order 
of presentation of the two gambles.  
 
3.4.7.4 Demonstration of the ‘framing effect’ 
The ‘framing effect’ occurs when preference for a particular option can be changed by 
presenting the same options in different formats (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  In a series of 
experiments, Tversky & Kahneman (1981), demonstrated how choices worded to concentrate 
on the gains often produced risk-averse responses, and choices worded to concentrate on loss 
often produced risk-seeking choices.  There is evidence that this effect is mediated by an 
emotional response to the language of the frame, which guides preference (De Martino et al., 
2006).  Here, the framing effect is assessed using one of the questions developed by Tversky 
& Kahneman (1981).  The question was presented to each participant in both the ‘gain’ and 
the ‘loss’ versions.  The order of presentation of the two frames was counterbalanced. 
 
3.4.8 Summary of the selected paradigms 
The selected paradigms, and the research questions they will address, are shown in Table 3.5. 
 
 
   
 
Table 3.5 Summary of experimental paradigms used in this investigation and the specific research questions they will address 
Area of 
research 
Research questions 
(Compared to the general population:) 
Tasks 
Survey GDMS CGT IST RCT IGT Heuristics 
Self-reported 
experiences 
Do participants with ASCs experience decision-making 
differently?  
  
 
 
 
    
 
Behaviour and 
physiological 
characteristics 
Do participants with ASCs demonstrate different flexibilities 
and greater caution in decision-making? 
 
 
 
      
Do participants with ASCs gather more information prior to 
making decisions? 
 
 
 
      
Do participants with ASCs take longer to make decisions? 
 
 
 
      
Are participants with ASCs more aroused when making 
decisions? 
 
 
 
      
Decision-
making 
processes 
Do participants with ASCs demonstrate differences in 
motivational processes in decision-making? 
 
 
 
      
Do people with ASCs demonstrate reduced reliance on 
heuristics to make decisions? 
 
 
 
      
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3.5 Measurement of individual characteristics 
In addition to the paradigms described above, several measures of individual characteristics 
relevant to decision-making were obtained.  These provided an opportunity to assess the 
contribution of these characteristics to group differences in decision-making, and also to 
recruit groups of participants with similar verbal abilities. 
   
3.5.1 Intellectual ability 
Intellectual ability was assessed using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI, Wechsler, 1999).  This is a short, reliable measure providing scores of Verbal IQ, 
Performance IQ and Full-Scale IQ (VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ, respectively).  Scores are 
standardised around a general population mean of 100.  The WASI requires specific training 
to administer and takes approximately 40 minutes to complete.  Inter-rater reliability was 
established by double scoring 8 (10%) of the assessments by an independent rater.  The 
intraclass correlation coefficient was ri = 0.996. 
 
3.5.2 Planning ability 
Planning ability was assessed using the One-touch Stockings of Cambridge (OTS) task, 
which is part of the CANTAB.  This task was selected because it is quick to administer (10 
minutes) and has been shown to reveal ASC-related impairments in planning (see Ozonoff et 
al., 2004).  Participants are presented with two on-screen arrangements of coloured balls, and 
asked to work out the minimum number of moves required to make the bottom arrangement 
look like the top arrangement, by moving the balls in the bottom arrangement, one at a time, 
according to a set of rules.  Participants are presented with twenty problems of varying 
difficulty.  Performance is measured as the mean number problems solved, and the mean 
number of attempts to solve problems with a minimum of five moves (the hardest problems). 
 
3.5.3 Working Memory 
Working memory was assessed using the Digit Span test, which is part of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale –Third Edition (WAIS-III, Wechsler, 1997).  This measure was selected 
because it is reliable, quick to administer (5 minutes), and is not affected by individual 
differences in reading ability.  In the first part of the task, participants are read sequences of 
numbers of increasing length and asked to repeat each sequence immediately after its 
presentation.  In the second stage, participants are read different sequences of numbers and 
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asked to repeat each sequence backward.  The scores awarded for each sequence are summed 
to provide an overall score for each participant. 
 
3.5.4 Attention shifting 
Attention shifting was measured using the Intradimensional/Extradimensional shift (ID/ED) 
task, which is part of the CANTAB.  The task is short (10 minutes), easy to administer and 
more sensitive to ASC-related deficits in set-shifting than the similar Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Task (Heaton, Chelhune, Talley, Kay & Curtiss, 1993; Ozonoff, 1995; Hughes et al., 1999).  
Participants are presented with samples of stimuli consisting of coloured shapes and white 
lines.  Over a series of trials, they are provided with feedback to learn a rule for selecting the 
correct exemplar.  However, after six consecutive correct selections, the rule is changed and 
participants have to learn the new rule.  The task difficulty increases over eight stages: the 
earlier stages involve learning a new rule in the same ‘dimension’ as the previous stage 
(termed an ‘intradimensional shift’, for example, switching from one pink shape to the other 
pink shape); later in the task, participants have to learn a new rule in a different dimension 
(termed an ‘extradimensional shift’, for example, switching from the pink shape to one of the 
white lines).  Performance was measured as the number of errors made at the 
extradimensional shift stage of the task, since this is the stage that is sensitive to ASC-related 
impairments in attention shifting (Ozonoff et al., 2004).  The total number of errors (adjusted 
for any stages that were not passed) is also reported.  
 
3.5.5 Motor screening 
A task of motor screening (MOT) is a prerequisite of all the tasks administered using the 
CANTAB.  This task provides a demonstration of how the touch-screen should be used, as 
well as an indication of each participant’s motor speed.  Participants use the tip of the 
forefinger of their dominant hand to touch ten crosses as they appeared on the screen.  The 
task takes less than one minute to administer. 
 
3.5.6 Anxiety and Depression 
Anxiety and depression were measured using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
(HADS, Zigmond & Snaith, 1983).  This assessment was developed for use in the general 
population.  It was selected for use because it has been shown to have good validity 
(Bjelland, Dahl, Haug & Neckelmann, 2002), and is quick to administer (4 minutes).  
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Participants respond using a four-stage Likert-type scale.  Seven questions contribute to a 
score for anxiety, and seven questions contribute to a score for depression.  
 
3.6 Presentation order of the tasks in the experimental investigation 
All the tasks were completed in a single testing session as far as possible (69 out of 78 
participants), which took approximately 5 hours with breaks.  Eight of the remaining 
participants completed the tasks over two sessions separated by less than two weeks.  One 
participant completed the task over two sessions that were 4½ weeks apart.  Levels of anxiety 
and depression (HADS) were reassessed in the second testing session if the testing sessions 
were more than two days apart; the appropriate values were used in all statistical analyses.  
The order of the tasks was carefully considered so that demanding tasks were presented early 
on when participants were least fatigued (see Lezak, Howieson, Loring, Hannay & Fischer, 
2004), and tasks requiring sustained concentration were separated by tasks that required less 
effort to complete.  The order of the four laboratory tasks was counter-balanced using a Latin 
Squares design to reduce potential order effects.  The assessment of depression and anxiety 
was made at the beginning of the session to help ensure that transient effects on mood, which 
can occur as a result of completing such questionnaires (see Mark, Sinclair & Wellens, 1991), 
had had an opportunity to recover before administration of the decision-making tasks 
(approximately 1½ hours later); the mood assessment was not presented at the end of the 
session to avoid any influence from perceived performance on the tasks.  The testing session 
also included two assessments used to confirm diagnosis of ASCs.  One, the Autism 
Spectrum Quotient (AQ, see Section 4.3), was administered to all participants, the other was 
an observational assessment, the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS, see 
Section 4.3), which was administered only to participants with ASCs at the end of their 
testing session.  This ensured that the testing sessions followed the same format for both 
groups.  The order of presentation of the tasks is shown in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6 Task order in the testing session 
 
Item 
No. 
Task 
Length 
(approx) 
1 HADS 5 minutes 
2 WASI 40 minutes 
3 AQ 10 minutes 
4 MOT 1 minute 
5 ID/ED 10 minutes 
6 Questionnaire of decision-making experiences 10 minutes 
7 Laboratory task 1: (either CGT, IST, IGT or RCT) 20 minutes 
8 Digit Span 5 minutes 
9 Laboratory task 2: (either CGT, IST, IGT or RCT) 10 minutes 
10 Heuristics 10 minutes 
11 Laboratory task 3: (either CGT, IST, IGT or RCT) 15 minutes 
12 GDMS 5  minutes 
13 Laboratory task 4: (either CGT, IST, IGT or RCT) 50 minutes 
14 OTS 10 minutes 
(15) ASC assessment (ADOS) – ASC group only 40 minutes 
TOTAL TIME 
4 hours 
(+ breaks) 
 
3.7 Ethical approval 
The experimental study received ethical approval from the Cambridge Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee.  The approved Information Sheets and Consent Forms are reproduced in 
Appendix I.   
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CHAPTER 4: PARTICIPANTS 
 
This chapter describes the participants recruited for the experimental study.  The participants 
of the experimental group were adults with ASCs, while the participants of the control group 
were adults without ASCs who were recruited from the general population. 
   
4.1 Recruitment 
Participants with ASCs were recruited via advertisements to members of the NAS, locally-
based autism support organisations in the UK, and disability support centers in local colleges 
and universities; letters of invitation were also sent to volunteers registered with the 
University of Cambridge Autism Research Centre volunteer database living within a 
reasonable distance of Cambridge, and to participants of the initial survey who had requested 
to be contacted with information about future studies.  Participants from the general 
population were recruited via advertisements in the local community, universities, colleges, 
and by word-of-mouth.  Recruitment took place between May 2009 and January 2010. 
   
4.2 Participants 
Forty two people with an ASC and forty one people without an ASC were recruited to the 
study.  They were all aged between 16 and 65 years.  The lower age limit reflects the 
definition of an adult in the Mental Capacity Act (England and Wales) 2005, and the upper 
age limit was selected as the incidence of cognitive decline due to conditions such as 
dementia increases significantly above this age (e.g. Hofman et al., 1991).  Five participants 
were excluded due to low Verbal IQ (less than 90) or concern over the validity of their 
diagnosis of an ASC (see Section 4.3).  As a result, 38 participants with an ASC and 40 
participants without an ASC (and who had no family members with an ASC) were included 
in the final analyses.  
  
The target sample size had been 45 participants in each group.  This sample size was selected 
to be able to detect a group difference on the computational model of the IGT of the same 
magnitude and direction as that reported by Johnson et al. (2006) with almost 90% power at 
α = 0.1 (one-tailed).  As discussed in Chapter 1, their result tended towards a significant 
difference in attention to the motivational properties of choices, but in their opinion the result 
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was not significant due to the small sample size of the study.  Unfortunately for the present 
study, it was not possible to recruit more than 83 participants in the time available.  The 
actual sample size obtained would, therefore, have been able to detect a difference of the 
same magnitude and direction as Johnson et al. (2006) with 80% power at α = 0.1 (one-
tailed). 
  
4.3 Confirmation of diagnosis of an ASC 
All participants in the ASC group reported that they had received a clinical diagnosis of an 
ASC from a qualified practitioner.  To confirm their reports, information about the 
participants’ diagnosis was sought by contacting the clinical service in which the diagnosis 
was originally made, or a service which had access to the relevant records.  In six cases, this 
information was not sought because the Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised (ADI-R, 
Lord, Rutter & Le Couteur, 1994) had recently been carried out as part of another study in the 
same research group and the scores for these participants were available.  The ADI-R is a 
comprehensive, semi-structured interview that can be used to make a diagnosis of an ASC 
according to ICD-10 diagnostic criteria.  It requires specific training to administer and is 
carried out with an informant (usually a parent) who is able to provide information about the 
participant’s social and communication development, and restricted, repetitive, and 
stereotyped patterns of behaviour and interests in early life.  The ADI-R scoring schedule 
provides cut-off scores that are required for diagnosis of an ASC.  Where information from 
the clinical service was not available (5 participants), the ADI-R was carried out. 
 
The information provided by the clinical services (for 31 participants) varied considerably in 
the detail provided and the apparent thoroughness of the diagnostic assessment.  While many 
of the reports described a thorough assessment procedure that included taking a 
developmental history from an informant (20 participants), other reports lacked detail about 
the assessment procedure (4 participants), or described procedures that did not involve taking 
a developmental history (7 participants). 
 
To ensure that the participants included in the final analysis had a valid diagnosis of an ASC, 
information provided by the clinical reports and the ADI-R was put together with information 
from two other assessments carried out in the testing sessions.  These were the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule Module 4 (ADOS-G, Lord et al., 1989), a standardised 
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observation schedule requiring specific training to administer, and the Autism Spectrum 
Quotient (AQ, Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), a 50-item self-administered questionnaire 
providing a score of the number of autistic traits.  While these measures do not on their own 
provide sufficient information to make a diagnosis of an ASC, they provide clinically 
relevant information that may be useful in a diagnostic assessment: the ADOS scoring 
schedule provides a cut-off for autism spectrum disorder, although individuals with AS or 
PDD-NOS may or may not meet this criterion (Baird et al., 2006); the AQ has good 
discriminate validity at a threshold score of 26/50, at which 83% of people with an ASC will 
be correctly classified (Woodbury-Smith, Robinson, Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen, 2005).  
Inter-rater reliability on the ADOS was established by double coding four (10%) of the 
videotaped assessments with an independent rater, very experienced in using this assessment 
with people with ASCs and a trainer in its administration.  The agreement between the codes 
assigned by the two raters was 95% (kappa = 0.884, almost perfect agreement, see Landis & 
Koch, 1973). 
 
For the experimental study, participants with a diagnosis of an ASC confirmed by a report of 
a thorough assessment, or the ADI-R, were included if either their ADOS or AQ scores were 
consistent with a diagnosis of an ASC.  Participants with a diagnosis confirmed by a weaker 
clinical report were included only if their ADOS and AQ scores were consistent with a 
diagnosis of an ASC.  
 
The procedure followed for diagnostic inclusion is shown in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1 Diagnostic inclusion flowchart 
 
 
 
4.4 Other exclusion criteria 
Other exclusion criteria, for both groups of participants, were diagnosis of schizophrenia or a 
related disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and Bipolar Disorder.  Since 
anxiety and depression are extremely common in people with ASCs, due a number of 
complex biological and social factors (see Tantam, 2000), reports of anxiety and depression 
were not exclusion criteria for this investigation, although a measure of depression and 
anxiety (see Section 3.5.6) was obtained for each participant during the testing session.  
People taking the medication diazepam, which is known to affect decision-making (Deakin, 
Aitken, Dowson et al., 2004), were not recruited to the study, nor were those reporting 
acquired brain damage with lasting effects on cognition, and those reporting regular and 
NO
Was diagnostic 
information provided by a 
clinical or other relevant 
service
Was diagnosis confirmed 
using the ADI-R? 
Did the clinical report 
confirm the diagnosis? 
Did the clinical report 
describe a thorough 
assessment procedure?
Does the person have an 
ADOS or AQ score 
consistent with diagnosis? 
Does the person have 
ADOS and AQ scores 
consistent with diagnosis?
YES
YES 
NO
NO 
YES
YES 
NO YES NO
Exclude
(1 person)
Exclude
(2 people)
YES 
Include
(8 people)
Exclude
(1 person)
Include
(30 people)
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Person reports a clinical 
diagnosis of an ASC 
Exclude
(0 people)
NO
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significant recreational drug use (the heaviest user reported taking recreational drugs 3 – 4 
times a year; all other participants reported that they had been drug free for at least 1 year, 
with the exception of a participant who reported that he had taken cocaine on two occasions 5 
months prior to his participation).  All participants spoke English as their first, or a fully 
bilingual, language. 
 
Of note, seven participants with ASCs were taking Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor 
(SSRI) medication for depression or anxiety and two participants were taking anxiolytics.  
One participant in the control group was taking a tricyclic antidepressant.  These drugs may 
have effects on decision-making cognition similar to those described by Deakin, Aitken, 
Dowson et al. (2004b) and there is evidence that decision-making is modulated by the 
serotonin system (see Brand et al., 2006).  However, due to the widespread use of these 
medications in clinical populations, several studies of decision-making in clinical populations 
have included participants taking SSRI medication (see, for example, Chamberlain et al., 
2007).  The recent decision-making study carried out by De Martino et al. (2008) found that 
their results were not affected when the participants with ASCs taking SSRI medication were 
excluded from the analysis.  In the interests of caution, all analyses presented in this study are 
carried out with and without these participants to check that these medications do not alter the 
results.   
 
Finally, three participants (one with an ASC and two in the control group) reported that they 
had a colour vision impairment.  The only task in which colour vision impairments could 
have been problematic is the Information Sampling Task.  Therefore, the participants with a 
colour vision impairment were instructed to report any trials in which they could not 
distinguish the two displayed colours.  This affected between one and two trials in each 
condition for each of these participants.  Their scores were adjusted to exclude the affected 
trials.   
 
4.5 Participant characteristics 
Since it was not possible to match the participants individually, an attempt was made to 
match the two groups for age, gender and Verbal IQ, which are factors known to impact on 
decision-making cognition (e.g. Deakin, Aitken, Robbins & Sahakian, 2004).  The 
distributions of age and Verbal IQ are shown in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3.  Other 
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information, including scores of anxiety, depression and executive function, are summarised 
in Table 4.1.   
 
Figure 4.2 Age distributions for both groups of participants 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Verbal IQ distributions for both groups of participants 
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Table 4.1 Summary of participant characteristics 
 
Characteristic  
ASC group 
(n = 38) 
Control Group 
(n = 40) 
Test of group 
difference 
% male 65.8 67.5 χ2= 0.03, p = 0.87 
Mean age in years 34.03 (15.47) 34.03 (14.54) z = -0.15, p = 0.89 
Mean Verbal IQ  116.4 (10.15) 114.2 (11.75) t(76) = 0.89, p = 0.38 
Digit Span: mean score  19.1 (4.67) 18.8 (4.50) t(76) = 0.32, p = 0.75 
ID/ED: EDS mean errors  6.2 (9.14) 6.8 (8.15) z = -0.14, p = 0.89 
ID/ED: EDS mean trials to 
criterion  
15.6 (13.27) 17.7 (13.77) z = -1.18, p = 0.24 
OTS: Mean number of problems 
solved at the first attempt 
17.4 (3.14) 17.3 (2.31) z = -0.99, p = 0.32 
OTS: Mean attempts to solve 
problems requiring five moves  
1.4 (0.69) 1.5 (0.46) z = -1.34, p = 0.18 
HADS: Anxiety  10.6 (3.60) 5.4 (2.68) t(76) = 7.27, p < 0.001 
HADS: Depression 4.7 (3.24) 1.6 (1.60) z = -5.07, p < 0.001 
 
____________________ 
Table 4.1 shows a summary of the characteristics of both groups.  Values are presented as mean (SD), unless 
otherwise specified.  The groups did not differ in their gender distribution, age, or Verbal IQ.  The measures of 
executive function also did not differ between the groups.  Compared to the control group, the participants with 
ASCs had significantly higher scores of anxiety and depression.  These results did not change when the 
participants taking antidepressant or anxiolytic medication were excluded. 
 
ID/ED = Intradimensional/Extradimensional shift task of attention shifting (EDS refers to the stage involving 
the extradimensional shift); OTS = One-Touch Stockings of Cambridge; HADS = Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale. 
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CHAPTER 5: DO PARTICIPANTS WITH ASCS 
EXPERIENCE DECISION-MAKING DIFFERENTLY TO 
PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONTROL GROUP? 
 
5.1 Background 
The measures used to address whether participants with ASCs experience decision-making 
differently from those in the control group were: i) the adapted questionnaire of decision-
making experiences; and ii) the General Decision Making Style Inventory (GDMS, Scott & 
Bruce, 1995).  A full description of these measures is provided in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, 
respectively.  To summarise, the questionnaire of decision-making experiences was an 
adapted version of the questionnaire developed for the initial survey (see Appendix D).  The 
GDMS is a 25-item questionnaire probing reliance on several styles of decision-making, but 
importantly including an avoidant style.  These measures provided quantitative data. 
 
5.2 A priori hypotheses 
Based on the literature reviewed in the Chapter 1, the following predictions were made.  
Compared to the control group, it was expected that participants with ASCs would report: 
1. more frequent experiences of problems due to thoughts or feelings that hinder the 
decision-making process; 
2. higher ratings of difficulty associated with particular features of decisions; and 
3. greater reliance on the avoidant style of decision-making. 
In addition, it was expected that:  
4. participants with ASCs would report interference from their condition when making 
decisions. 
 
5.2.1 Experimental details 
5.2.1.1 Participants 
The data presented from the adapted questionnaire and the GDMS are based on the responses 
of the 38 participants with ASCs and the 40 control participants who were recruited to the 
experimental study (see Section 4.2). 
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5.2.1.2 Analyses 
The data were analysed using chi-squared tests, and parametric and non-parametric difference 
tests, as appropriate.  Given the directionality of the hypotheses, one-tailed tests of 
significance (α = 0.1) were used.  For tests that involved multiple comparisons, the threshold 
for significance was adjusted using Dunn-Sidak’s correction (α’ = 1 – (1 – α)1∕c, where c 
denotes the number of comparisons involved in the analysis (see Howell, 1997).  In the 
experimental study, the effects of medication were controlled for by repeating each of the 
analyses with and without the ten participants with ASCs taking antidepressant or anxiolytic 
medication.  Exclusion of these participants did not affect any of the findings reported below. 
  
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Frequency of problems experienced during decision-making 
The responses relating to the frequency with which twelve types of problems are encountered 
during decision making are shown in Table 5.1.  The distributions of responses were 
compared between groups using the χ2 test for linear trend (also known as the Mantel-
Haenszel statistic, see Howell, 1997).  Consistent with the initial hypothesis, the participants 
with ASCs reported experiencing all but one of the listed problems more frequently than the 
participants in the control group. 
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Table 5.1 Summary of responses to questions about the frequency with which particular 
problems are experienced during decision-making  
 
Problem experienced during 
decision-making 
 
Response (% of participants) χ2 statistic for 
linear trend Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
Frequent changes of mind 
about the decision 
ASCs 0 50 21 29 χ2 (1) = 2.65†, 
 p = 0.10 Controls 15 32.5 52.5 0 
Concern or worry about 
making the decision 
ASCs 2.5 16 44.5 37 χ2 (1) = 18.3†, 
p<0.001* Controls 10 50 35 5 
Concerned or worry about 
making the ‘wrong’ choice 
ASCs 0 13 40 47 χ2 (1) = 13.6†, 
p<0.001* Controls 2.5 35 52.5 10 
Lack of confidence 
ASCs 5 16 50 29 χ2 (1) = 23.7, 
p<0.001* Controls 22.5 52.5 25 0 
Uncertainty about the 
consequences 
ASCs 3 26 45 26 χ2 (1) = 11.2†, p 
= 0.001* Controls 10 52.5 32.5 5 
Uncertainty about which 
factors are relevant  
ASCs 8 16 47 29 χ2 (1) = 28.4, 
p<0.001* Controls 37.5 47.5 15 0 
Difficulty remembering all the 
relevant information 
ASCs 10 29 32 29 χ2 (1) = 22.9, 
p<0.001* Controls 37.5 52.5 10 0 
No knowledge of the choices 
available  
ASCs 11 34 37 18 χ2 (1) = 13.0‡, 
p<0.001* Controls 35 47.5 17.5 0 
Difficulty asking for help 
ASCs 8 18 37 37 χ2 (1) = 24.4, 
p<0.001* Controls 37.5 42.5 17.5 2.5 
Mental ‘freezing’ and inability 
to make the decision 
ASCs 8 13 47 32 χ2 (1) = 34.3, 
p<0.001* Controls 45 45 10 0 
Spending too much time 
thinking about the decision 
ASCs 3 13 35 49 χ2 (1) = 23.1†, 
 p<0.001* Controls 5 51 41 3 
Experience of exhaustion 
ASCs 10 24 34 32 χ2 (1) = 27.7, 
p<0.001* Controls 47.5 42.5 10 0 
† Responses of ‘Never’ and ‘Rarely’ were collapsed to meet the assumption for chi-squared tests that 80% of cells 
have an expected frequency of 5 or more (see Pallant, 2005). 
‡ Responses of ‘Sometimes’ and ‘Often’ were collapsed to meet the assumption for chi-squared tests that 80% of 
cells have an expected frequency of 5 or more (Pallant, 2005) 
*  χ
2
 is significant at α’ = 0.0087 (α = 0.1, one-tailed, adjusted using Dunn-Sidak’s correction for multiple 
comparisons) 
 
____________________ 
Table 5.1 shows the percentage of participants in each group giving each type of response.  Participants with 
ASCs reported experiencing all but one of the listed problems (frequent changes of mind) more frequently than 
the control group. 
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5.3.2 The difficulty associated with different features of decisions 
The mean ratings of difficulty for decisions involving different features are shown in Table 
5.2.  Ratings of difficulty were indicated on unmarked visual analogue scales, scaled to range 
in difficulty from 0 (‘Not difficult’) to 1 (‘Very difficult’).  Prior to analysis, the ratings were 
arcsine transformed [f(x) = 2arcsin(x
½
)],) as is appropriate whenever the variance is 
proportional to the mean (Howell, 1997; Rahman et al., 1999).  The data were screened for 
extreme outliers, which were defined as mean ratings more than three times the interquartile 
range from the upper or lower quartiles (see Pallant, 2005).  Two control participants were 
excluded from one of the analyses (the decision requires talking to another person) on this 
basis.  
 
Consistent with expectations, the participants with ASCs reported greater difficulty with three 
features of decisions.  These were: the decision has to be made quickly (ASC group: 
M = 0.60, SD = 0.29; Control Group: M = 0.34, SD = 0.22, (t(68.2) = 4.3, p<0.001); ii) the 
decision involves a change of routine (ASC group: M = 0.62, SD = 0.28.; Control Group: 
M = 0.29, SD = 0.23, t(76) = 5.8, p<0.001); and iii) the decision involves talking to others 
(ASC group: M = 0.60, SD = 0.25; Control Group: M = 0.18, SD = 0.18, z = -6.3, 
p<0.001,α’ = 0.01).  The difficulty ratings for the other features of decisions did not differ 
significantly between the groups.  The scores are summarised in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Mean ratings of difficulty associated with different features of decisions 
 
Feature 
Rating of difficulty  
(proportion of the visual analogue line, SD) 
Group difference 
ASC 
participants 
Control 
participants 
The decision is about something trivial 0.33 (0.27) 0.20 (0.24) z = -2.12, p = 0.034 
The decision has to be made quickly* 0.60 (0.29) 0.34 (0.22) t(68.2) = 4.32, p<0.001* 
The decision involves a change of routine* 0.62 (0.28) 0.29 (0.23) t(76) = 5.80, p<0.001* 
The decision is about a favourite interest or activity 0.28 (0.24) 0.22 (0.21) z = -1.47, p = 0.14 
The decision requires talking to another person* 0.60 (0.25) 0.18 (0.18) z = -6.28, p<0.001* 
The decision affects others 0.61 (0.27) 0.54 (0.26) t(76) = 1.23, p = 0.22 
The decision is about health 0.39 (0.30) 0.30 (0.27) z = -1.17, p = 0.24 
The decision will have a big effect on the future 0.65 (0.27) 0.66 (0.23) t(76) = -0.21, p = 0.83 
Other people have strong feelings about the choice 0.51 (0.33) 0.57 (0.22) t(62.6) = -0.64, p = 0.52 
The reasons for and against are finely balanced 0.75 (0.22) 0.67 (23.0) t(76) =1.44, p = 0.15 
* t or z are significant at α’ = 0.0105 (α = 0.1, one-tailed, adjusted using Dunn-Sidak’s correction for multiple 
comparisons) 
 
____________________ 
Table 4.2 shows the mean ratings of difficulty that both groups of participants associated with different features 
of decisions.  For ease of comparison, the data are shown as the percentage of the distance between ‘Not 
difficult’ and ‘Very difficult’, rather than the distance in mm along the visual analogue line.   The difference 
tests, however, show statistics based on the transformed scores.  Compared to the control group, the 
participants with ASCs rated: i) quick decisions; ii) decisions involving a change of routine; and iii) decisions 
that require talking to others, as significantly more difficult.   
 
5.3.3 General decision making styles 
The mean scores for each style of decision-making (assessed using the GDMS) are shown in 
Figure 5.1.  Consistent with the initial hypothesis, the participants with ASCs reported greater 
reliance on the avoidant style of decision-making, compared to the control group (ASC 
group: M = 2.9, SD = 0.96; Control group: M = 2.4, SD = 0.65, t(64.5) =  2.54, p = 0.014). 
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Figure 5.1 Mean scores for the five styles of decision-making assessed using the GDMS 
 
____________________ 
Figure 5.1 shows the mean scores of both groups of participants for the five decision making styles assessed 
using the GDMS.  Error bars represent the Standard Error of the Mean.  Consistent with the initial hypothesis, 
participants with ASCs reported a greater tendency to avoid decision-making. 
 
5.3.4 Perceived interference from ASCs on decision-making 
The responses of participants with ASCs to two closed questions about the frequency with 
which ASCs can help and interfere with decision-making are shown in Figure 5.2.  Consistent 
with the initial hypothesis, the distribution of responses for ‘interference’ from ASCs was 
skewed towards response options indicating a greater frequency of interference.  Moreover, 
the distribution of responses for ‘help’ from ASCs was skewed towards response options 
indicating a lower frequency of help.  The difference between the ratings for the two 
questions was significant (z = -3.3, p<0.001), indicating that ASCs were more often 
perceived as a hindrance than a help with decision-making. 
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Figure 5.2 Distribution of responses to two questions about how often ASCs can help and 
interfere with decision-making 
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of responses for the participants with ASCs to two questions about the 
frequency with which they believe their condition can help or hinder with decision-making.  Consistent with the 
initial hypothesis, ASCs were more often perceived as a hindrance than a help with decision-making.  
 
5.4 Supplementary analyses 
a) Relationships with depression and anxiety 
The relationships between perceived frequency of interference from ASCs and scores of 
depression and anxiety were assessed using one-way ANOVA for linear trend (see Field, 
2005).  Both analyses indicated that as scores of depression and anxiety increased, the 
perceived frequency of interference from ASCs also increased (Depression: F(1, 33) = 9.1, p 
= 0.005; Anxiety: F(1, 33) = 8.5, p = 0.006, α’ = 0.025, two-tailed). 
  
b) Relationships with executive functions 
Two of the questionnaire items seemed particularly relevant to the executive functions of 
planning and working memory.  The questionnaire items were: i) difficulty knowing the 
consequences of decisions; and ii) difficulty remembering the relevant information.  The 
relationships between these items and the measures of planning and working memory (see 
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Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3) were assessed using one-way ANOVA for linear trend in the ASC 
group.  The relationships between these measures were not significant (difficulty knowing the 
consequences and planning: F(1, 34) = 0.002, p = 0.96; difficulty remembering the 
information and working memory: F(1, 34) = 0.265, p = 0.61). 
 
c) Informal test-retest reliability analysis 
Although the test-retest reliability of the adapted questionnaire was not established, it was 
possible to compare the responses of eleven participants who completed both versions of the 
questionnaire.  The intra-class correlation coefficient (ri, two-way mixed model for absolute 
agreement) for the total ratings of frequency with particular problems in decision-making was 
ri = 0.81, p<0.001 and that for the total ratings of difficulty with particular features of 
decisions was ri=0.47, p = 0.035.  The questions about the extent to which ASCs might help 
or interfere with decision-making were answered identically in both studies by eight out of 
the ten participants (one participant did not provide an answer to these questions). 
 
5.5 Summary of findings 
Consistent with the initial hypotheses, the participants with ASCs reported experiencing 
several of the expected problems in decision-making more frequently than the participants in 
the control group.  The mean difficulty ratings for some types of decisions were also higher 
in the ASC group.  In addition, the distributions of responses to the questions about the 
frequency with which ASCs can help or interfere with decision-making suggested that ASCs 
were perceived more often as a hindrance than a help with decision-making.  Consistent with 
the initial hypothesis, the responses to questions on the GDMS suggested that participants 
with ASCs tend to avoid decision-making more often than the participants in the control 
group.   
 
5.6 Discussion of results 
The findings suggest that participants with ASCs experience greater difficulty with decision-
making, compared to the participants in the control group.  Specifically, decision-making in 
ASCs was associated with anxiety, exhaustion, mental ‘freezing’, and other problems in the 
required cognitive process.  Decision-making was also more likely to be avoided.  These 
findings are consistent with the quantitative and qualitative findings from the initial survey. 
   
81 
 
Some of the difficulties reported are consistent with known features of the condition.  For 
example, the difficulties in foreseeing consequences and remembering information are 
consistent with known impairments in executive functions (see, for example, Hill, 2004b).  
Surprisingly, however, there were no significant relationships between the frequency of two 
problems that seemed, theoretically, most related to the executive functions assessed in this 
study.  This suggests that, in this sample at least, some of the specific difficulties reported 
were not due to impairments in the assessed executive functions.  
 
It is possible that the difficulties reported by the participants with ASCs are exacerbated by 
higher levels of anxiety and depression.  The supplementary analysis (a) indicated that ratings 
of perceived frequency of interference from ASCs increased proportionally with levels of 
anxiety and depression.  These relationships may reflect findings from previous research, in 
which anxiety and low mood are associated with disadvantageous decision-making on 
laboratory tasks (for example, Miu et al., 2008), and in ASCs, where, in contrast to the 
general population, heightened anxiety is associated with increased risk-taking (South et al., 
2010).  It is not possible, however, to infer the causality of these relationships because the 
result may also reflect a tendency for participants with ASCs to perceive their abilities 
negatively because of their depressed or anxious state of mind.  Future studies assessing 
behavioural differences in the decision-making of people with and without ASCs, matched 
for levels of anxiety and depression, may be able to address this issue. 
 
Consistent with the views reported in the initial survey, the GDMS indicated that ASCs were 
more likely to avoid decision-making, compared to control participants.  Furthermore, the 
known relationship between the avoidant style and higher levels of cortisol release during 
decision-making (Thunholm, 2008), is consistent with the view that decision-making is 
stressful for people with ASCs.   
 
A limitation of the questionnaire was that the test-retest reliability was not established.  It is, 
however, reassuring to note that the responses of 11 participants who took part in both studies 
were reasonably consistent between the two versions of the questionnaire, despite systematic 
differences in the circumstances in which the two questionnaires were completed.  Another 
limitation of the questionnaires was that the response options were not balanced to control for 
biased responding (such as a tendency to select response options based on their position in 
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the list, see Paulhus & Vazire, 2007).  Again, however, it is reassuring to note that the 
distributions of the response patterns to the questions about the frequency with which ASCs 
can help or interfere with decision-making were skewed in opposite directions.  This suggests 
that, for this question at least, the participants were responding to the question and not the 
position of the response option (see Paulhus & Vazire, 2007).   
 
Despite these limitations, the findings from these questionnaires are consistent with 
suggestions from the literature, as well as the initial survey, and suggest that decision-making 
may be particularly difficult for people with ASCs.   
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CHAPTER 6: DO PARTICIPANTS WITH ASCS 
DEMONSTRATE REDUCED FLEXIBILITY AND 
GREATER CAUTION IN DECISION-MAKING? 
 
6.1 Background 
This chapter considers two aspects of decision-making that were highlighted as potential 
issues in the initial survey.  The first is flexibility, which is the degree to which the decision-
making of an individual is sensitive to changes in task-related information (Minassian et al., 
2007).  The second is risk-taking, which is the degree to which the decision-making of an 
individual favours options associated with the possibility of a large, positive outcome (but 
with the risk of a large negative outcome) at the expense of options associated with smaller, 
but more certain, outcomes (Mellers, Schwartz & Weber, 1997; Leland & Paulus, 2005).  
These aspects of decision-making are related, since flexibility may be indexed by changes in 
risk-taking across different situations. For example, Sinz et al. (2008) examined changes in 
risk-taking that resulted from controlling the probability of receiving a large, positive 
outcome.  When comparing participants with ASCs to controls, differences in flexibility and 
risk-taking may co-occur (for example, decision-making may appear less flexible if 
participants with ASCs take fewer risks).  Alternatively, differences in flexibility and risk-
taking may occur independently (for example, risk-taking may vary appropriately across 
different situations, but remain low throughout).  Schematic illustrations of four possible 
combinations of variations in flexibility and risk-taking in ASCs and controls as the 
probability of success is varied are shown in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1 Schematic of possible combinations of differences in decision-making 
flexibility and risk-taking 
  
____________________ 
Figure 6.1 shows four possible combinations of differences in flexibility and risk-taking, when comparing 
participants with ASCs to control participants.  The schematic assumes that, as demonstrated in previous 
research (e.g. Sinz et al., 2008), control participants increase their preference for risky choices as the 
probability of success increases.  
 
The rationale for investigating flexibility stems from reports in the initial survey that 
participants with ASCs can have difficulty engaging with decisions and may make decisions 
in order to replicate previous choices (see Section 2.3.2.1).  This is consistent with research 
suggesting that people with ASCs can have difficulty adapting to changes in the environment 
(Goldstein et al., 2001; Shu, Lung, Tien & Chen, 2001; Hill, 2004b).  To date, the only aspect 
of decision-making flexibility to have been studied in ASCs is sensitivity to changes in 
feedback (Minassian et al., 2007, see Section 1.5.4).  Other aspects of decision-making 
flexibility, such as sensitivity to changes in probabilistic information and the order in which 
options are presented have yet to be studied. 
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The motivation for assessing risk-taking stems from reports in the initial survey that 
participants with ASCs experience high levels of anxiety when making decisions (see Section 
2.3.1), which is associated, in other studies, with reduced risk-taking (for example, 
Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Maner & Schmidt, 2006; Maner et al., 2007; Fairchild et al., 
2009).  In addition, a recent study carried out by De Martino et al. (2008), used a two-choice 
gambling task to examine framing effects in ASCs (see Section 1.5.4).  They identified a non-
significant trend (p = 0.058) towards reduced risk-taking in participants with ASCs, 
compared to control participants.  However, since the number of participants with ASCs 
recruited to that study was small (n = 14), the study may have lacked the necessary power to 
be able to detect a real difference between the groups.  Here, the aim is to assess risk-taking 
in ASCs with a larger sample size. 
 
The tasks used to assess these aspects of decision-making were the Risky Choice Task (RCT, 
Rogers et al., 2003) and the Cambridge Gamble Task (CGT, Rogers et al., 1999).  These 
tasks were described in detail in Sections 3.4.5 and 3.4.3.  To summarise, the RCT presents 
participants with two virtual ‘roulette’ wheels on a computer screen.  Each of these wheels 
has eight segments showing the number of points that can be won or lost if a ‘spin’ of the 
wheel selects that segment.  On each trial
2
, participants choose one of the wheels on which to 
gamble.  This wheel is then ‘spun’ by the computer and the outcome (the number of points on 
the segment that the ticker lands on) is presented.  One of the wheels is a ‘control’ wheel 
(always showing four segments that will win 10 points, and four segments that will lose 10 
points; Expected Value
3
 = 0).  The other wheel, the ‘experimental’ wheel, presents different 
probabilities of winning and losing different numbers of points in such a way that the 
difference in the Expected Values (ΔEV) of the two wheels is varied systematically.  The 
potential wins and losses of the experimental wheel are always larger than the ten points 
shown on the control wheel.  Participants are asked to try to win as many points as possible.  
The dependent measure is the proportion of trials on which the ‘experimental’ (risky) wheel 
was chosen.  
 
The CGT measures flexibility via sensitivity to changes in probabilistic information and the 
order in which options are presented, both of which are important determinants of choice 
                                                 
2
 In the ‘decision’ condition (see Section 3.4.5) 
3
 Expected Value = (4 × 10) + (4 × -10)  
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(von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Doya, 2008; Lawrence et 
al., 2009).  Risk-taking is defined as the proportion of risky to safe choices.  To summarise 
the CGT, participants are presented with a row of ten boxes, on a computer screen, each of 
which is coloured either red or blue. The ratio of red to blue boxes differs on each trial (72 
trials), ranging from 9:1 to 1:9.  Participants are told that the computer has hidden a token 
beneath one of the boxes, and that they must guess the colour of the box that is hiding the 
token.  Once they have chosen, they are then asked to bet a proportion of their points (5%, 
25%, 50%, 75%, or 95%) on their choice being correct.  The available bets are presented 2.5 
seconds apart in ascending or descending order, depending on the condition of the task.  
Participants are asked to try to win as many points as possible.   
 
The measures of the CGT are: i) risk-adjustment, which quantifies the tendency of 
participants to bet a greater proportion of points in response to more favourable ratios (this is 
calculated as [(2 × % points bet 9:1 trials) + (% points bet 8:2) – (% points bet 7:3) – (2 × % 
points bet 6:4) / mean % points bet], so that higher scores indicate greater risk-adjustment 
(flexibility); ii) delay aversion, which quantifies the tendency to choose the bets presented 
earlier rather than later in the trial; and iii) risk-taking, which is the mean proportion of points 
bet on each of the different trial types (i.e. ratio of blue to red) in each condition.  These 
measures include only the trials in which participants chose the colour in the majority (where 
applicable), since this ensures assessment of sensitivity to the changing conditions (see 
Rahman et al., 1999).  The quality of decision-making is the proportion of trials for which 
participants choose the majority colour.  This is reported because it provides information 
about the extent to which participants understand, and are engaged by, the task. 
 
The tasks used in the present study assess risk-taking and flexibility differently.  The RCT 
presents decisions with two choices under different probabilities of winning and losing.  
Changes in the difference of Expected Values between the two wheels typically results in a 
predictable pattern of choices (see Fairchild et al., 2009).  Like the RCT, the CGT also 
provides an index of the influence of changes in probabilistic information on decision-
making.  However, the CGT is more complex than the RCT, as it provides five response 
options instead of two.  The CGT also provides an opportunity to assess the impact of delay 
on decision-making.  Typically, participants bet a higher proportion of their points when the 
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betting options are presented in a descending rather than an ascending order (Rahman et al., 
1999; Lawrence et al., 2009). 
 
6.2 A priori hypotheses 
Based on the findings from the initial survey, as well as previous studies on the behavioural 
rigidity and anxiety in ASCs, the following predictions were made.  Compared to the control 
group, it was hypothesized that the participants with ASCs would demonstrate: 
1. reduced flexibility on the RCT; 
2. reduced risk-taking on the RCT; 
3. similar scores for quality of decision-making on the CGT; 
4. reduced risk-adjustment on the CGT; 
5. reduced delay-aversion on the CGT; and 
6. reduced risk-taking on the CGT. 
In addition, it was expected that: 
7. levels of anxiety (as measured using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, 
HADS, see Section 2.5.6) would correlate with overall risk-taking on the CGT. 
 
6.2.1 Experimental details 
6.2.1.1 Participants 
The tasks were completed by 38 participants with ASCs, and 40 control group participants, 
all meeting the inclusion criteria for the study (see Section 3.2.2).  Two participants (one 
ASC group, one control group) were excluded from the RCT due to a technical failure.  One 
participant (control group) was excluded from the CGT analysis because their quality of 
decision-making score was a statistical outlier (defined as more than three times the 
interquartile range from either quartile boundary, Field, 2005).  This participant’s score was 
extremely low (choosing the most likely option on only 45% of the trials), suggesting that 
they did not have an adequate understanding of the task or that they were not sufficiently 
engaged by it.  All other participants had quality of decision-making scores of 72% or higher. 
 
6.2.1.2 Data analysis 
Raw scores are expressed as proportions and so were arcsine transformed [f(x) = 
2arcsin(x
½
)],) as is appropriate whenever the variance is proportional to the mean (Howell, 
1997; Rahman et al., 1999).  The transformed data were analysed using repeated measures 
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ANOVA, where assumptions about the normality of residuals were met.  Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections were applied when the assumption of sphericity was violated.  Non-
parametrically distributed data were analysed using Mann-Whitney U tests and Friedman 
tests, with correction for multiple comparisons (Dunn-Sidak correction, α’ = 1 – (1 – α)1/c, 
where c is the number of comparisons in the analysis) .  Given the directionality of the 
hypotheses, one-tailed tests of significance (α = 0.1) were used. 
 
Exploratory correlations (using Pearson and Kendall’s correlation coefficients, for normally 
and non-normally distributed data, respectively) were carried out to assess the influence of 
anxiety and depression on the dependent measures.  Scatterplots were inspected visually for 
outliers.  There were no significant correlations between these measures and the dependent 
variables of the RCT and CGT; as a result, they are not included as covariates in following 
analyses (see Clark et al., 2009). 
 
The effects of antidepressant and anxiolytic medication were controlled for by repeating each 
of the analyses with and without the nine participants with ASCs and one control participant 
taking these medications.  Any changes to the results obtained are reported. 
 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Proportion of risky choices by trial type on the RCT 
The mean proportion of trials on which the ‘experimental’ (risky) wheel was chosen is shown 
in Figure 6.2.  These data were extremely skewed, with several outliers in both groups (more 
than 30% of participants in each group were outliers in at least one trial type).  Since so many 
participants were identified as outliers, they were not excluded from the analysis and non-
parametric difference tests were used.  Mann-Whitney U tests did not reveal group 
differences on any of the trial types (all p>0.11).  This suggests that both groups made 
similar proportions of risky choices.  In addition, both groups demonstrated a strong effect of 
trial type (ASC group: Friedman χ2 (9) = 236.9, p<0.001; Control group: Friedman χ2 (9) = 
289.1, p<0.001).  This suggests that both groups of participants modified their choices in 
response to changes in the probabilistic information. 
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Figure 6.2 The mean proportion of risky choices for each trial type of the RCT  
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 6.2 shows the mean proportion of trials on which participants in both groups selected the ‘experimental’ 
(risky) gamble.  Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.  The trial types are ordered according to 
the degree of preference for the ‘experimental’ wheel gamble observed in the neurotypical population (see 
Fairchild et al., 2009).  The trials labeled 0(+) and 0(-) refer to the ‘framing trials’ (see Section 2.4.4); these 
are discussed in Chapter 10.   Both groups demonstrated sensitivity to the difference in the expected values of 
the two wheels.  There were no significant differences in the proportion of risky choices between the two groups. 
 
6.3.2 Quality of decision-making on the CGT  
Both groups demonstrated quality of decision-making scores that were significantly above 
chance (ASC group: M = 0.96, SD = 0.068, t(37) = 41.7, p<0.001; Control group: M = 0.99, 
SD = 0.017, t(38) = 179.4, p<0.001), indicating that they understood the task.  However, 
there was a significant difference in the mean scores of the two groups (z = -2.58, p = 0.010).  
When the ten participants taking antidepressant or anxiolytic medications were excluded 
from the analysis (M = 0.93, SD = 0.072), the difference was no longer significant (ASC 
group: M = 0.97, SD = 0.065; Control Group: M = 0.99, SD = 0.017, z = 1.50, p = 0.14). 
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6.3.3 Risk-adjustment on the CGT 
The risk-adjustment scores were compared between the groups using repeated measures 
ANOVA with Condition (ascending, descending), Condition Order (ascending first, 
descending first), and Group.  Condition Order was not a significant factor (p = 0.20) and 
was therefore excluded from the analysis (see Lawrence et al., 2009).  Contrary to 
expectations, the groups did not differ in their risk-adjustment scores (ASC group: M = 1.79, 
SD = 1.20; Control Group: M = 1.73, SD = 0.86, F(1, 75) = 0.027, p = 0.87).  There was an 
effect of Condition (F(1, 75) = 10.7, p = 0.002), as both groups demonstrated greater risk-
adjustment in the ascending condition, compared to the descending condition.  The Group × 
Condition interaction was not significant (F(1, 75) = 2.32, p = 0.13), however, indicating that 
the groups adjusted their choices similarly in the two conditions. 
 
6.3.4 Delay aversion 
The scores for delay aversion are shown in Figure 6.3.  The scores were analysed using a 2-
way ANOVA with Condition Order and Group.  Contrary to the initial hypothesis, the groups 
did not differ in their delay aversion scores (F(1, 73) = 0.028, p = 0.87), since both groups 
made slightly larger bets in the descending condition, compared to the ascending condition 
(ASC group: Mascending = 0.46, SD = 0.19, Mdescending = 0.57, SD = 0.19; Control group: 
Mascending = 0.50, SD = 0.15, Mdescending = 0.60, SD = 0.17).  There was a significant effect of 
Condition Order (F(1, 73) = 18.7, p<0.001), as participants completing the ascending 
condition first demonstrated greater delay aversion.  The Group × Condition Order 
interaction was not significant (F(1, 73) = 0.37, p = 0.55), however, indicating that the 
groups were affected similarly by the order of the two conditions. 
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Figure 6.3 Delay aversion scores on the CGT by Condition Order 
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 6.3 shows the mean delay aversion scores for both groups of participants, separated according to 
Condition Order.  The delay aversion scores did not differ significantly between the groups.  Participants 
completing the ascending condition first demonstrated higher delay aversion scores. 
 
6.3.5 Risk-taking 
The proportion of points that were risked for each of the trial types on the CGT is shown in 
Figure 6.4.  The proportions of points risked were analysed using a repeated measures 
ANOVA with Condition (ascending, descending), Trial Type (9:1, 8:2, 7:3, 6:4, 5:5 ratios of 
coloured boxes), Condition Order (ascending first, descending first) and Group (ASC, 
controls).  Condition Order was not a significant factor (p = 0.17) and was therefore excluded 
from the analysis.  Contrary to the initial hypothesis, the groups did not differ significantly in 
the overall proportion of points risked (F(1, 75) = 1.49, p = 0.23).  There was a significant 
effect of Trial (F(1.76, 132.2) = 228.48, p<0.001), indicating that participants bet fewer 
points as the ratio of coloured boxes became less favourable.  There was also a significant 
effect of Condition (F(1, 300) = 29.1, p<0.001), indicating that participants bet more points 
in the descending condition. There were no significant interactions between Group, Condition 
or Trial, consistent with the analyses for risk-adjustment and delay aversion (above).  This 
provides further evidence that the groups adjusted their decision-making similarly across the 
different trial types and conditions.  These results did not change when the participants taking 
antidepressant or anxiolytic medications were excluded. 
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Figure 6.4 Mean proportion of points bet across different trial types of the CGT  
 
 
_____________________ 
Figure 6.4 shows the mean proportion of points bet on the different trial types of the CGT (averaged across 
condition) for both groups of participants.  Error bars represent the Standard Error of the Mean.  The groups 
did not differ in the mean proportions of points bet across all trial types 
 
6.4 Post-hoc analyses 
The relationships between risk-taking, flexibility and anxiety were assessed as part of the 
main analysis presented in this chapter; no significant relationships were found when all the 
participants were considered together.  However, the findings from a very recent study 
suggest that a post-hoc analysis of the group relationships between anxiety and these 
measures may be worthwhile.  South et al. (2010) found that the relationship between anxiety 
and risk-taking was significantly different for an ASC group of children and adolescents 
compared to the corresponding control group.  The authors used a risk-taking paradigm 
(Balloon Risk Task, Lejuez et al., 2002) that was similar to the CGT, but did not provide 
information about the probability of success.  They found that, in contrast to the typically 
developing control group, the participants with ASCs demonstrated increased risk-taking 
with increased anxiety.  The results from the present study therefore provide an opportunity 
to test whether the finding of South et al. extends to risk-taking and related measures that are 
assessed using different tasks. 
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The correlations between anxiety and the dependent measures of the RCT and CGT for both 
groups (excluding participants taking antidepressants or anxiolytics) are presented in Table 
6.1.  As exploratory analyses, two tailed tests of significance were used (α = 0.05), with the 
Dunn-Sidak correction for multiple comparisons.  Risk-taking scores for each task were 
collapsed across trial types to form a single variable for that task.  This was justified by the 
lack of significant Group  Trial type interactions in the main analyses.  Scatterplots were 
used to identify outliers; two participants were excluded from two of the analyses on this 
basis. 
 
Table 6.1 Correlations between anxiety and risk-taking measures on the RCT and CGT 
 
Measure Correlation 
Comparison of correlations 
between the two groups 
RCT risk-taking 
ASC r28 = 0.208, p = 0.29 
z = -0.349, p = 0.73 
Controls r37 = 0.370, p = 0.027 
CGT risk-taking 
ASC  r28 = 0.398, p = 0.036 
z = 1.303, p = 0.19 
Controls r38 = 0.080, p = 0.63 
CGT risk-adjustment 
(flexibility) 
ASC r29 = -0.46, p = 0.012 
z = -2.544, p = 0.011* 
Controls r38 = 0.160, p = 0.34 
CGT delay aversion 
ASC r29 = -0.112, p = 0.56 
z = -1.874, p = 0.061 
Controls r37 = 0.359, p = 0.024 
 *Significant at α’ = 0.0127 
 
The results show that only the relationship between CGT risk-adjustment and anxiety differed 
significantly between the groups.  As levels of anxiety increased in the ASC group, flexibility 
of decision-making decreased.  However, the flexibility of decision-making in the control 
group did not vary with levels of anxiety.  Although the relationships between CGT risk-
taking and anxiety did not differ significantly between the groups, the significant correlation 
in the ASCs was in the same direction as that found by South et al. (2010).  Inclusion of 
participants taking antidepressants and anxiolytics affected two of the findings: i) it reduced 
the strength of the relationship between risk-adjustment and anxiety in ASCs (r38 = -0.375); 
and ii) increased the strength of the relationship between delay aversion and anxiety in ASCs 
(r38 = -0.249).   
 
 
 
 
   
94 
 
6.5 Summary of findings 
Both groups demonstrated flexibility in their decision-making on the RCT and CGT by 
adjusting their choices in response to changes in the probabilistic information, and to changes 
in the order in which the options were presented.  The participants with ASCs did not 
demonstrate reduced risk-taking on either the RCT or the CGT; this is contrary to the initial 
hypotheses.  A post-hoc analysis revealed that, in contrast to the control group, levels of 
anxiety were associated with reduced flexibility in the ASC group.  Antidepressant and 
anxiolytic medications appeared to affect the quality of decision-making scores (although 
these participants still had a mean score significantly above chance, 93%). 
 
6.6 Discussion of results 
This study was carried out to assess whether: i) the reports of rigidity in everyday decision-
making were consistent with a quantitative measure of flexibility of decision-making; and ii) 
whether participants with ASCs were more cautious in their decision-making, compared to 
participants in the control group.  The only previous study to have examined flexibility in 
decision-making in ASCs focused on the influence of feedback (Minassian et al., 2007).  In 
contrast, the RCT and the CGT assess the influence of changes in probabilistic information 
provided to the participant. The CGT also assesses the effects of delay on decision-making.  
The only study to have assessed risk-taking in ASCs (De Martino et al., 2008) demonstrated a 
non-significant trend towards reduced risk-taking in a small group of people with ASCs. 
 
Surprisingly, the findings did not provide evidence of reduced flexibility in the decision-
making of participants with ASCs.  Both groups adjusted their choices in response to changes 
in probabilistic information, making riskier choices when the odds were favourable.  
Likewise, both groups were influenced by the presentation order of the available options, 
making riskier choices when such choices were presented first.  These findings are consistent 
with those found in other neurotypical groups using the CGT (for example, Manes et al., 
2002). The participants with ASCs did not demonstrate reduced risk-taking.  This was not 
consistent with the non-significant trend observed found by De Martino et al. (2008), 
although this may reflect the larger number of trials in their study. 
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Some of the findings were affected by excluding participants with ASCs who were taking 
antidepressant or anxiolytic medications.  The participants taking these medications 
demonstrated poorer quality decisions (choosing the majority colour in the CGT less 
reliably), and exclusion of these participants affected the group-specific relationships 
observed between risk-adjustment, delay aversion and anxiety.  The findings for quality of 
decision-making may simply reflect poorer concentration in these participants, since these 
medications may be associated with fatigue and drowsiness (Bull et al., 2002).  The 
relationship between anxiety and risk-adjustment may have been affected by the known 
action of SSRI medication on reducing activity in brain regions associated with caution in 
decision-making (Paulus, Rogalsky, Simmons, Feinstein & Stein, 2003; Samanez-Larkin, 
Hollon, Carstensen & Knutson, 2008; Simmons, Arce, Lovero, Stein & Paulus, 2009).  
Finally, the relationship between anxiety and delay aversion may have been affected by the 
known effect of SSRI and anxiolytic medication on impulsivity and tolerance of delay (Wolff 
& Leander, 2002).  
 
The findings from this study suggest that the participants with ASCs evaluated information 
and made decisions in a similar manner to the control group.  However, it is possible that the 
decisions presented on the RCT and CGT are too easy to capture the real-life difficulties 
reported by the participants with ASCs.  The participants were provided with explicit 
information about the probabilities of wins and losses for each choice, and, as a result, the 
available choices were directly comparable.  In contrast, the choices that led to difficulties 
reported in the initial survey typically involve a number of known and unknown variables 
(see for example, Figure 2.3). It is possible, therefore, that the idealized tasks used in this 
study were inadequate to reproduce some of the reported difficulties. 
 
There was, however, an interesting relationship observed between measures of flexibility of 
decision-making and anxiety in the ASC group.  In contrast to the control group, the 
participants with ASCs demonstrated less flexibility as their anxiety scores increased.  This 
suggests that high levels of anxiety in ASCs may exacerbate difficulties engaging with 
decisions, consistent with reports of their making decisions rigidly or impulsively when 
feeling overwhelmed with information (see, for example, Section 2.3.2.1).  In addition, a 
significant relationship between increased risk-taking on the CGT and anxiety was found for 
participants with ASCs, even though the difference between the two groups was not 
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significant.  This finding was contrary to the initial expectations of this research, that 
increased anxiety would be associated with reduced risk-taking (see for example, 
Raghunathan & Pham, 1999), but is consistent with the results of South et al. (2010).  These 
authors found that, in contrast to a control group of typically developing young people, 
children and adolescents with ASCs took more risks as scores of anxiety increased during a 
laboratory-based task.  To explain this, these authors proposed that risk-taking in ASCs was 
motivated to a greater extent by fear of failure, whilst risk-taking in the control group was 
motivated more by sensitivity to reward.  That finding, together with the findings from the 
present study, suggests that anxiety in ASCs can have a profound effect on decision-making, 
and one that appears to differ to that found in the general population.  It is possible, however, 
that these relationships reflect the effects of an elevated level of anxiety, rather than an 
interaction between ASCs and anxiety.  Future studies may be able to better understand the 
effects of ASC and anxiety on risk-taking and decision-making flexibility by including a 
control group selected to have high levels of anxiety.  
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CHAPTER 7: DO PARTICIPANTS WITH ASCS GATHER 
MORE INFORMATION PRIOR TO MAKING A 
DECISION? 
 
7.1 Background 
The findings from the initial survey suggested that people with ASCs often find decision-
making time-consuming and overwhelming.  Such experiences were attributed to a dislike of 
uncertainty and the concomitant tendency to spend time gathering information (see Section 
2.3.2.2).  This chapter considers whether the reports are consistent with scores on a laboratory 
measure of the amount of information gathering associated with making a decision. 
 
The task used to assess whether participants with ASCs gather more information prior to 
making a decision was the Information Sampling Task (IST, Clark et al., 2006).  This task 
was described in detail in Section 3.4.4.  To summarise, participants were presented with a 
5  5 array of grey boxes, behind each of which was one of two hidden colours.  The 
participants were instructed to open (by pressing) a box to reveal its colour, and to open as 
many boxes as they wished before deciding which of the two colours was in the majority.  
Participants indicated their decision by pressing one of the two coloured panels at the bottom 
of the screen.  The task was presented ten times in each of two conditions: i) a Fixed Win 
condition, in which the total number of points available for a correct decision was 100, 
regardless of how many boxes were opened; and ii) a Decreasing Win condition, in which the 
total number of points available for a correct decision started at 250 and decreased by 10 
points with every box that was opened.  In both conditions, the cost of an incorrect decision 
was 100 points. 
 
The dependent variables of interest were: i) the mean number of boxes opened prior to the 
decision being made; and ii) the mean probability that the choice made is correct, given the 
information available at the time of the decision (‘Probability Correct’, see Clark et al., 
2006).  For each trial, this probability was calcuated using the formula: 
 
                         ∑(
 
 
)
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where z = 25 – (the number of boxes opened) and A = 13 – (the number of open boxes of the 
chosen colour).  For example, if a participant opened 8 boxes distributed 6:2 and chose the 
colour in the visible majority, the probability that the decision made is correct would be 0.83. 
 
The mean number of boxes opened and the ‘Probability Correct’ are typically highly 
correlated (see Clark et al., 2009).  Under certain circumstances, however, the mean number 
of boxes opened can provide only a limited index of the amount of information gathered.  For 
example, the probability of making a correct decision having opened 20 boxes distributed 
10:10 is 0.5; the corresponding probability having opened 20 boxes distributed 15:5 is 1.  The 
‘Probability Correct’ is, therefore, a better indicator of the certainty tolerated when making 
decisions ‘under risk’ (where information about the probability of success is available, see 
Brand et al., 2007).  For this reason, ‘Probability Correct’ is considered the primary, and 
more ecologically valid, variable of interest (Clark et al., 2009).  The mean number of 
‘errors’ made by participants (i.e. choosing a colour not in the visible majority at the time of 
the decision) is also reported.  
 
7.2 A priori hypotheses 
Based on the finding from the initial survey that people with ASCs have a tendency to gather 
information, the following predictions were made: 
1. participants with ASCs would sample more information prior to making decisions on 
the IST, compared to the control group (indicated by a higher mean number of boxes 
opened and higher ‘Probability Correct’ scores); and  
2. the ‘Probability Correct’ scores would increase proportionally with the frequency of 
self-reported problems taking a long time to make decisions (self-report item from the 
questionnaire of decision-making experiences, see Section 3.4.1). 
  
7.2.1 Experimental details 
7.2.1.1 Participants 
The data presented are based on the responses of 38 participants with ASCs and 40 
participants in the control group. 
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7.2.1.2 Data analysis 
The analysis presented follows the statistical procedures carried out in previous studies that 
used the IST (see Clark et al., 2009; Lawrence et al., 2009).  These were repeated measures 
ANOVA, where assumptions about the normality of residuals were met, and Mann-Whitney 
U tests for non-parametric data.  The relationship between continuous and ordinal data were 
analysed using ANOVA tests for linear trend (Field, 2005).  ‘Probability Correct’ scores 
were arcsine transformed [f(x) = 2arcsin(x
½
), where x is the mean ‘Probability Correct’] as is 
appropriate for scores expressed as proportions (see Howell, 1997) and two statistical 
outliers, one in each group, defined as more than 3 times the interquartile range from the 
upper quartile boundary (see Field, 2005), were excluded.  Given the directionality of the 
hypotheses, one-tailed tests of significance (α = 0.1) were used.   
 
The scores of depression and anxiety (assessed using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale, Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) did not correlate with the mean number of boxes opened or 
‘Probability Correct’ in either condition (8 correlations, the largest correlation observed was 
for depression and ‘Probability Correct’ in the Decreasing Win condition, Kendall’s 
τ = -0.119, p=0.19).  These variables are not included, therefore, as covariates (see Clark et 
al., 2009) in the statistical analyses.  The effects of antidepressant and anxiolytic medication 
were controlled for by repeating each of the analyses with and without the ten participants (9 
ASCs, 1 control) taking these medications.  The ‘Probability Correct’ scores, and their 
relationship with a self-reported problem in decision-making, were affected by excluding 
these participants; for these analyses, therefore, the results presented are based only on the 
scores of the participants who were not taking antidepressant or anxiolytic medication (ASC 
group: n = 29; Control group: n = 39).  All other findings were unaffected and are reported 
based on the results of all participants (ASC group: n = 38; Control group: n = 40). 
 
7.3 Results 
7.3.1 The mean number of ‘errors’ made on the IST 
The groups did not differ in the mean number of ‘errors’ made on the IST (Fixed Win, ASC 
group: M = 0.34, SD = 0.67; Control group M = 0.55, SD = 1.2, z = -0.92, p = 0.36; 
Decreasing Win, ASC group: M = 0.79, SD = 1.38; Control group: M = 0.65, SD = 0.95, 
z = -0.20, p = 0.84).  These results suggest that both groups had a good understanding of the 
task. 
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7.3.2 Information gathering 
7.3.2.1 Mean number of boxes opened on the IST 
The mean number of boxes opened per trial for the two conditions of the IST is shown in 
Figure 7.1.  Both groups demonstrated sensitivity to task instructions by opening more boxes 
in the Fixed Win compared to the Decreasing Win condition (F(1, 76) = 106.04, p<0.001).  
However, contrary to the initial hypothesis, the groups did not differ in the mean number of 
boxes opened (F(1, 76) = 1.97, p = 0.16), and the Group  Condition interaction was not 
significant (F(1, 76) = 0.0024, p = 0.88).  This suggests that both groups adjusted their box 
opening similarly across the two conditions.  
 
Figure 7.1 Mean number of boxes opened on both conditions of the IST 
 
____________________ 
Figure 7.1 shows the mean number of boxes opened per trial by the two groups of participants for each of the 
two conditions of the IST.  Error bars represent one Standard Error of the Mean.  Both groups opened more 
boxes in the Fixed Win compared to the Decreasing Win condition.  The mean number of boxes opened in a 
given condition did not differ between the groups.  
 
7.3.2.2 Mean ‘Probability Correct’ on the IST 
Contrary to the initial hypothesis, the ‘Probability Correct’ scores did not differ significantly 
between the groups when all participants, excluding two outliers, were included in the 
analysis (F(1, 74) = 1.84, p = 0.18).  This result changed, however, when the ten participants 
taking SSRI or anxiolytic medications were excluded.  One of the two outliers was no longer 
an outlier in the new ASC group and they were therefore included in the following analysis 
(ASC group: n = 29; Control group: n = 38).  The scores for both groups, after excluding 
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these participants, are shown in Figure 7.2.  Both groups demonstrated sensitivity to task 
instructions by making decisions with a higher probability of success in the Fixed Win 
compared to the Decreasing Win condition (F(1, 65) = 63.8, p<0.001).  However, consistent 
with the initial hypothesis, the participants with ASCs made decisions with a higher 
probability of being correct (F(1, 65) = 4.14, p = 0.046).  The Group  Condition interaction 
was not significant (F(1, 65) = 0.532, p = 0.47), indicating that the participants with ASCs 
made decisions with a higher probability of being correct, given the information gathered, in 
both conditions.   
 
Figure 7.2 Mean Probability Correct for both conditions of the IST 
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 7.2 shows the mean ‘Probability Correct’ scores for both groups of participants (excluding ten 
participants taking antidepressant or anxiolytic medication) on both conditions of the IST.  Error bars represent 
one Standard Error of the Mean.  Both groups made decisions with a greater chance of success in the Fixed 
Win condition, compared to the Decreasing Win condition.  Participants with ASCs required higher certainties 
before making a decision. 
 
7.3.3 Relationships between information gathering and self-reported problems in 
decision-making 
The relationship between information gathering on the IST and the self-reported frequency of 
problems taking a long time to make decisions was assessed using ANOVA for linear trend.  
For this analysis, the mean ‘Probability Correct’ scores were collapsed across the two 
conditions to form a single variable.  This is justified by the absence of a significant Group  
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Condition interaction (see Clark et al., 2009).  There was a significant relationship between 
‘Probability Correct’ and this self-reported problem when the participants taking 
antidepressant or anxiolytic medication were excluded (F(1, 63) = 6.01, p = 0.017).  This 
suggests that as information gathering increased so too did the self-reported frequency of 
problems in taking a long time to make decisions. 
 
7.4  Summary of findings 
The main finding is that the participants with ASCs (who were not taking antidepressant or 
anxiolytic medication) made decisions with a higher degree of certainty. On average, the 
participants with ASCs sampled information until they had an 81% probability of being 
correct, whereas control participants sampled information until they had a 76% probability of 
being correct.  Furthermore, the mean ‘Probability Correct’ was associated with the self-
reported frequency of problems with taking too long to make decisions.  These findings are 
consistent with the initial hypotheses.  However, the group difference in information 
sampling was not reflected in the mean number of boxes opened, as had been hypothesised. 
   
7.5 Discussion 
This study was carried out to assess whether the reports of excessive information gathering in 
decision-making in ASCs were consistent with a quantitative measure of pre-decisional 
information gathering.  Overall, the findings provide some support for such reports.  The 
probability of being correct at the point of decision (‘Probability Correct’) was higher in 
participants with ASCs, and the expected relationship between the ‘Probability Correct’ 
scores and the self-reported frequency of problems taking a long time to make decisions was 
significant. The finding that this applied only to participants who were not taking 
antidepressant or anxiolytic medication was consistent with previous research: SSRI 
medication is associated with reduced activation of the posterior and middle insula in healthy 
volunteers (Simmons et al., 2009), and increased activation and responsivity of the insula is 
associated with anxiety and cautious decision-making following punishment (Paulus et al., 
2003; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2008).  The participants taking these medications may, 
therefore, have felt less cautious and tolerated greater uncertainty in their decisions.   
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Finally, the significant relationship between the self-reported frequency of problems taking a 
long time to make decisions and the ‘Probability Correct’ scores on the IST provides 
evidence to support the validity of the questionnaire of decision-making experiences (see 
Section 3.4.1).  In the initial survey, written reports of excessive information gathering were 
associated with taking a long time to make decisions; this is reflected in this quantitative 
experiment.  It is possible, however, that other factors, such as slower cognitive processing 
(see Bowler, 1997), also contribute to the experience of taking a long time to make decisions.  
Latency of decision-making is considered in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8: DO PARTICIPANTS WITH ASCS TAKE 
LONGER TO MAKE DECISIONS? 
 
8.1 Background 
The time required to make decisions in everyday life was identified as problematic by many 
of the adults with ASCs who took part in the initial survey of decision-making experiences.  
This chapter uses two tasks to assess whether such reports are consistent with quantitative 
measures of decision-making speed.  The two tasks used here are the Cambridge Gamble 
Task (CGT) and the Information Sampling Task (IST).  These are described in detail in 
Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4, respectively. 
 
To summarise, the CGT is a laboratory-based task in which participants are presented with a 
row of ten boxes, each of which is coloured red or blue.  The ratio of red to blue boxes differs 
on each trial (72 trials), ranging from 9:1 to 1:9.  Participants are told that the computer has 
hidden a token beneath one of the boxes, and that they must guess the colour of the box that 
is hiding the token.  Once they have chosen, they are then asked to bet a proportion of their 
points on their choice being correct.  Participants are asked to try to win as many points as 
possible.  Latency of decision-making (termed the ‘deliberation time’) is calculated as the 
mean time taken to make the decision, measured from the start of the trial. 
 
In the IST, participants are presented with a 5  5 array of grey boxes, behind each of which 
is one of two hidden colours.  Participants are instructed to open (by pressing) a box to reveal 
its colour, and to open as many boxes as they wish before deciding which of the two colours 
was in the majority.  Participants indicate their decision by pressing one of the two coloured 
panels at the bottom of the screen.  The task is presented ten times in each of two conditions: 
i) a Fixed Win condition, in which the total number of points available for a correct decision 
is 100, regardless of how many boxes are opened; and ii) a Decreasing Win condition, in 
which the total number of points available for a correct decision starts at 250 and decreases 
by 10 points with every box that is opened.  In both conditions, the cost of an incorrect 
decision is 100 points.  Latency of decision-making in this task (termed ‘choice latency’, see 
DeVito et al., 2008) is calculated as the mean time between opening the final box and 
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guessing which colour is in the majority. The mean number of boxes opened was presented in 
7.3.2.1). 
 
Both measures of latency provide information about the time taken to make simple choices.  
They differ, however, because of differences in the tasks used to measure them.  The CGT 
presents decisions with explicit information about the probability of success whereas the IST 
encourages participants to make decisions with incomplete information.  In addition, 
deliberation time (CGT) covers only a single decision about which colour to choose, whereas 
choice latency (IST) covers a decision about which colour to choose as well as a decision to 
stop gathering information and commit to a choice.  Exceptions to this were trials on the IST 
in which participants opened all of the boxes; these decisions were made with complete 
information about the distribution of the two colours and without the opportunity to gather 
more information.  Participants were more likely to open all the boxes in the Fixed Win 
condition of the IST (ASC group: 27% of trials; Control group: 24% of trials), compared to 
the Decreasing Win condition (less than 1% overall). 
  
In addition, choice latency on the IST may be influenced by the number of boxes opened by 
the participant since previous research has shown that decision-making latency increases as 
the information load increases (Malpas & Joyce, 1969).  For this reason, it was expected that 
participants would take longer to make decisions on trials in which they opened more boxes.  
The number of boxes opened was therefore controlled for when comparing group differences 
in latency on the IST. 
 
Since the tasks involved making a motor response to communicate the decisions, motor speed 
was assessed using the Motor Screening Task (MOT, see Section 3.5.5).  This measure was 
included to control for group differences in motor speed, if necessary. 
 
8.2 A priori hypotheses 
The initial survey found that participants with ASCs reported frequently experiencing 
problems in taking a long time to make decisions.  Based on these findings, the following 
predictions were made. 
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Compared to the control group, it was expected that participants with ASCs would 
demonstrate: 
1. longer deliberation time on the CGT; and 
2. longer choice latency on the IST. 
In addition, 
3. deliberation time and choice latency would correlate with the frequency of self-
reported problems of taking a long time to make decisions. 
  
8.2.1 Experimental details 
8.2.1.1 Participants 
The data presented are based on the responses of 38 participants with ASCs and 40 
participants in the control group.  One participant (control) was excluded from the CGT 
analysis due to poor understanding of the task (n = 39, see Section 6.2.1.1). 
 
8.2.1.2 Data analysis 
To reduce skew, deliberation times (CGT) and choice latencies were transformed using a 
reciprocal transformation [f(x) = 1/x, with x = mean deliberation time].  Data were analysed 
using t-tests, univariate and repeated measures ANOVA, where appropriate.  Greenhouse-
Geisser corrections were applied when the assumptions of sphericity were violated.  Non-
parametrically distributed data were analysed using Mann-Whitney U tests.  Given the 
directionality of the hypotheses, one-tailed tests of significance (α = 0.1) were used.  Separate 
analyses within the same task were corrected for multiple comparisons using the Dunn-Sidak 
correction (α’ = 1 – (1 – α)1/c, where c is the number of comparisons in the analysis). 
 
Exploratory correlations (using Pearson and Kendal’s correlation coefficients for normally 
and non-normally distributed data, respectively) were carried out to assess the relationships 
between anxiety and depression (assessed using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, 
HADS) and the dependent measures.  There was a significant relationship between 
depression and overall deliberation time on the CGT (Kendall’s τ = -0.202, p = 0.013).  
However, depression was not included as a covariate in the ANOVA because the assumption 
of homogeneity of regression was not met (see Pallant, 2005).  Depression and anxiety did 
not correlate with any of the other dependent measures, and were therefore not included as 
covariates in the ANOVA (Clark et al., 2009).  The effects of medication were controlled for 
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by repeating each analysis with and without the ten participants taking antidepressant (SSRI 
or tricyclic) or anxiolytic medication.  This did not affect any of the findings. 
 
8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Motor speed on the MOT 
The mean motor response latencies did not differ significantly between the groups (ASC 
group: M = 861.1 msec, SD = 249.3; Control group: M = 853.6 msec, SD = 187.2, 
t(68.6) = 0.15, p = 0.88).  This suggests that any observed differences in response latencies 
on the decision tasks are not due to differences in motor speed. 
 
8.3.2 Deliberation time on the CGT 
The mean deliberation times for all trial types of the CGT are shown in Figure 8.1.  The data 
were analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA with Trial type (5 levels: 9:1, 8:2, 7:3, 6:4, 
and 5:5 colour ratios) and Group (2 levels: ASCs and controls).  Consistent with the initial 
hypothesis, there was a main effect of Group (F(1, 75) = 8.05, p = 0.006), indicating that the 
participants with ASCs took longer to make the decisions.  There was also a significant effect 
of Trial type (F(2.9, 214.5) = 92.24, p<0.001), indicating that both groups of participants 
took longer to make the decisions when the ratio of red to blue boxes was finely balanced.  
The Group × Trial type interaction was not significant (F(2.9, 214.5) = 2.13, p = 0.10), 
suggesting that both groups increased their response times similarly as the decisions became 
more finely balanced.  
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Figure 8.1 Mean deliberation times for both groups of participants on the CGT  
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 8.1 shows the mean deliberation times for both groups of participants on all trial types of the CGT.  
Error bars represent one Standard Error of the Mean.  Consistent with the initial hypothesis, the participants 
with ASCs took longer to make the decisions, compared to the control group.  Both groups took longer to make 
the decisions when the ratio of red to blue boxes was less certain (e.g. 5:5 red to blue boxes).   
 
8.3.3 Choice latency on the IST 
The mean response latencies for the two conditions of the IST are shown in Table 8.1.  The 
participants with ASCs demonstrated significantly longer choice latencies than participants in 
the control group (F(1, 76) = 5.85, p = 0.018).  Both groups took longer to make the 
decisions in the Fixed Win compared to the Decreasing Win condition (F(1, 76) = 28.8, 
p<0.001).  The Group × Condition interaction was not significant (F(1, 76) = 0.063, p = 
0.80), indicating that both groups were affected similarly by the two conditions.   
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 7, the groups differed in the amount of information they 
chose to sample, and this may have had an impact on choice latency (i.e. having more 
information to process may increase the time taken to make a decision).  For this reason, the 
relationship between choice latency and the mean number of boxes opened in the 
corresponding condition was assessed using correlations and is shown in Table 8.1.  There 
was a significant correlation between choice latency and the mean number of boxes opened in 
the corresponding condition.  The choice latencies of the groups were therefore compared in 
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separate ANOVAs with the mean number of boxes entered as a covariate.  The difference 
between the groups was not significant in either condition (Decreasing Win: F(1, 75) = 2.95, 
p = 0.090; Fixed Win: F(1, 75) = 0.96, p = 0.33, α’ = 0.051).  This suggests that the reduced 
speed demonstrated by the ASC group on the IST reflected increased information gathering 
(see Section 7.3.2.2). 
 
Table 8.1 Mean choice latencies and relationship with the mean numbers of boxes 
opened on the IST 
 
 Decreasing Win condition Fixed Win condition 
Choice latency 
(msec) (SD) 
Relationship with 
the number of boxes 
opened 
Choice latency 
 (msec) (SD) 
Relationship with 
the number of boxes 
opened 
ASC 
participants 
2528.7 (1556.0) r = -0.313, p = 0.056 3866.2 (2817.6) r = -0.747, p<0.001 
Control 
participants 
1820.5 (706.3) r = -0.348, p = 0.028 2881.1 (1677.6) r = -0.732, p<0.001 
 
8.3.4 Relationships between decision-making latency and self-reported problems 
The relationship between decision-making latency on the CGT and the IST and the self-
reported frequency of problems taking a long time to make decisions were assessed using 
ANOVA for linear trend.  For this analysis, the mean deliberation times were collapsed 
across the five trial types to form a single variable, and the mean choice latencies were 
collapsed across the two conditions to form a single variable.  This was justified by the 
absence of significant Group  Trial type and Group  Condition interactions (see Clark et 
al., 2009).  The relationship between deliberation time (CGT) and this self-reported problem 
approached significance after correcting for multiple comparisons (F(1, 72) = 3.91, p = 
0.052, α’ = 0.0501).  The relationship between choice latency (IST) and this self-reported 
problem was significant (F(1, 72) = 6.81, p = 0.011).  This suggests that as the frequency of 
self-reported problems with taking a long time to make decisions increased so too did 
decision-making latency on the tasks.  
 
8.4 Summary of results 
Consistent with the initial hypotheses, the participants with ASCs took longer to make the 
decisions presented on both the CGT and IST, compared to the control group.  However, the 
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difference in choice latency on the IST was not significant after controlling for the mean 
number of boxes opened.  Finally, there was a significant relationship between the frequency 
of self-reported problems with taking a long time to make decisions and choice latency.  The 
relationship between this self-reported problem and deliberation time approached 
significance. 
 
8.5 Discussion of results 
This study was carried out to assess whether the reports of taking a long time to make 
decisions were consistent with two quantitative measures of decision-making speed.  The 
findings provide support for such reports.  Compared to the control group, the participants 
with ASCs took longer to make the decisions presented on the CGT and IST, which did not 
appear to reflect differences in motor speed.  
 
The finding that participants with ASCs took longer to make the decisions on the CGT 
suggests that reduced speed in decision-making can occur even for decisions that are very 
straightforward.  This reduction in speed is consistent with previous research demonstrating 
reduced response speed to comprehension questions in ASCs (see Bowler, 1997).  It is, of 
course, possible that the increased latency reflected slower perceptual processing of the 
number of coloured boxes.  However, this interpretation is not supported by a previous study 
demonstrating comparable inspection times (the ‘stimulus exposure time required to make a 
simple perceptual judgment, for example, the relative length of two lines’) between 
individuals with high-functioning autism and control participants (Wallace, Anderson & 
Happé, 2009). 
 
The decisions presented on the IST were more complex than those presented on the CGT.  
Participants were required to evaluate the available information about the frequency of the 
two colours and (in most trials) make a decision about whether to gather more information or 
commit to a choice.  The longer latencies demonstrated by the participants with ASCs were 
consistent with the findings for the CGT.  However, in this case, the latencies of the two 
groups did not differ after controlling for the amount of information that was sampled.  This 
suggests that the longer latencies on the IST are underpinned by the tendency for participants 
with ASCs to gather more information prior to making the decisions.  Possible reasons for 
this are that the time taken to evaluate the information increases as the information load 
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increases (Malpas & Joyce, 1969), and/or that participants seeking more information are 
more cautious and take longer to consider their action. 
 
The significant relationship between the self-reported frequency of problems to make 
decisions and latency of decision-making on the IST provides some evidence for the validity 
of the questionnaire of decision-making experiences.  However, given the effect of 
information gathering on this measure of latency, this relationship is more likely to reflect 
group differences in information gathering than speed of processing.  The finding that the 
relationship between decision-making latency on the CGT and this self-reported problem 
approached significance, suggests that participants in both groups were aware of their 
limitations in making decisions, since their reports tended to reflect their behaviours.  
 
Limitations of these measures are that the decisions presented were simple.  However, as a 
result of this, the findings suggest that decision-making can take longer in ASCs 
independently of other factors reported to make decision-making difficult (for example, busy 
environments, the involvement of others, significant consequences, and time pressure).  A 
second limitation of these measures was the use of the touch-screen CANTAB apparatus to 
record response times.  Although the relevant instructions regarding the position of the screen 
and participant were followed, participants of different heights would have made slightly 
different movements to touch the screen.  There is, however, no reason to suspect a 
systematic difference between the groups.  Future studies may be able to obtain more 
accurate response times using key press or button box equipment. 
 
The findings from these tasks indicate that people with ASCs may benefit from additional 
time to make decisions.  However, little is known about the circumstances in which 
additional time may be most helpful.  Future studies seeking to understand more about the 
factors affecting decision-making speed in ASCs could consider the effect of systematically 
increasing the number of variables and imposing time limits.  Study of these factors could 
help to discern whether the increased decision-making latency demonstrated in ASCs reflects 
a processing difficulty in decision-making in ASCs or a difference in decision-making style 
(i.e. a tendency to take greater care over decisions).   
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CHAPTER 9: ARE PARTICIPANTS WITH ASCS MORE 
AROUSED WHEN MAKING DECISIONS? 
 
9.1 Background 
The findings in the initial survey suggested that people with ASCs experience high levels of 
anxiety when making decisions (see Section 2.3.1).  This chapter uses an adapted version of 
the Risky Choice Task (RCT, Rogers et al., 2003; Fairchild et al., 2009) to assess whether 
these reports are consistent with an established empirical measure of physiological arousal, a 
correlate of anxiety, during decision-making.   
 
The RCT was described in detail in Section 3.4.5.  To summarise, a computer program 
presents participants with two ‘roulette’ wheels, each with eight segments showing the 
number of points that can be won or lost if a ‘spin’ of the wheel selected that segment.  
Participants are asked to chose (by key press) which of the two wheels they wish to gamble 
on to try to win as many points as possible.  This wheel was then ‘spun’ digitally and the 
outcome (the number of points on the segment selected) is presented and added to the 
participant’s score.  The difference in the Expected Value (ΔEV) between the two wheels is 
varied systematically across eight trial types (32 trials, ranging from -55 to +55).  Trials were 
presented in a pseudorandom order, with each trial type presented four times in two 
conditions: one where participants were instructed to make their own decision (‘decision’ 
condition) and the other, a control condition, where they were informed that the computer 
would make the decision for them (‘no decision’ condition). 
 
In addition, participants were presented with two trial types with equal Expected Values, each 
presented eight times.  These trials, one presenting the decision in terms of wins
4
, the other in 
terms of losses,
5
 were included to assess the effect of a ‘frame’ on decision-making 
(discussed further in Chapter 11, Section 11.3.4.2).  However, they are considered here as a 
third condition in which finely balanced decisions are presented (‘finely balanced’ condition). 
                                                 
4
 Control wheel: 1.0 chance of winning 40 points; Experimental wheel: 0.5 chance of winning 80 points and 0.5 
chance of winning nothing 
 
5
 Control wheel: 1.0 chance of losing 40 points: Experimental wheel: 0.5 chance of losing 80 points,  
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The dependent variable for behavioural performance was the proportion of trials on which the 
‘experimental’ (risky) wheel was chosen.  Arousal during decision-making was assessed by 
comparing changes in skin conductance (the skin conductance response, SCR, Dawson et al., 
2000) between the conditions.  Increased skin conductance is a physiological correlate of 
anxiety (see Geddes et al., 1993; Court et al., 2008). 
 
Changes in skin conductance can, however, reflect other cognitive and biological events, 
such as mental effort (Kahneman et al., 1969).  For this reason, participants were asked to 
provide retrospective self-reports of anxiety and effort experienced during the task using 
visual analogue scales and pre-and post-test versions of the Spielberger State Anxiety 
Inventory (SSAI, Spielberger et al., 1970).  In the post-test version of the SSAI, participants 
were asked to complete the questions in relation to their feelings during the decisions (see 
Margrain et al., 2003), and the pre-test score was then subtracted from the post-test score 
(higher difference scores indicating higher levels of anxiety during decision-making).  These 
measures were included to assist interpretation of changes in skin conductance. 
 
9.2 A priori hypotheses 
Based on the general findings from the initial survey that people with ASCs experience high 
levels of anxiety during decision-making, and that finely balanced decisions can be 
particularly difficult, the following predictions were made.  Compared to the control group, it 
was expected that the participants with ASCs would: 
1. demonstrate greater arousal in the ‘decision’ condition, compared to the ‘no decision’ 
condition; 
2. demonstrate greater arousal for finely balanced decisions (‘finely balanced’ condition) 
compared to trials with a difference of Expected Value (‘decision’ condition); and 
3. demonstrate larger skin conductance responses overall; and 
4. report higher levels of anxiety while making decisions, with no difference in levels of 
mental effort, compared to when the computer was making the decisions. 
In addition, it was expected that: 
5. retrospective reports of anxiety during the task would correlate with the SCR 
amplitude for the trials in which participants made decisions. 
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9.2.1 Experimental details 
9.2.1.1 Participants 
The task was completed by 38 participants with ASCs and 40 participants in the control 
group who met criteria for inclusion in the main study (see Section 4.2).  However, a number 
of participants were excluded from the final analysis.  Participants taking antidepressant 
(SSRIs or tricyclic) or anxiolytic medication (9 ASC participants, 1 control participant) were 
excluded because of the possible effects of these medications on skin conductance (Spohn, 
Thetford & Cancro, 1971; Breyer-Pfaff, Gaertner & Giedke, 1982; Shores, Pascualy, Lewis, 
Flatness & Veith, 2001; Bond, Wingrove, Baylis & Dalton, 2003), in addition to their effects 
on anxiety.  One participant in each group was excluded because of a technical failure.  
Finally, three participants in each group were excluded because their minimum skin 
conductance level (SCL) during the task was less than 1μS, which is outside of the normal 
range (1 – 20μS, see Indovina, 2008).  The data presented are therefore based on the 
responses of 25 participants with ASCs and 35 participants in the control group.  The gender 
distribution, mean age and Verbal IQ (VIQ) of the two groups did not differ significantly (see 
Table 9.1). 
 
Table 9.1 Participant characteristics 
 
Characteristic 
Participants with 
ASCs  
(n = 25) 
Participants in 
the control 
group (n = 35) 
Test of group difference 
% male 68% 74% χ
2
(1, N = 60) = 0.284, p = 0.59 
Mean age (years) (SD) 30.2 (13.7) 33.4 (14.6) t(58) = -0.934, p = 0.35 
Mean Verbal IQ (SD) 117 (11.6) 113 (11.6) t(58) = 1.23, p = 0.23 
 
To control for the effects of other medications that might affect the sympathetic nervous 
system (asthma medication (salbutamol, Symbicort®, 2 participants), medication for high 
blood pressure (Doxasozin, 1 participant), medication for diabetes (metformin, 2 
participants), and a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory (Diclofenac, 1 participant)), use of these 
medications was included as a between-subjects factor in the analyses (ANOVA).  There was 
no significant effect of these medications. 
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9.2.1.2 Acquisition and analysis of SCRs 
SCL was recorded continuously during the task using the MP150 system, SCL amplifier 
(GSR100C) and transducer (TSD203) (BIOPAC Systems Inc. Goleta, California) at an 
acquisition sample rate of 200Hz.  The epochs of interest were the 5 seconds period starting 
0.5 seconds after the onset of the stimulus in the decision-making phase.  The minimum and 
maximum SCL values within these epochs, and the times at which they occurred, were 
extracted using Windows Visual Basic software programmed by Dr Barney Dunn (MRC 
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge).  For each trial, SCR amplitude was 
calculated as the range of SCL values within the corresponding epoch.  This amplitude was 
then multiplied by the direction of the change: positive changes reflect an increase in SCL 
over the 5 second period, whereas negative changes reflect a decrease in SCL over the 5 
second period.  Mean SCR amplitude was calculated by averaging amplitude values across all 
trials in which a positive response occurred (Dawson et al., 2000). 
 
Data were analysed using repeated measures ANOVA, where assumptions about the 
normality of residuals were met.  Non-parametrically distributed data were analysed using 
Mann-Whitney U and Wilcoxon tests, using the Dunn-Sidak correction for multiple 
comparisons (1 – (1 – α)1/c, where c is the number of comparisons in the analysis).  Given the 
directionality of the hypotheses, one-tailed tests of significance were used (α = 0.1).  Scores 
expressed as proportions were arcsine transformed [f(x) = 2arcsin(x
½
)],) as is appropriate 
whenever the variance is proportional to the mean (Howell, 1997; Rahman et al., 1999).  SCR 
amplitude values were subjected to a logarithmic transformation [f(x) = Log10(x + 0.1)] to 
reduce skew.  Exploratory correlations were carried out to assess the influence of general 
levels of anxiety and depression (as measured using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale, see Section 2.5.6) on the dependent measures.  These variables were included as 
covariates in the ANOVA where correlations were significant (Clark et al., 2009), and the 
assumption of homogeneity of regression was met (Pallant, 2005). 
 
The behavioural data for the RCT were presented in Chapter 6.  The groups did not differ in 
their proportions of risky choices. 
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9.3 Results 
9.3.1 SCR amplitude for ‘decision’ vs. ‘no decision’ trials 
The mean SCR amplitude for the trials in each condition of the RCT is shown in Figure 9.1.  
Consistent with expectations, there was a significant effect of Group (F(1, 56) = 2.99, 
p = 0.089), indicating larger overall SCR amplitude in the ASC group compared to the 
control group.  However, there was no effect of Condition (F(1, 56) = 0.476, p = 0.49) and 
the Group × Condition interaction was not significant (F(1, 56) = 0.140, p = 0.71).  This 
suggests that changes in arousal were not related to whether or not the participant or 
computer made the decisions. 
 
Figure 9.1 Mean SCR amplitude for the three trial types of the RCT 
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 9.1 shows the mean SCR amplitude for all three conditions of the RCT for both groups of participants.  
Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.  Contrary to expectations, there were no significant 
differences in the SCR amplitudes between the conditions for either group. 
 
9.3.2 SCR amplitude for ‘decision’ vs. ‘framing’ trials 
The mean SCR amplitudes for ‘decision’ and ‘finely balanced’ trials were compared using 
repeated measures ANOVA with general anxiety (measured using the Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale, HADS) as a covariate, since this measure correlated significantly with 
SCR amplitude for ‘finely balanced’ trials (Kendall’s τ(60) = 0.195, p = 0.033).  Consistent 
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with expectations, there was a main effect of group (F(1, 55) = 2.91, p = 0.094), indicating 
larger overall SCR amplitude in the ASC group, compared to the control group.  However, 
there was no effect of Condition (F(1, 55) = 0.00, p = 0.99), and the Group × Condition 
interaction was not significant (F(1, 55) = 0.183, p = 0.67).  This suggests that changes in 
arousal were not related to whether decisions were finely balanced or weighted with 
differences in EV. 
 
9.3.3 Retrospective reports of anxiety and mental effort during decision-making 
9.3.3.1 Group comparisons of retrospective anxiety and mental effort 
Contrary to expectations, the participants with ASCs did not report retrospectively higher 
levels of anxiety when making the decisions, as measured using the difference between pre- 
and post-SSAI scores (ASC group: M = 0.38, SD = 12.0; Control Group: M = 4.26, SD = 7.2, 
t(34.4) = -1.55, p = 0.17).   
 
The mean ratings for the self-reported measures of anxiety and mental effort, as measured 
using visual analogue scales, are shown in Figure 9.2. 
 
Consistent with the result for the SSAI scores, the groups did not differ in their mean rating 
of anxiety experienced during decision making (z = -0.43, p = 0.67).  The groups also did not 
differ in their mean ratings of anxiety when the computer made the decisions (t(58) = -0.49, 
p = 0.62); nor did they differ in their ratings of mental effort when they were making the 
decisions (and t(58) = 0.71, p = 0.48).  However, interestingly, both groups reported higher 
levels of anxiety when the computer was making the decisions rather than when they 
themselves were making the decisions (ASC group:  Wilcoxon z = -2.10, p = 0.025; Control 
group: Wilcoxon z = -3.82, p<0.001).  
 
These results suggest that the groups experienced the decisions as similarly anxiety 
provoking and effortful.  Participants felt more anxious when the computer was making the 
decisions, compared to when they themselves were making the decisions.  
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Figure 9.2 The mean ratings of anxiety and mental effort on the RCT as measured using 
visual analogue scales 
 
 
_____________________ 
Figure 9.2 shows the mean ratings on visual analogue scales representing anxiety and mental effort during the 
RCT for both groups of participants.  The data are presented as a percentage of the visual analogue line 
(45.7mm long, ranging from ‘no anxiety’ and ‘no effort’, to ‘extremely anxious’ and ‘a great deal of effort’); 
error bars represent one standard error of the mean.  Contrary to expectations, both groups experienced higher 
levels of anxiety when the computer made the decisions, rather than when they made the decisions.  There were 
no differences in any of the ratings between the groups.    
 
9.3.3.2 Relationship between self-report measures of anxiety and mental effort and SCRs 
There were no significant correlations between SCR amplitude for ‘decision’ trials, ‘framing’ 
trials, or ‘no decision’ trials with the self-report measures of anxiety and mental effort (all 
p>0.051, α’ = 0.017).  These results suggest that the SCR amplitudes did not reflect 
experiences of anxiety and mental effort during the task. 
 
9.4 Summary of findings 
Consistent with the initial hypothesis, the participants with ASCs demonstrated larger SCRs, 
compared to the control group.  However, contrary to expectations, the participants with 
ASCs did not demonstrate relatively larger SCRs when they were making the decisions 
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compared to when the computer was making the decisions, or when making finely balanced 
decisions compared to decisions weighted with differences in EV.  Contrary to expectations, 
the groups did not differ in their reports of anxiety or mental effort when making the 
decisions.  Both groups reported significantly higher levels of anxiety when the computer was 
making the decisions, compared to when they themselves were making the decisions.  
However, neither self-reported levels of decision-related anxiety or effort correlated 
significantly with SCR amplitude.   
 
9.5 Discussion 
This study was carried out to assess whether the survey reports of anxiety, and difficulty in 
making finely balanced decisions, were consistent with a commonly-used physiological 
measure of arousal during decision-making.  Overall, the findings did not provide support for 
such reports.  While the participants with ASCs demonstrated larger SCRs overall, neither 
group demonstrated a significant difference in arousal between trials in which they made the 
decision, and trials in which the computer made the decision.  This suggests that the 
increased arousal in the participants with ASCs was not specific to decision-making on this 
task.  The finding that overall SCR amplitudes were larger in the ASC group compared to the 
control group is consistent with previous research assessing SCRs in ASCs (see De Martino 
et al., 2008) and was attributed to higher levels of general anxiety.  Neither group 
demonstrated a significant difference in arousal between clear-cut and finely balanced 
decisions. 
 
The self-reported measures of decision-related anxiety and mental effort did not correlate 
with the index of arousal (SCR amplitude), and there were no significant differences in the 
self-reported experiences of the two groups.  However, the participants reported significantly 
higher levels of anxiety when the computer was making the decisions compared to when they 
were making the decisions. 
 
There are several possible explanations for these findings.  Firstly, the task may have been 
too abstract and/or simplistic to capture the higher levels of decision-related anxiety reported 
by participants with ASCs.  The participants were provided with explicit probabilities about 
the expected wins and losses for each wheel, and the two choices were directly comparable.  
In contrast, the difficulties reported in the initial survey often involved choices with a number 
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of known and unknown variables (see for example, Figure 2.3).  A second possibility is lack 
of motivation for the task.  The decisions did not have significant consequences, such as 
monetary reward and punishment, and this may have limited the emotional engagement of the 
participants.  In addition, the nine second interval between the feedback and the start of the 
next trial resulted in a lengthy task and the participants may have lost interest.  This interval 
was selected to allow changes in skin conductance to return to baseline by the start of the 
next trial (see Dawson et al., 2000).  However, some studies have used shorter intervals, such 
as 6 seconds (Bechara et al., 1999), in order to maintain participants’ involvement in the task 
(Crone et al., 2004).   
 
A third possibility is that changes in decision-related arousal were masked by stronger 
feelings of anxiety when the computer was making the decisions.  This may reflect higher 
levels of anxiety associated with an external locus of control (see, for example, Sandler & 
Lakey, 1982), and the related possibility that the computer may make an unfavorable 
decision.  Future studies seeking to avoid this effect could present, as an alternative control 
(‘no decision’) condition, trials in which the two wheels are identical.  These trials would not 
involve weighing EVs (as in the ‘decision’ condition) or the gain/loss format (as in the ‘finely 
balanced’ condition) of the two wheels, but would remove the possibility of the computer 
making an unfavorable selection.   
 
To conclude, the findings from this study do not provide quantitative support for the reports 
of decision-related anxiety in ASCs.  However, this finding may not be generalisable beyond 
the confines of the specific task used here.  As an example, this study found that participants 
with ASCs did not demonstrate reduced anxiety when the computer made decisions.  
However, they may experience reduced anxiety when, in the real world, decisions are made 
on their behalf by people they know and trust.  In this study, the computer’s selection was 
random and participants would have learnt that the computer could not be trusted to make a 
good decision.  Future studies seeking to better validate reports of decision-related anxiety 
could, therefore, present more realistic decisions that involve a parent or another trusted 
person making some decisions on the participant’s behalf.  This may provide a more realistic 
environment to examine arousal in decision-making in ASCs. 
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CHAPTER 10: DO PARTICIPANTS WITH ASCS 
DEMONSTRATE DIFFERENCES IN MOTIVATIONAL 
PROCESSES IN DECISION-MAKING? 
 
10.1 Background 
The task used to address whether people with ASCs demonstrate differences in motivational 
processes in decision-making was the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT, Bechara et al., 1999), 
which was described in detail in Section 3.4.6.  To summarise, this is a laboratory-based task 
of decision-making in which participants make repeated selections from four decks of cards 
in order to win as much money as possible.  Unbeknownst to participants, two of the decks 
are weighted with large wins and large losses in such a way that repeated selection from these 
decks leads to a net loss of money.  The other two decks are weighted with smaller wins but 
fewer and smaller losses so that repeated selections from these decks leads to a net gain of 
points.  Successful performance on the IGT depends upon learning these contingencies and 
making more selections from the two advantageous decks.  
 
The contributions of specific cognitive and motivational processes to performance on the IGT 
can be assessed using the Expectancy-Valence Learning (EVL) model (Busemeyer & Stout, 
2002), which was described in Section 3.4.6.1.  Briefly, this model provides estimates for 
three parameters, in turn relating to: i) a learning and memory factor (the tendency to be 
influenced by recent outcomes and to forget or discount past outcomes); ii) a motivational 
factor (the tendency to be attracted to wins and indifferent to losses); and iii) a response 
factor (the tendency to make choices erratically due to factors such as boredom and fatigue). 
 
10.1.1 Previous studies using the IGT with participants with ASCs 
Two studies have used the IGT to study decision-making in adolescents and young adults 
with ASCs.  The first study was carried out by Johnson et al. (2006), in which IGT  
performance and the EVL parameters were compared between 15 participants with Asperger 
syndrome (AS) and 14 age and IQ-matched control participants.  They used a version of the 
task similar to that used by Bechara et al. (1999), although they extended it from 100 to 150 
trials, and used slightly different contingencies to reflect the real amounts of money won and 
lost by the participants.  The nature of the contingencies (i.e. one deck with a large win on 
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every trial and 
1∕10 probability of a very large loss) were the same as in the original task 
developed by Bechara et al. (1994, 1999).  They found that participants with AS learnt the 
contingencies associated with each deck in a similar way to the control group, but were less 
influenced by the motivational properties (expectancies about the outcome) they assigned to 
the decks (indexed by a lower estimate for the response consistency parameter, c).  This 
‘response inconsistency’ was also reflected in an analysis of the number of consecutive 
selections that were made from the same deck; the participants with ASCs tended to make 
much smaller numbers of consecutive selections from the same deck and shifted between the 
decks more frequently.  By comparing their findings to the IGT performance of people with 
brain damage to the prefrontal ventromedial cortex and the amygdala described in the 
literature (for review, see Yechiam et al., 2005), Johnson and her colleagues interpreted the 
response in ASCs as an abnormal interaction between the brain regions involved in learning 
the contingencies and the brain regions involved in choice behaviour.  In addition, there was 
a trend towards poorer IGT performance in the ASC group, driven by their response 
inconsistency, and a trend towards greater attention to loss as measured using the EVL model, 
but they concluded that their sample was too small to detect these differences. 
 
The second study was carried out by Yechiam et al. (2010).  They used a version of the IGT 
identical to original task developed by Bechara et al. (1994), which had 100 trials.  The 
findings from this study were similar to those described by Johnson et al. (2006), as they too 
found a tendency for the participants with ASCs to shift more frequently between the decks 
and make fewer consecutive selections from the same deck.  They did not, however, find any 
significant differences in the parameters of the EVL model between the groups, nor was the 
EVL model able to predict the choices of the ASC group with as great an accuracy as for the 
control group.  To account for the observed differences in the behaviour of the two groups, 
they examined the selection patterns using a new cognitive model, which assumes that 
exploring alternatives holds greater value for the decision-maker than the actual outcomes of 
the alternatives.  They found that this model was better at predicting the choices of the 
participants with ASCs, and they interpreted this as a difference in reinforcement learning 
style, characterised by a greater tendency to explore response options.   
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10.2 The IGT in the present investigation 
This investigation aimed to carry out a study similar to Johnson et al. (2006), using a larger 
sample of participants with ASCs.  The deck contingencies were, however, identical to those 
used by  Bechara et al. (1994, 1999) and Yechiam et al. (2010), as these are recommended for 
use with EVL model (see Busemeyer & Stout, 2002, and Stallen, 2006).  The task was 
adapted to enable participants to make 150 trials; however, a technical problem prevented the 
number of selections from each deck exceeding 100.  For this reason, the data presented are 
based on the first 115 trials, which is the maximum number of trials for which all participants 
had the four response options available.  The dependent measure of task performance was the 
proportion of choices from the advantageous decks in five consecutive blocks of 23 trials. 
 
10.3 A Priori hypotheses 
Based on the findings from Johnson et al. (2006), the following predictions were made. 
Compared to the control group, the participants with ASCs would: 
1. Make fewer advantageous choices; 
2. Shift more frequently between the four response options (reflected by a lower number 
of consecutive selections from the same deck); 
3. Be less influenced by the motivational properties (expectancies about the outcome) 
they assigned to the decks (reflected by a lower estimate for the response consistency 
parameter, c, calculated using the EVL model); 
4. Demonstrate greater attention to losses compared to wins (reflected by a higher 
estimate for the attention weight parameter, w, calculated using the EVL model). 
 
10.3.1 Experimental details 
10.3.1.1 Participants 
The task was completed by 38 participants with ASCs and 40 control participants.  Three 
participants in the control group were excluded from the final analysis because they 
responded abnormally.  These participants made over eighty consecutive selections from 
Deck B before sampling the other decks.  Two of these participants failed to sample from all 
of the decks.  As a result, the final analyses are based on the data from 38 participants with 
ASCs and 37 control participants.  The effects of medication were controlled for by repeating 
each of the analyses with and without the ten participants (nine ASC group, one control 
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group) taking antidepressant or anxiolytic medication.  Any changes to the findings are 
reported. 
 
10.3.1.2 Data analysis 
Where possible, data were analysed using parametric tests.  For these tests, scores represented 
as proportions were transformed using the arcsine transformation ([f(x) = 2arcsin(proportion 
score)
½
]; see Howell, 1997) to reduce the skew of residuals.  The maximum run lengths and 
the Learning/Memory parameter of the EVL model were log transformed [f(x) = log(score)] 
to reduce skew.  Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied where the assumption of 
sphericity was violated.  Given the directionality of the hypotheses, one-tailed tests of 
significance (α = 0.1) were used. 
 
Exploratory correlations were carried out to assess the influence of general levels of anxiety 
and depression (as measured using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, see Section 
3.5.6) on the dependent measures.  Scatterplots were inspected visually for outliers.  These 
variables were included as covariates in the ANOVA where correlations were significant 
(Clark et al., 2009), and the assumption of homogeneity of regression was met (Pallant, 
2005). 
 
10.4 Results 
10.4.1 Decision-making performance on the IGT 
The performance of the two groups of participants on the IGT is shown in Figure 10.1.  
Repeated measures ANOVA of Block (5 levels: 5 consecutive blocks of 23 trials) by Group 
(2 levels: ASC and controls) showed a main effect of Block (F(3.5, 252.2) = 26.65, p<0.001), 
indicating that both groups learnt to make more selections from the advantageous decks.  
Contrary to expectations, an effect of Group indicated that, compared to controls, the 
participants with ASCs made a greater proportion of advantageous choices (F(1,73) = 4.49, 
p = 0.037).  The Block × Group interaction was also significant (F(3.5, 252.2) = 4.44, 
p = 0.003).  A simple effects analysis revealed that the interaction was due to the superior 
performance of the ASC group in the final block of trials (F(1,74) = 9.01, p = 0.004).  The 
same analysis also revealed that the participants with ASCs made a significant improvement 
between Blocks 1 and 2, which was not the case in the control group (ASC group: 
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Mdifference = 0.39, p<0.001; Control group: Mdifference = -0.21, p = 0.25).  Together, these 
findings suggest that the ASC group improved at a faster rate than the control group. 
 
Figure 10.1 Performance on the IGT for the ASC and control groups 
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 10.1 shows the mean proportion of choices from the advantageous decks (A and B) for each consecutive 
block of 23 selections (115 trials in total), for both groups of participants.  Error bars represent one standard 
error of the mean.  Both groups made a greater proportion of advantageous choices as the task progressed.  
However, compared to the control group, the participants with ASCs demonstrated greater overall improvement 
on the IGT. 
 
Consistent with this finding, overall improvement on the task, measured as the difference in 
the proportion of advantageous selections between the first and final block of trials, was 
significantly higher in the ASC group (z = -3.07, p = 0.002).  Overall improvement on the 
IGT is shown in Figure 10.2. 
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Figure 10.2 Overall improvement on the IGT for both groups of participants 
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 10.2 shows the mean improvement in performance on the IGT for both groups.  This is calculated as the 
difference in the proportion of advantageous selections between Block 5 and Block 1.  Error bars represent one 
standard error of the mean.  Participants with ASCs demonstrated greater overall improvement on the IGT, 
compared to the control group. 
 
10.4.2 Selection patterns on the IGT 
Analysis of the maximum number of consecutive selections from a single deck (termed ‘run 
length’, see Johnson et al., 2006) revealed a distinct selection pattern between the two groups.  
However, this distinction was contrary to the pattern expected.  For the advantageous decks, 
the participants with an ASC made longer stretches of consecutive choices from the same 
deck, compared to participants in the control group (ASC group: M = 29.6 trials, SD = 27.24; 
control group: M = 12.1 trials, SD = 16.2, z = -3.80, p < 0.001).  The mean maximum run 
length for the disadvantageous decks did not differ between the groups (ASC group: M = 7.5 
trials, SD = 5.87; Control group: M = 6.2 trials, SD = 3.43, z = -0.07, p = 0.95).  The mean 
maximum run length for the advantageous and disadvantageous decks is shown in Figure 
10.3. 
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Figure 10.3 Mean maximum run lengths of consecutive choices from the same deck 
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 10.3 shows the mean maximum run lengths of consecutive choices from the same deck on the IGT, for 
both the ASC and control groups.  Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.  The mean maximum 
run length for the advantageous decks was significantly longer for the ASC group, compared to the control 
group.  However, there was no significant difference for the disadvantageous decks 
 
Examples of the typical selection pattern demonstrated by two participants with an ASC are 
shown in Figure 10.4.  These are shown alongside the selection patterns of the two control 
participants most closely matched to them for age and Verbal IQ.  This shows how the 
participants with ASCs made more consecutive selections from the same deck towards the 
end of the task when they had learnt the contingencies.  This suggests that exploration and/or 
risk-taking by making occasional selections from the disadvantageous decks was limited in 
the ASC group.  The possibility that the control participants did not learn the overall 
contingencies is not supported by the findings from the main repeated measures ANOVA 
(see section 10.4.1), which found a main effect of Block. 
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Figure 10.4 IGT selection patterns for two participants with an ASC and control 
participants of similar age and intellectual ability 
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 10.4 shows the IGT selection patterns for two participants with an ASC, and the control participants 
most closely matched to them for age and Verbal IQ.  The participants with ASC made much longer stretches of 
consecutive selections from the same deck, especially towards the end of the task when they had learnt the 
contingencies. 
 
10.4.3 Application of the Expectancy-Valence Learning (EVL) model 
The response patterns of individuals were investigated using the EVL model, which provides 
estimates for three parameters believed to contribute to performance on the IGT (see Section 
3.4.6.1).  The fit of the EVL model (its ability to predict the trial by trial selections for each 
participant) was evaluated by comparing it with a control model (the Bernoulli model), which 
takes no account of learning from past outcomes.  This was calculated using the G
2 
statistic 
(Busemeyer & Wang, 2000), which is an analogue of the χ2 statistic.  Positive values of G2 
indicate that the fit of the EVL model to the data is superior to that of the control model; 
negative values indicate that the fit of the control model is superior to that of the EVL model.  
The fit of the EVL model was satisfactory: 80% of the participants had positive values of G
2. 
 
This is virtually identical to the 78% of neurotypical participants producing positive G
2
 
values in Busemeyer & Stout (2002) when they developed the model.  The overall fit of the 
EVL model was better than that found by Johnson et al. (2006), in which only 55% of 
participants overall had positive values of G
2
, (χ2 (1, N = 76) = 5.94, p = 0.026); they did not 
present data regarding the fit of the EVL model for each group separately.  In the present 
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study, the fit of the EVL model did not differ between the ASC and control groups (χ2 (1, 
N = 76) = 0.32, p = 0.57).  This differs from the result found by Yechiam et al. (2010). 
 
10.4.4 Comparison of the EVL model parameters 
The mean and median estimates of the three parameters produced by the EVL model for each 
group are shown in Table 10.1.  None of the three parameters differed between the groups.  It 
is surprising that the response consistency parameter, denoted c, did not differ significantly 
between the groups, given the significantly longer run lengths demonstrated by the 
participants with ASCs.  However, the direction of the non-significant difference in c is 
consistent with the longer run lengths demonstrated in the ASC participants.  These results 
suggest that both groups: i) integrated information about the deck contingencies across the 
task; and ii) paid similar overall attention to losses compared to wins. 
 
Table 10.1 Summary of the estimated EVL model parameters for both groups of 
participants 
 
Group 
Learning/memory (a) Attention to losses (w) Response consistency (c) 
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
ASCs (n = 38) 0.23 0.08 0.32 0.44 0.39 0.27 1.57 1.34 2.06 
Controls (n = 38) 0.22 0.05 0.35 0.47 0.42 0.28 0.98 1.19 1.78 
 
____________________ 
Table 10.1 shows a summary of the three EVL model parameter estimates for the ASC and control groups.  The 
Learning/memory parameter, a, ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 reflecting learning over long spans of trials and 1 
reflecting strong recency effects; the Attention to losses parameter, w, ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 reflecting a 
strong attraction to wins, and 1 reflecting a strong aversion to loss; the Response consistency parameter, c, 
ranges from -5 to +5, with -5 reflecting random selection, and +5 reflecting consistent application of the 
expectancies assigned to each deck.  There are no significant differences between the groups using the 
parameters generated for 115 trials. 
 
10.4.5 Post-hoc analysis 
Since the participants with ASC demonstrated a superior performance on the IGT, a post-hoc 
analysis was carried out to examine the relationship between IGT performance and particular 
experiences of difficulty in decision-making in everyday life.  Three self-reported problems 
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in decision-making (from the questionnaire of decision-making experiences, see 
Section 3.4.1) were selected for this analysis, which could, in theory, be a consequence of a 
more logical (in this case, better quality) decision-making analysis.  These were: i) problems 
taking a long time to make decisions; ii) problems with mental ‘freezing’ (overload); and iii) 
problems with exhaustion.  One participant was an outlier (more than 3 times the interquartile 
range from the quartile boundary) and removed from the first and second of these analyses.  
 
There was a significant relationship between the self-reported frequency of problems with 
taking a long time to make decisions and performance on the IGT, when the participants 
taking antidepressants or anxiolytics were excluded (ASC group: F(1, 24) = 9.10, p = 0.006).  
As the frequency of this self-reported problem increased, so too did performance on the IGT.  
The relationships between the self-reported frequency of problems with mental ‘freezing’ and 
exhaustion were not related to IGT performance (F(1, 34) = 0.122, p = 0.73, F(1, 34) = 0.55, 
p = 0.46, respectively, α’ = 0.025, α = 0.05). 
 
10.5 Summary of findings 
Contrary to expectations, the participants with ASCs demonstrated significantly better 
performance on the IGT, compared to the control group.  Contrary to the initial hypothesis, 
the participants with ASCs shifted less frequently between the decks, compared to the control 
group.  Contrary to expectations, the participants did not demonstrate greater attention to 
losses, as measured using the EVL model parameter; neither did they demonstrate reduced 
response consistency, compared to control participants.  Contrary to the results of Yechiam et 
al. (2010), the EVL model provided a good fit for the response patterns of the majority of 
participants, both with and without ASCs.  Finally, the superior performance demonstrated by 
participants with ASCs was related to the self-reported frequency of slowness in decision-
making in real life. 
 
10.6 Discussion of results 
The choices made by this group of participants with ASCs did not resemble those made by 
the participants recruited by Johnson et al. (2006) and Yechiam et al. (2010).  Their 
participants made distinctly erratic choices compared to the control participants, despite both 
groups demonstrating that they had learnt the contingencies associated with each deck.  In 
contrast, in the present study, the opposite pattern of responding was observed, although, as 
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in the previous studies, both groups demonstrated that they had learnt the contingencies.  No 
differences were found in the groups’ attention to loss using the EVL model, which does not 
support the prediction made by Johnson et al. (2006). 
  
The superior performance of the participants with ASCs is likely to be due to the consistency 
with which they made selections from one advantageous deck.  This consistency may reflect 
a dislike of risk-taking;  towards the end of the task, the typical strategy demonstrated by 
control participants was to make most selections from the advantageous decks with 
occasional selections from the disadvantageous decks (after all, Deck D could still provide a 
large win on 9 out of 10 selections).  While this is a reasonable strategy, it produces a lower 
proportion of advantageous choices when analysed in blocks of consecutive trials, as shown 
in Figure 10.1.  It is also possible that the participants with ASCs were better able to focus on 
the objective of the task without losing interest. 
 
Differences between the findings in the present and previous studies may reflect differences 
in the ages of the sample populations.  The participants recruited by Johnson et al. (2006) and 
Yechiam et al. (2010) were considerably younger (M = 16.1 years, SD = 2.3 and M = 15.6 
years, SD = 2.8, respectively), than the participants recruited for this study (M = 34.0 years, 
SD = 15.5.  Adolescents have been found to make more risky choices on the IGT, compared 
to young adults (Cauffman et al., 2010), and this may account for the more erratic choices 
demonstrated by the adolescents with ASCs in the previous studies.  The only other known 
difference between the participants recruited in present and previous studies is that the AQ 
scores would have been higher in Yechiam et al. (2010).  They used a cut-off score of 32, 
whereas a cut-off score of 26, found to have good specificity as a screen for diagnosis 
(Woodbury-Smith et al., 2005), was used in this study to provide additional information 
about diagnostic integrity.  However, this explanation for the difference in findings was not 
supported by an analysis of the correlation between IGT performance and AQ (Kendall’s τ = 
0.0, p>0.999) for the ASC participants in this study. 
 
It is of interest that, for the participants with ASCs, there was a significant relationship 
between self-reported slowness to make decisions in real life and quality of decision-making 
on the IGT.  This suggests that participants with ASCs who reported problems with 
deliberation time may be those who made more logical decisions. 
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A key limitation of the IGT is that it lacks ecological validity, despite capturing the aspect of 
uncertainty that is associated with many decisions in real life.  It is, however, widely used to 
assess decision-making, and its inclusion in this study has provided information about the 
performance of a large group of people with ASCs, who are older than those previously 
studied.  The findings differ from those of previous studies, but suggest that adults with ASCs 
are not only able to focus on these types of decisions, but also to learn by experience to make 
advantageous decisions.  The response patterns may also reflect a reluctance to take risks 
once the deck contingencies have been learnt.  A real-life implication of these findings, 
supported by the correlation with self-reported problems slowness in decision-making, may 
be that people with ASCs attempt to make logical decisions, which demand time and 
cognitive resources, to a greater extent than is typical within the general population.  This 
interpretation is consistent with the finding by De Martino et al. (2008) that people with 
ASCs are more logical in laboratory-based tasks of decision-making. 
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CHAPTER 11: DO PARTICIPANTS WITH ASCS 
DEMONSTRATE REDUCED RELIANCE ON 
HEURISTICS? 
 
11.1 Background 
Heuristics are general strategies (‘short-cuts’) used to simplify some of the complex mental 
processes involved in decision-making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Gilovich et al., 2002; 
Kochler & Harvey, 2004, see Section 1.3.2).  Most of the time, they facilitate adaptive and 
efficient decision-making; in some situations, however, their use can result in systematic 
biases towards particular response options (Kahneman et al., 1982).  Heuristics, and the 
biases they generate, are typically demonstrated in research by using questions carefully 
constructed to offer a ‘rational’ or ‘correct’ choice, and an ‘incorrect’ choice that leads 
naturally from the heuristic-led thought process. 
 
The findings from the initial survey suggested that people with ASCs often find decision-
making overwhelming and exhausting (see Section 2.3.1 and Section 2.3.2.2).  Since 
heuristics can reduce the cognitive demands of decision-making, the focus of this chapter is 
to consider whether the additional effort in decision making reported by people with ASCs 
might be explained by a reduced reliance on heuristic short-cuts.  It is important to note, 
however, that robust demonstrations of heuristic-led biases tend to require large sample sizes 
(e.g. N = 100) due to the limited, categorical response options of the questions that 
demonstrate the bias.  For this reason, the data presented in this chapter should be considered 
as merely exploratory, and highlight potential areas for future research.  
 
The tasks used to assess reliance on heuristics were six short, quiz-like questions (described 
in detail in Section 3.4.7) and the Risky Choice Task (RCT) (described in Section 3.4.5).  
Together, these questions have been shown to demonstrate reliance on the: i) 
Representativeness; ii) Availability; iii) Anchoring-Adjustment; and iv) Affect heuristics, 
which are four of the most well known biases in human decision-making (see Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974; Gilovich et al., 2002; see Section 3.4.7 for description of each of these 
heuristics.).  A summary of these tasks is shown in Table 11.1. 
   
 
Table 11.1 Summary of tasks used to assess reliance on heuristics in decision-making 
Heuristic Task/Question Summary Demonstrable error/bias Original finding 
Representativeness 
Birth Order 
(Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1972) 
Judge how many families of six children in a city have the birth order ‘B 
G B B B B’ if 72 families have the birth order ‘G B G B B G’.  
Misconception of chance, influenced by the 
similarity of the sample to the parent population. 
82% of participants incorrectly judged 
the number of families to be less than 72.  
(N = 92) 
Hospital Births  
(Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1972) 
Judge whether the number of days on which more than 60% of babies 
born are boys is greater in a small hospital, a large hospital, or about the 
same in both. 
Insensitivity to sample size, influenced by 
attending to the similarity of the percentage 
(60% boys) to the parent population (50% boys) 
56% of participants incorrectly judged 
the number of days to be about the same 
in both hospitals; 24% incorrectly judged 
the number of days to be greater in the 
large hospital.  (N = 50) 
Availability 
Path Frequency 
(Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973 
Judge whether one type of path is more frequent than another type of 
path in a 6x6 grid of two types of symbols (X and O).  Paths of six 
symbols are constructed by linking symbols from the top to the bottom 
of the grid.  The two path types considered are those containing 5X’s and 
1O, and those containing 6X’s and no O’s.   
Bias of imaginability, due to the immediate 
visibility of several examples of the less frequent 
path type; examples of the other path type 
require mental visualization.  
76% of participants incorrectly judged 
the less frequent path type (5X’s and 1O) 
as more numerous.  (N = 50) 
‘R’ Position 
(Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973) 
Judge whether the letter ‘R’ is more likely to appear in the first or third 
position in English words, of three letters or more. 
Bias due to the effectiveness of a search 
technique, as it is easier to call to mind words 
that being with a letter than words with the letter 
in the third position. 
69% of participants incorrectly judged 
that the letter would be more likely to 
appear in the first than the third position 
of words.  (This includes responses for 
four additional letters of similar 
positional frequency to ‘R’).  (N = 152) 
Anchoring-
adjustment 
Conjunctive Vs. 
Simple gambles 
(Bar-Hillel, 1973) 
Judge whether to take a simple gamble (e.g. pick one red marble from a 
bag containing 50% red marbles) or a conjunctive gamble (e.g. pick a red 
marble seven times in a row, with replacement, from a bag containing 
90% red marbles). 
Insufficient adjustment down from the simple 
probability to the conjunctive probability. 
80% of participants incorrectly chose the 
conjunctive over the simple gamble. 
(N = 15) 
Disjunctive Vs. 
Simple gambles 
(Bar-Hillel, 1973) 
Judge whether to take a simple gamble (e.g. pick one red marble from a 
bag containing 50% red marbles) or a disjunctive gamble (e.g. pick a red 
marble at least once in seven draws, with replacement, from a bag 
containing 10% red marbles). 
Insufficient adjustment up from the simple 
probability to the disjunctive probability. 
80% of participants incorrectly chose the 
simple over the disjunctive gamble. 
(N = 20) 
Affect 
Asian Flu 
(Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981) 
Choose one of two treatment programmes to combat a pandemic.  One 
programme has a certain outcome, the other is probabilistic.  The 
question is presented in two formats; one focusing on the lives saved, the 
other focusing on lives lost.   The question is presented once in each 
format 
Framing effect, charactersied by the tendency to 
be risk averse when considering possible gains 
and risk taking when considering possible losses.   
72% of participants were risk averse in 
the gain frame; 22% of participants were 
risk averse in the loss frame.  (N = 155) 
Risky Choice Task 
(Fairchild et al., 
2009) 
Choose one of two gambles with equal expected values.  One has a 
certain outcome, the other is probabilistic.  The question is presented in 
two formats; one presenting wins, the other presenting losses.  The 
question is presented eight times in each format.   
Risk taking occurred on 45% of ‘gain-
focused’ trials and 71% of ‘loss-focused’ 
trials.  (N = 84) 
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11.2 A priori hypotheses 
Combining the findings from the initial survey with the finding that adults with ASCs are 
generally less susceptible to framing effects underpinned by the Affect heuristic (De Martino 
et al., 2008), the following predictions were made.  Compared to the control group, 
participants with ASCs would demonstrate: 
1. reduced reliance on the Representativeness heuristic (indicated by more participants 
with ASCs selecting the correct options on the Birth Order (Appendix Hi) and/or the 
Hospital Births (Appendix Hii) questions); 
2. reduced reliance on the Availability heuristic (indicated by more participants with 
ASCs selecting the correct option on the Path Frequency question (Appendix Hiii) 
and/or selecting the options with equal frequency on the ‘R’ position (Appendix Hiv) 
question); 
3. reduced reliance on the Anchoring-Adjustment heuristic (indicated by more 
participants with ASCs selecting the conjunctive and simple gambles that have a 
higher likelihood of success) (Appendix Hv and Hvi); and 
4. reduced reliance on the Affect heuristic (indicated by a reduced susceptibility to the 
framing effect on the Asian Flu question (Appendix Hvii) and the RCT). 
In addition, it was expected that susceptibility to the Affect heuristic would: 
5. correlate negatively with an index of the number of autistic traits; 
6. correlate negatively with particular self-reported difficulties in decision-making that 
may, in theory, reflect more effortful processing: i) exhaustion during decision-
making; ii) mental ‘freezing’ during decision-making; and iii) slowness in decision-
making. 
 
11.2.1 Experimental details 
11.2.1.1 Participants 
The data presented are based on the responses of 38 participants with an ASC and 40 
participants in the control group.  The effects of medication on the RCT were controlled for 
by repeating each of the analyses with and without the ten participants taking antidepressant 
or anxiolytic medication.  Exclusion of these participants did not affect the findings.  This 
control was not applied to the data for the quiz-like questions, as large sample sizes are 
required for meaningful analysis of this type of categorical data.   
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11.2.1.2 Data analysis 
Data from the quiz-like questions were analysed using chi-squared tests of independence 
(N = 78), and data from the RCT were analysed using non-parametric statistics, due to non-
normality of the means and residuals after applying an arcsine transformation (see Howell, 
1997).  Relationships between variables were examined using Kendall’s correlation 
coefficient (for two continuous variables) and ANOVA linear contrasts (for one continuous 
and one ordinal variable).  To control for multiple comparisons, the Dunn-Sidak correction 
was applied to these analyses.  Given the directionality of the hypotheses, one-tailed (α = 0.1) 
tests of significance were used.  The exception to this was the chi-squared tests, which are, by 
their nature, are non-directional.  The chi-squared tests were thresholded at α = 0.05.  
 
11.3 Results 
11.3.1 Reliance on the Representativeness heuristic 
11.3.1.1 Misconceptions of chance influenced by similarity to the parent population 
The distribution of responses to the Birth Order question is shown in Figure 11.1.  The data 
presented are based on the responses of 72 participants, as four participants with an ASC and 
two participants in the control group did not feel able to answer this question.  Contrary to the 
initial hypothesis, the distribution of responses to the Birth Order question did not differ 
between the groups (χ2 test of independence (1, N = 72) = 0.01, p = 0.92).  The modal 
response in both groups was that the number of families with the birth order ‘B G B B B B’ 
would be less than 72 (ASC group: 65%; Control group: 66%).  While the distribution of 
responses in the control group is consistent with findings of Kahneman & Tversky (1972) (in 
which 82% of participants judged that the number of families would be less than 72; χ2 (1, 
N = 130) = 3.75, p = 0.053)
 f
, the bias demonstrated in this study is clearly less pronounced.  
These findings suggest that there is no difference in the tendency of the groups to rely on the 
Representativeness heuristic to answer this question.  However, the participants in the control 
group did not demonstrate a bias as strong as was expected, based on the findings of the 
original study. 
 
  
                                                 
f
 Chi-squared test of independence between the control group in the present study and the participants recruited 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1972) (n = 38 and n = 92, respectively). 
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Figure 11.1 The distribution of participants’ responses to the ‘Birth Order’ question 
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 11.1 shows the distribution of responses of both groups of participants to the Birth Order question.  
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1972), reliance on the Representativeness heuristic is demonstrated by a 
tendency to judge that the number of families with the ‘B G B B B B’ will be less than 72.  This is the modal 
response in both groups of participants. 
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11.3.1.2 Insensitivity to sample size 
The distribution of responses is shown in Figure 11.2.  Contrary to the initial hypothesis, the 
distribution of responses to the Hospital Births question did not differ between the groups 
(χ2(2, N = 78) = 0.80, p = 0.67).  The modal response in both groups was that the number of 
days on which ‘more than 60% of babies born were boys’ would be the same in the small and 
the large hospital (ASC group: 53%; Control group: 60%).  This finding is consistent with 
that of Kahneman & Tversky (1972), in which 56% of participants judged that the number of 
days would be the same in the small and the large hospital, (χ2(2, N = 90) = 1.21, p = 0.55).  
This apparent lack of sensitivity to sample size suggests that both groups tend to rely on the 
Representativeness heuristic to answer this question. 
 
Figure 11.2 The distribution of responses to the Hospital Births question 
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 11.2 shows the distribution of responses of both groups to the Hospital Births question.  According to 
Kahneman & Tversky (1972), reliance on the Representativeness heuristic is demonstrated by a tendency to 
judge that the number of days on which ‘more than 60% of the babies born were boys’ would be the same in a 
small and a large hospital.  This is the modal response in both groups of participants. 
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11.3.2 Reliance on the Availability heuristic 
11.3.2.1 Bias of imaginability 
The distribution of responses to the Path Frequency question is shown in Figure 11.3.  The 
data presented are based on the responses of 77 participants, as one participant in the control 
group did not feel able to answer the question.  A slightly smaller proportion of participants 
with an ASC selected the incorrect answer, compared to the control participants (53%, and 
59%, respectively).  While the direction of this difference in the distributions is consistent 
with the initial hypothesis (that the participants with ASCs would demonstrate a smaller 
Availability heuristic-led bias) the response distributions of the two groups do not differ 
significantly (χ2(1, N = 77) = 0.31, p = 0.58).  The distribution of responses in the control 
group was consistent with the findings of Tversky & Kahneman (1973), in which 76% of 
participants judged that there were more paths containing 5X’s and 1O, (χ2(1, N = 89) = 2.95, 
p = 0.086), although the bias demonstrated by the control participants in the present study is 
less pronounced than was found in the original study (see Discussion, Section 11.5). 
 
These findings show that the groups did not differ in their tendency to rely on the Availability 
heuristic, although the control group demonstrated a bias smaller than expected given the 
response distribution found by Tversky & Kahneman (1973).  However, as exploratory data, 
the response distribution does indicate a slight trend towards reduced bias in the ASC group. 
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Figure 11.3 The distribution of responses to the Path Frequency question 
 
 
_______________________ 
Figure 11.3 shows the distribution of responses of both groups to the Path Frequency question.  According to 
Tversky & Kahneman (1973), reliance on the Availability heuristic is demonstrated by a tendency to judge that 
there are more paths containing 5X’s and 1O than paths containing 6X’s and no O’s.  The modal response in 
both groups was that paths of 5X’s and 1O would be more frequent than paths of 6X’s and no O’s.  Although a 
greater proportion of the control group judged this path type to be more frequent, the distribution of responses 
does not differ significantly between the groups.   
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11.3.2.2 Bias due to the effectiveness of the search technique 
The distribution of responses to the ‘R’ Position question is shown in Figure 11.4.  A smaller 
proportion of participants with an ASC selected the incorrect answer, compared to the control 
participants (54% and 74%, respectively).  The direction of this difference is consistent with 
the initial hypothesis, but the difference between the groups is not statistically significant 
χ2(1, N = 76) = 3.42, p = 0.065).  Analysed separately, however, the response distribution of 
the ASC group did not differ from chance (χ2 goodness-of-fit (1, N = 37) = 0.11, p = 0.75), 
while the response distribution of the control group did differ significantly from chance (χ2 
goodness-of-fit (1, N = 39) = 9.26, p = 0.002).  The distribution of responses in the control 
group was consistent with the findings of Tversky & Kahneman  (1973), in which 69% of 
participants selected the incorrect option (χ2(1, N = 191) = 0.41, p = 0.52).  
 
These findings suggest that reduced reliance on the Availability heuristic may be associated 
with ASCs, although the difference in the distributions of responses between the groups only 
approached statistical significance with this sample size.  Replication of these proportions 
with a larger sample size (e.g. n > 74)
g
 would provide sufficient power to test this hypothesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
g
 This is the sample size required to detect a difference in the observed proportions with 70% power. 
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Figure 11.4 The distribution of responses to the ‘R’ Position question 
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 11.4 shows the distribution of responses for both groups of participants to the ‘R’ Position question.  
According to Tversky & Kahneman (1973), reliance on the Availability heuristic is demonstrated by a tendency 
to judge that the letter ‘R’ occurs more frequently in the first than the third position in English words.  Although 
a smaller proportion of participants with ASCs selected the first position, compared to the control group, the 
difference in the distribution of responses between the two groups only approached significance. 
 
11.3.3 Reliance on the Anchoring-Adjustment heuristic 
11.3.3.1 Insufficient adjustment when choosing between conjunctive and simple gambles 
The distribution of responses to the three Conjunctive vs. Simple Gamble questions is shown 
in Figure 11.5.  Contrary to the initial hypothesis, the groups did not differ in their responses 
(χ2(3, N = 78) = 5.49, p = 0.14).  However, the modal response for the ASC group was to 
choose 2 out of 3 conjunctive gambles (45%) and the modal response for the control group 
was to choose 3 out of 3 conjunctive gambles (33%). This is in line with initial expectations.  
The bias demonstrated by the control group was not as pronounced as that found by Bar-
Hillel (1973).  This may be attributed to the fact that for Question B the distribution of 
responses in the control group was not consistent with the distribution found by Bar-Hillel 
(1973) (χ2(1, N = 55) = 4.04, p = 0.045).   
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These results do not provide evidence to support the hypothesis that the participants with 
ASCs relied less on the Anchoring-Adjustment heuristic to answer these questions than the 
control group.  However, as exploratory data, the response distributions do show a slight 
trend towards reduced bias in the ASC group. 
 
Figure 11.5 The distribution of responses for the Conjunctive vs. Simple Gambles question 
 
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 11.5 shows the distribution of responses for both groups of participants to the Conjunctive vs. Simple 
gamble questions.  According to Bar-Hillel (1973) and Tversky & Kahneman (1974), reliance on the 
Anchoring-Adjustment heuristic is demonstrated by a tendency to select conjunctive gambles more often than 
simple gambles.   The modal response in the ASC group was to choose 2 out of 3 conjunctive gambles, whereas 
the modal response in the control group was to choose 3 out of 3 conjunctive gambles.  However, the 
distribution of responses does not differ significantly between the groups. 
 
11.3.3.2 Insufficient adjustment when choosing between disjunctive and simple gambles 
The distribution of responses to the Disjunctive vs. Simple Gambles questions is shown in 
Figure 11.6.  Contrary to the initial hypothesis, the groups did not differ in their responses 
χ2(3, N = 78) = 4.26, p = 0.23).  The modal response of the ASC participants was to choose 1 
out of 3 simple gambles, and the modal response in the control group was to choose 2 out 3 
simple gambles.  The distribution of responses in the control group was not consistent with 
26%
11%
45%
18%18%
23%
28%
33%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
0 1 2 3
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
 in
 e
ac
h
 g
ro
u
p
Number of times the conjunctive gamble was chosen
ASC group
Control group
   
144 
 
the distributions found by Bar-Hillel (1973) for any of the three questions.  These findings, 
therefore, imply that neither group relied upon the Anchoring-Adjustment heuristic to answer 
these questions. 
 
Figure 11.6 The distribution of responses to the Disjunctive vs. Simple Gambles questions 
 
 
____________________ 
Figure 11.6 shows the distribution of responses for both groups to the Disjunctive vs. Simple Gamble questions.  
According to Bar-Hillel (1973) and Tversky & Kahneman (1974), reliance on the Anchoring-Adjustment 
heuristic is demonstrated by a tendency to select simple gambles more often than disjunctive gambles.  The 
distribution of responses suggests that neither group relied on the Anchoring-Adjustment heuristic to answer 
these questions.   
 
11.3.4 Reliance on the Affect heuristic 
11.3.4.1 The framing effect on a the Asian Flu question (single trial) 
The distribution of responses to the two question formats of the Asian flu question is shown 
in Figure 11.7.  Contrary to the initial hypothesis, the groups did not differ in the distribution 
of their responses to the two versions of the question (Gain-focused format: 
χ2(1, N = 78) = 0.03, p = 0.87; Loss-focused format: χ2(1, N = 78) = 0.79, p = 0.38).  
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Loss-focused format (ASC group: 50% participants selected the risk taking option; Control 
group: 60% participants selected the risk taking option) is in line with the initial hypothesis.  
The absence of a significant finding in the present study may be due to the smaller bias 
demonstrated by the control group, compared to the participants recruited by Tversky & 
Kahneman (1981).  In their study, 78% of control participants selected the risk-seeking 
option in the Loss-focused format, which is significantly different from the corresponding 
proportion found in the present study (χ2(1, N = 195) = 5.44, p = 0.02).  
 
Despite the above negative findings, it is worth considering the consistency of participants’ 
responses (whether risk-averse or risk-taking) on the two question formats, since DeMartino 
et al (2008) report enhanced consistency between positive and negatively framed questions in 
people with ASCs that was independent of individual differences in risk-taking.  These data 
are shown in Figure 11.8.  The participants with ASCs in the present study were more 
consistent in their responses between the two question formats.  In the ASC group, 82% of 
participants were consistent in their choices, while only 55% of the control were consistent in 
their choices (χ2(1,N = 78) = 4.36, p = 0.037).  This suggests that, overall, the participants 
with ASCs were less influenced by the wording of the question and more consistent in their 
responses compared to the control group. 
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Figure 11.7 The distribution of responses to the two formats of the Asian Flu question 
 
a) Gain-focused format 
 
b) Loss-focused format 
 
____________________ 
Figure 11.7 shows the distribution of the responses of both groups to the Asian Flu question: a) shows the 
responses to the Gain-focused format of the question; b) shows the responses to the Loss-focused format of the 
question.  According to Tversky & Kahneman (1981) and DeMartino et al. (2006), the framing effect is 
underpinned by the Affect heuristic, which is demonstrated by a tendency to be risk-averse (preferring the 
certain option) when focusing on gains, and risk-seeking (preferring the probabilistic option) when focusing on 
losses.  Although the proportion of the participants with ASCs selecting the risk-seeking option is smaller in the 
Loss-focused format, compared to the control group, the distributions of responses do not show a statistically 
significant difference between the groups. 
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Figure 11.8 The proportion of participants responding consistently between the two 
formats of the Asian Flu question 
 
 
___________________ 
Figure 11.8 shows the proportions of participants in both groups responding consistently between the two 
formats of the Asian Flu question.  According to Tversky & Kahneman (1981), the format of the questions elicits 
a framing effect demonstrated by preference reversal.  The participants with ASCs demonstrated greater 
consistency in their responses (whether risk-averse or risk-taking), compared to the control group. 
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11.3.4.2 The framing effect on the Risky Choice Task (multiple trials) 
The proportion of probabilistic choices made in each condition of the Risky Choice Task 
(RCT) is shown in Figure 11.9.  Contrary to the initial hypothesis, the participants with ASCs 
did not demonstrate reduced susceptibility to the framing effect (z = -1.17, p = 0.24), 
although the small non-significant difference in the magnitude of the framing effect between 
the groups (ASC group: 31% fewer risky choices in gain frame compared to the loss frame; 
Control group: 38% fewer risky choices in the gain frame compared to the loss frame) is in 
the direction predicted by the initial hypothesis.   Both groups demonstrated a framing effect 
by choosing the probabilistic (risk-taking) option more frequently in the Loss condition, 
compared to the Gain condition (ASC group: z = -3.83, p<0.001; Control group: z = -4.53, 
p<0.001).  These findings suggest that participants with an ASC demonstrated a framing 
effect similar to that of the control participants on the RCT.   
 
Figure 11.9 The proportion of probabilistic (risky) choices made in the Loss-frame and 
Gain-frames on the Risky Choice Task 
 
____________________ 
Figure 11.9 shows the mean proportion of trials in which the probabilistic (risky) gamble was chosen for the 
two framing conditions of the Risky Choice Task, for both groups of participants.  According to Tversky & 
Kahneman (1981), participants tend to be risk-averse (preferring the certain option) when focusing on gains, 
and risk-taking (preferring the probabilistic option) when focusing on losses.  Both groups demonstrated a 
framing effect by choosing the probabilistic option more often in the Loss frame compared to the Gain frame.  
There was no difference in the mean magnitude of the framing effect between the groups.  The magnitude of the 
framing effect was calculated by subtracting the proportion of probabilistic choices in the Gain frame from the 
proportion of probabilistic choices in the Loss frame.     
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11.3.4.3 Correlations between the framing effect and relevant participant characteristics 
Although the groups did not differ in their susceptibility to the framing effect on the RCT, 
two correlation analyses were carried out to establish whether magnitude of the framing 
effect (a continuous variable) was inversely related to: 1) the Autism Spectrum Quotient 
(AQ) score; and 2) the frequency of self-reported problems with i) mental ‘freezing’ 
(‘analysis paralysis’) during decision-making, ii) taking a long time to make decisions, and 
iii) feeling exhausted by decision-making (self-reports provided by the survey questions 
administered in the experimental study, see Section 3.4.1).  The survey questions selected for 
analysis were those with a theoretical link to more effortful processing in decision-making.  
The magnitude of the framing effect was calculated by subtracting the proportion of risky 
choices made in the gain frame, from the proportion of risky choices made in the loss frame. 
 
There was no overall correlation between AQ scores and the magnitude of framing effects on 
the RCT (Kendall’s τ = -0.086, p = 0.30).  This suggests that susceptibility to the framing 
effect is not related to this index of the number of autistic traits.  The magnitude of the 
framing effect was, however, inversely related to the self-reported frequency of mental 
‘freezing’ during decision-making (F(1, 72) = 5.29, p = 0.025, α’ = 0.0259).  The 
relationships between magnitude of the framing effect and feelings of exhaustion and 
slowness during decision-making were not significant (F(1, 72) = 0.361, p = 0.062 and 
F(1, 71) = 0.322, p = 0.57, respectively).  This suggests that reduced susceptibility to the 
framing effect, thought to be underpinned by the Affect heuristic, is associated with more 
frequent feelings of mental ‘freezing’ (‘analysis paralysis’) during decision-making.  This 
relationship is consistent with the view that reliance on heuristics can reduce the cognitive 
demands required to make certain decisions. 
 
11.4 Summary of findings 
Contrary to the initial hypotheses, the participants with ASCs responded similarly to the 
control group on the tasks constructed to demonstrate reliance on the Representativeness, 
Anchoring-Adjustment and the Affect heuristics.  However, the results suggest a trend for 
participants with ASCs to demonstrate reduced reliance on the Availability heuristic although 
a larger scale study would be required to confirm this trend.  While the groups did not differ 
in their susceptibility to the framing effect on the Asian flu question, the participants with 
ASCs were less likely to reverse their preference (whether risk-averse or risk-taking) between 
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the two question formats.  Finally, the framing effect, as measured by the Risky Choice Task 
(RCT), did not differ between the groups and was not associated with an index of the number 
of autistic traits.  Reduced framing effects were, however, associated with the frequency of 
self-reported problems of mental ‘freezing (‘analysis paralysis’) during decision-making. 
 
11.5 Discussion of results 
This exploratory study was carried out to assess whether reduced reliance on heuristic short-
cuts could account for the feelings of exhaustion reported by people with ASCs in the initial 
survey of decision-making experiences.  For the most part, the findings from the quiz-like 
questions and the RCT do not provide evidence to support this hypothesis.  In particular, the 
participants with ASCs demonstrated clear reliance on the Representativeness heuristic for 
the Hospital Births question, and a robust framing effect on the RCT.  However, the findings 
from the ‘R’ Position question, tends to suggest that participants with ASCs are less reliant on 
the Availability heuristic than control participants.  In addition, the findings from the Asian 
Flu question suggest that participants with ASCs are less likely to reverse their preference 
(whether risk-averse or risk-taking) with a change in the question format, compared to the 
control participants. 
 
For most of the tasks, there were small, non-significant differences in the distributions of 
responses between the groups that were consistent with the initial hypotheses; the main 
limitation in carrying out a robust test of these hypotheses appears to be the sample size.  
While the demonstrations published by Tversky & Kahneman, and their colleagues typically 
used a sample size in excess of 50, the sample size in the present study was significantly 
smaller than this since the investigation was powered on the basis of a test described in an 
earlier chapter.  If further studies were to be conducted, it would be particularly worthwhile 
considering the ‘R’ position question,  since, based on the proportions found here, the initial 
hypothesis may be adequately tested with around 80 participants. 
 
The similarity between the groups may also be due to the responses of the control group.  
Although the distribution of responses between the present control group and the participants 
in the original studies did not differ significantly from one another in the Birth Order, Path 
Frequency, Avian Flu (gain frame), and Conjunctive vs. Simple gamble questions, the biases 
demonstrated by the control group in this study were clearly less pronounced than previously 
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reported.  It is, therefore, difficult to know whether the lack of a statistically significant 
difference between the ASC and control groups is a real effect or indicates an abnormal 
control group.  It is possible that the general method of administration of the questions 
reduced their effectiveness as demonstrations of heuristic-led biases.  For example, perhaps 
the payment offered to participants in Kahneman & Tversky (1972) and Bar-Hillel (1973), 
increased  motivation to attempt the questions?  Alternatively, the within-subject design may 
have provided cues signaling the need to override the heuristic responding system (e.g. 
Kahneman & Tversky, 2000), which might include the feeling that a series of ‘trick’ 
questions were being presented.  This can be a particular problem with participants of high 
intellectual ability (like many of those recruited in the present study), who are better able to 
override their heuristic-led response when they recognise the need to do so (Stanovich & 
West, 2008).  It is important to note, however, that many heuristic-led biases are surprisingly 
independent of cognitive ability (Stanovich & West, 2008; Morsanyi, Primi, Chiesi & 
Handley, 2009).  Another possible explanation is that the control participants’ understanding 
of probability and statistics may be superior to the psychology undergraduates recruited to the 
original studies.  In the support of this hypothesis, 43% of the control participants had further 
education qualifications in a scientific or mathematical field. 
 
Specific differences in the administration of two of the questions may also have contributed 
to the smaller biases demonstrated by the control group, compared to the findings of the 
original studies.  The effectiveness of the Path Order question may have been reduced by 
reproducing the test card with a smaller distance between the columns of symbols (5mm) in 
the 6x6 grid, than was presented in the original study (7mm), as a larger distance may further 
encourage vertical visualisation of the paths.  The administration of this question was also 
affected by the need to point out an example of a path with the first two participants of the 
study, who did not understand the written instructions that were reproduced from the original 
study.  For consistency, this practice was continued with all the participants, but may have 
emphasised the instruction that paths can be made by linking symbols in different columns. 
 
The administration of the Asian Flu question differed from the original study by presenting 
both formats of the question to each participant (within-subjects), rather than just one format 
of the question (between-subjects, see  Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  Although the order of 
presentation of the questions was fully counterbalanced, and the order of all six quiz-like 
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questions was randomised, some participants may have recognised the equivalence of the 
response options and answered the second question differently as a result (see the above 
discussion about the effects of within-participant designs).  This may explain the consistency 
demonstrated by the participants with ASCs.  Analysis of the first format of the question 
presented to participants, however, would be based on sample sizes that are too small to be 
meaningful (n = 19).  To establish whether the enhanced consistency demonstrated by the 
participants with ASCs is due to increased recognition of the equivalence of the response 
options, or a traditional framing effect, repetition of the (within-participant) experiment with 
a larger sample of participants would be required.  
 
The similarity between the performance of the two groups in the framing trials of the RCT 
was not consistent with the findings of De Martino et al. (2008).  In this study, which did not 
use the RCT but a novel task developed by the researchers, participants with ASCs 
demonstrated reduced susceptibility to framing compared to controls.  It is possible, however, 
that this difference was due to the larger number of trials presented by De Martino and his 
colleagues (192 trials, compared to 16 trials in the RCT), and differences in the task 
presentation of the gambles, which involved representations of money rather than points.  
The mean ages and intellectual ability of the participants with ASC recruited by De Martino 
and his colleagues were similar to the participants in the present study (Mage = 34.8 years (SD 
= 7.9), MFSIQ = 112.1 (SD = 13.5), compared to Mage = 34.0 years (SD = 15.5) and 
MFSIQ = 119.2 (SD = 10.6), respectively).  The consistency demonstrated on the Asian Flu 
question (whether risk-taking or risk-averse), does, however, support their finding that 
participants with ASCs are more logical in their choices, even though the pattern of choices 
in the Loss frame in the current study did not provide statistically significant evidence of a 
traditional framing effect. 
 
Although this exploratory aspect of the present study has produced few conclusive findings, it 
is of interest that the relationship between the magnitude of the framing effect on the RCT 
and the self-report measure of mental ‘freezing’ (‘analysis paralysis’) during decision-
making is significant.  This suggests that reduced reliance on framing effects, believed to be 
underpinned by the Affect heuristic, is associated with experiences of effortful decision-
making.  It is possible, therefore, that reduced reliance on heuristics makes a small 
contribution to the experiences of people with ASCs during decision-making.  The findings 
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of this exploratory study highlight reliance on heuristics as an area of potential future 
research.  In particular, these results suggest that the recruitment of the large sample sizes 
required for this type of analysis would be warranted. 
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CHAPTER 12: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The focus of this research has been the decision-making experiences and processes of 
intellectually able adults with Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASCs).  While adults with ASCs 
are able, in many situations, to make decisions for themselves, there are suggestions from a 
variety of sources that decision-making can be difficult for them.  Consistent with this 
suggestion, there is increasing recognition that statutory frameworks seeking to empower and 
protect adults at risk of lacking capacity for making one or more decisions autonomously (for 
example, the Mental Capacity Act (England and Wales) 2005) are relevant to some people 
with ASCs (Butcher, 2007).  At present, there is limited guidance available for clinicians and 
carers of adults with ASCs about the ways in which decision-making may be affected by the 
condition, or guidance about how these adults could be supported.  This research has 
investigated some of the putative difficulties experienced by people with ASCs when making 
decisions.  In this final chapter, the main findings are summarised and their implications for 
clinical practice and future research, together with some limitations of the project, are 
discussed. 
 
12.1 Main findings of the research 
12.1.1 Survey of decision-making experiences 
An initial aim of the research was to evaluate whether an empirical study of decision-making 
cognition in ASCs would be worthwhile and, if so, which aspects should be the focus of such 
a study.  To this end, a national survey of the decision-making experiences of adults with 
ASCs, which included the perspectives of family members and support workers of adults 
with ASCs, was carried out.  The findings suggested that decision-making could be difficult 
for many adults with ASCs.  Decision-making was reported to be associated with anxiety, 
feelings of limited confidence, exhaustion and fatigue, and a tendency to avoid decision-
making.  In addition, a number of specific difficulties were reported that could generally be 
placed into three broad, but not necessarily distinct, categories: i) problems engaging in 
decision-making; ii) problems in reaching a decision; and iii) fears of negative judgements 
about the decision made.  These problems were listed in Section 2.3.2. 
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Despite the generally negative view of the effect of ASCs on decision-making, a number of 
benefits of the condition were also identified.  These included enhanced abilities to apply 
logic, consider details and gather information, and to develop strategies for decision-making.  
Moreover, some of these benefits could be ‘double-edged’ in that they could also frustrate 
decision-making in certain situations.  For example, the tendency to consider details and 
gather information, while viewed as generally positive, could be detrimental in situations 
where decisions needed to be made quickly. 
 
The main conclusion drawn from the survey was, therefore, that decision-making is perceived 
as an area of difficulty for people with ASCs.  The findings suggested some differences in the 
decision-making experiences and processes of people with ASCs compared to the general 
population, although further empirical studies are required to quantify these more precisely. 
 
12.1.2 Experimental study of decision-making in ASCs 
To develop some of the findings from the survey, an empirical investigation was carried out 
using five tests of decision-making.  Importantly, this part of the research involved 
comparing the experiences and behaviours of participants with ASCs to those of control 
participants recruited from the general population.  Taken together, the specific research 
questions attempted to establish: i) whether the profile of self-reported experiences 
distinguished participants with ASCs from control participants; ii) whether the experiences 
reported were consistent with behaviour measured by established neuropsychological tests of 
decision-making; and iii) whether there were differences in the decision-making processes of 
people with ASCs that could account for some of the difficulties they described.  The 
research questions formulated are summarised in Table 12.1 together with the corresponding 
findings.   
 
   
 
Table 12.1 Summary of findings from the experimental study of decision-making in ASCs 
 
Research Question 
Overall 
conclusion 
Description of findings 
(participants with ASCs compared to the control group) 
Section 
Do participants with 
ASCs experience 
decision-making 
differently to 
participants in the 
general population? 
Yes 
 Participants with ASCs experience several problems with decision-making more 
frequently than the control group.  Specific problems include: anxiety, exhaustion, 
mental ‘freezing’ and slowness. 
 Participants with ASCs experience particular difficulty with decisions that involve: i) a 
change of routine; ii) talking to others; and iii) that need to be made quickly. 
 Participants with ASCs report greater avoidance of decision-making. 
 Participants with ASCs believe that their condition is more often a hindrance than a 
help with decision-making. 
5.3.1 
 
 
5.3.2 
 
5.3.3 
5.3.4 
Do participants with 
ASCs demonstrate 
reduced flexibility and 
greater caution in their 
decision-making? 
No 
 Participants with ASCs demonstrate similar levels of flexibility and risk-taking in 
decision-making to the control group. 
 In the ASC group (and not the control group), increased anxiety is correlated with 
reduced flexibility in decision-making. 
6.3.1 – 6.3.5 
 
6.4 
Do participants with 
ASCs gather more 
information prior to 
making a decision? 
Yes 
 Participants with ASCs make decisions with a higher degree of certainty. 
 Across both groups, the tendency to make decisions with a higher degree of certainty is 
associated with self-reported problems of slowness in everyday decision-making. 
7.3.2.2 
Do participants with 
ASCs take longer to 
make decisions? 
Yes 
 Participants with ASCs take longer to make decisions on two laboratory tasks. 
 Across both the ASC and control groups, the time taken to make the decisions 
increases with an individual’s tendency to make decisions with a higher degree of 
certainty. 
8.3.2 & 8.3.3 
8.3.3 
 
   
 
Research Question 
(cont.) 
Overall 
conclusion 
Description of findings (cont.) Section 
Are participants with 
ASCs more aroused 
when making 
decisions? 
No 
 Although participants with ASCs demonstrate generally higher levels of arousal, they 
do not demonstrate increased arousal while making decisions. 
 Both the ASC and control groups experience greater anxiety when the computer makes 
the decisions, rather than when they themselves make the decisions.  
9.3.1 
 
9.3.3 
 
Do participants with 
ASCs demonstrate 
differences in 
motivational processes 
in decision-making? 
No 
 Participants with ASCs are motivated by positive and negative feedback in a manner 
similar to that of control participants. 
 Participants with ASCs make a greater proportion of advantageous decisions and 
demonstrate less variation in their choices. 
 The tendency for participants with ASCs to make advantageous choices is associated 
with self-reported problems of slowness in everyday decision-making. 
10.4.4 
 
10.4.1 
 
10.4.5 
Do participants with 
ASCs demonstrate 
reduced reliance on 
heuristics to make 
decisions? 
No  
(but…) 
 Participants with ASCs demonstrate similar reliance on the Representativeness and 
Affect heuristics to the control group. 
 Participants with ASCs demonstrate a non-significant trend towards reduced reliance 
on the Availability heuristic. 
 Participants with ASCs are more consistent in their choices, and less influenced by the 
wording of the question. 
 Across both groups, reduced reliance on the Affect heuristic was associated with self-
reported problems of mental ‘freezing’ in everyday decision-making. 
11.3.1 & 11.3.4.2 
 
11.3.2 
 
11.3.4.1 
 
11.3.4.3 
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Overall, the results indicated that people with ASCs experience significant problems in 
decision-making in everyday life.  Their performance on some of the standard laboratory tests 
of decision-making were also consistent with the experiences they reported (increased 
information gathering, slowness, and enhanced logic).  When compared to the control 
participants, the participants with ASCs did not demonstrate differences in two decision-
making processes (motivation and reliance on heuristics), although there was a non-
significant trend for participants with ASCs to rely less on the availability heuristic.  If found 
to be significant in a larger sample, this finding could account for their experiences of 
exhaustion and mental overload in decision-making. 
 
The findings of this thesis relate to decision-making in a real-world, as well as a laboratory, 
context.  The consistency between some of the self-report and behavioural findings is 
particularly striking when the differences between the two contexts are considered.  The self-
reported experiences related to decision-making in complex situations with multiple factors 
that could affect a person’s ability to decide (for example, social pressure, Asch, 1956; a large 
number of alternatives, Fasolo, McClelland & Todd, 2007; busy environments and 
interruptions, Sperier, Vessey & Valacich, 2003; and personal significance, such as a special 
interest, Howlin, 2004).  In contrast, the laboratory tasks assessed decision-making under 
controlled and optimal conditions: the environment was quiet and without distraction; the 
number of choices was limited; participants did not have to generate the alternative courses of 
action for themselves; and the decisions did not carry serious consequences.  The differences 
between laboratory and real-world settings may be particularly significant for people with 
ASCs, since evidence from a number of studies suggests that people with ASCs are more 
sensitive to, and likely to feel overwhelmed by, environmental stimuli (for example, Kootz, 
Marinelli & Cohen, 1982; Minshew & Hobson, 2008) and are also more likely to feel anxious 
in social situations (for example, Bellini, 2006; Kuusikko et al., 2008).  The behavioural 
measures that were not consistent with the self-reported experiences may, therefore, simply 
reflect these differences of context. 
 
Nevertheless, the findings may be combined to identify situations that would be expected to 
be very difficult for a person with an ASC.  A difficult decision may be characterised by the 
following features: the decision needs to be made quickly; information about options and 
their consequences is limited; other factors (such as environmental noise or the prospect of 
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talking to people) are contributing to heighted anxiety; and other people are putting pressure 
on the person to make the decision in a particular way. 
 
These factors may be relevant in a number of real-life situations.  For example, healthcare 
decisions may need to be made quickly in a single consultation.  Within education, people 
may have to make decisions that involve a number of different options (for example, which 
courses to take, whether to remain in education). In both of these situations, but particularly 
in the latter, the outcomes may involve a number of unknowns.  In social care systems, 
people with ASCs are often presented with choices about how to spend their personal budgets 
(for example, Self-Directed Support, see Putting People First, 2007), and how to spend their 
time (for example, Personalisation, see Carr, 2010) and these are matters that others may 
have strong feelings about.  It is interesting to note the tension between the findings of this 
research and these social care policies: the findings suggest that decision-making can be an 
unpleasant activity for some people with ASCs and yet, through legislation and policy, they 
are encouraged to make decisions within their everyday lives.  Resolution of this tension may 
require attention to improving the experience of decision-making for people with ASCs. 
 
12.2 Practical implications of the research 
The findings from this research suggest a number of recommendations for ways in which 
people with ASCs could be better supported to make decisions.  The strategies may include: 
1. Addressing stress and anxiety already present at the time of the decision.  The 
detrimental effects of anxiety on decision-making are well-known, and the findings 
have shown that the ability to be flexible in decision-making may be compromised by 
high levels of anxiety in ASCs.  It therefore seems sensible to address, if possible, any 
underlying anxiety prior to the attempt to encourage someone to make a decision.  
Anxiety may be addressed with reassurance (in particular reassurance that the 
individual will not be judged negatively), removal of stressors, or simply trying to 
ensure that decisions are made at a time when the person is likely to be relatively 
relaxed.  There is some evidence that cognitive behavioural techniques may be 
successful in alleviating anxiety in some people with ASCs (see Sze & Wood, 2007; 
Wood et al., 2009), although these were not assessed as part of the present research.  
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2. Providing additional time to make decisions and reassurance that there is no need to 
rush.  The participants described slowness in decision-making as a particular problem, 
and this was supported by longer response times on the decision-making tests. 
3. Presenting closed (rather than open) questions.  This may reduce experiences of 
mental overload in ASCs. 
4. Minimising irrelevant stimuli in the environment.  This may alleviate experiences 
among people with ASCs of feeling overwhelmed by decision-making. 
5. Providing encouragement and reassurance.  The findings indicated that people with 
ASCs can view their abilities to make decisions negatively.  However, their 
performance on the standard tests of decision-making indicated that, in fact, they are 
able to make decisions of similar quality to those in the general population.  Indeed, in 
some situations the quality of decisions made by those with ASCs is superior to that 
of the general population.  Reassurance that the person is capable of making decisions 
may, therefore, be helpful.  This may also help to reduce anxiety levels (see 1 above). 
6. Tailoring the decision-making process to match the person’s strengths in decision-
making.  The research indicated that people with ASCs can be more logical in their 
decision-making.  Providing all the relevant information in a clear format may 
therefore help the person to focus on the analytical part of the process, rather than 
becoming distracted by information gathering. 
 
Of course, these recommendations are general and may not apply to particular individuals 
with an ASC.  Efforts to provide support will, therefore, require an assessment of the person’s 
individual strengths and weaknesses.  These recommendations will also appear to be common 
sense for many families, support workers and practitioners with experience of working with 
people with ASCs.  However, their dissemination and inclusion in guidance may be useful, 
since, as Preece & Jordan (2007) found in their study of social workers, even those who are 
frequently involved in providing support around key decisions can have limited awareness of 
the condition and its impact in everyday life. 
 
Outside of clinical and social care services, the findings may be of use to others who also 
provide support to individuals around important decisions, such as college tutors, disability 
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support staff in educational and occupational settings, volunteer advisors (for example 
Citizens Advice Bureau volunteers), and advocates. 
 
12.3 Limitations of the research 
The limitations of individual tasks in the study have been discussed in the relevant previous 
chapters.  There are, however, a number of more general limitations; these are considered 
here.   
 
12.3.1 Participants 
12.3.1.1 Sampling bias 
As with most research studies involving people with ASCs, the participants were those who 
accepted an invitation to take part and were able to make arrangements to attend the research 
site.  As a result, the sample may not be representative of the population of people with 
ASCs; the ASC group in this study was above average intellectual ability and demonstrated 
no impairments in the measured executive functions. Furthermore, these were people who 
were keen to participate in research.  The findings from this research may not, therefore, be 
generalisable beyond this population. 
 
12.3.1.2 Participant characteristics 
The age range of the participants was rather wide (16 – 65 years).  Since age is an important 
factor in decision-making behaviour (Deakin, Aitken, Robbins et al., 2004), the statistical 
analyses may have been more powerful if a narrower age range of participants had been 
recruited.  However, to control for the effect of age as best as possible, the groups were 
matched for age.   
 
A further limitation is that the scores of depression and anxiety were significantly higher in 
the ASC group compared to the control group.  This was not surprising since anxiety and 
depression are very common in people with ASCs (see Kim, Szatmari, Bryson, Steiner & 
Wilson, 2000; Tantam, 2000).  However, it is difficult to discern whether group differences 
observed (in some tests only) may be attributed to higher levels of anxiety and/or depression 
or a result of the presence of an ASC.  Statistical control of anxiety and depression was 
carried out wherever it was necessary and possible to do so.  Nonetheless, the situations 
where anxiety could not be controlled for statistically (for example, where the assumption of 
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homogeneity of regression was not met) indicated an effect of anxiety or depression that was 
specific to the participants with ASCs.  However, this may simply have reflected the higher 
ratings of anxiety in the participants with ASCs.  From the perspective of everyday life, it is 
noted that the experiences of many people with ASCs may be influenced by high levels of 
anxiety and depression.  From an academic perspective, the recruitment of participants in the 
control group with similar levels of anxiety and depression to those in the experimental group 
would have helped to control for any specific effect of anxiety and/or depression on task 
performance. 
 
Ten participants (nine in the ASC group, one in the control group) were taking antidepressant 
or anxiolytic medications that could have affected their performance on the decision-making 
tasks.  To control for this, each analysis was repeated without these participants.  However, it 
should be noted that this solution created its own limitation; there were smaller and less equal 
group sizes, which reduces the power and robustness of statistical tests. 
 
Finally, this research did not consider the heterogeneity of people with ASCs.  There is, of 
course, considerable heterogeneity in the behaviours and impairments demonstrated by 
people with ASCs (Rutter & Schopler, 1987; Ring, Woodbury-Smith, Watson, Wheelwright 
& Baron-Cohen, 2008).  The participants with ASCs in this research were treated, however, 
as a single group.  While this approach is commonly taken in other studies (for example, De 
Martino et al., 2008; Yechiam et al., 2010), there is increasing recognition that future studies 
should seek to identify behavioural subtypes within the group in order to identify the most 
effective treatments for individuals (South et al., 2010).  The findings presented are, 
therefore, general findings about population differences between control participants and 
participants with ASCs; they are unlikely to apply equally to all individuals with ASCs.   
 
12.3.2 Reliability 
It is a significant limitation that the test-retest reliability of the measures developed 
specifically for this research (the questionnaires of decision-making experiences and the 
adapted Risky Choice Task) was not established.  At best, there was an informal comparison 
of the responses of the eleven participants who completed both the survey and experimental 
versions of the questionnaire (see Section 3.4.1).  The other measures employed in the 
research were, however, established measures that have been developed for research use. 
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12.3.3 Validity 
The validity of the questionnaires of decision-making experiences was not formally assessed 
prior to their use in the study.  Instead, only post-hoc and piecemeal analyses were carried 
out.  One of these was a general comparison of the survey responses of participants with 
ASCs and family members and support workers of adults with ASCs.  However, the study 
design would have been strengthened by obtaining matched responses from family members 
and support workers of the participants.   
 
Other problems of validity concern the laboratory-based tests of decision-making.  While 
they were designed to capture elements of decision-making that are encountered in real life 
(see Cavedini et al., 2006; Salmond et al., 2006), they present decisions that are abstract and, 
at face value, lack ecological validity.  Nevertheless, the majority of the tests had been 
developed to the standard required for general research use and there is evidence that 
performance on the tasks is associated with particular problems in real-life decision-making 
(see for example, Clark et al., 2006, in which observations of impulsive decision-making in 
substance abusers are found to be associated with increased tolerance of uncertainty as 
measured by the Information Sample Task).  Moreover, in the present research it was 
possible to compare the behavioural measures with responses on the questionnaire of 
decision-making experiences that were relevant to those measures.  For example, the 
relationship between self-reported problems of slowness and speed of decision-making on the 
behavioural tasks was assessed.  In most cases, the measures from the tests were related to a 
particular experience in decision-making.  This provides some support for the validity of both 
the questionnaires and the tests of decision-making. 
 
12.4 Implications for future research 
One of the main limitations of the research was that the decision-making tasks were 
simplified and lacked ecological validity.  As a result it is difficult to establish the extent to 
which the observed similarities and differences between the ASC and control groups are 
related to the subtleties of real-world decision making that may lead to the difficulties 
reported by the participants.  Future studies should, therefore, consider assessing decision-
making in ASCs using more realistic tasks.  A starting point for such research could be the 
adaptation of the paradigms developed by Braeutigam and colleagues to study decision-
making (for example, Braeutigam, Stins, Rose, Swithenby & Ambler, 2001; Ambler, 
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Braeutigam, Stins, Rose & Swithenby, 2004).  These paradigms involve shopping decisions 
(a class of decision that was identified as problematic in several of the survey accounts) and 
have enabled identification of several neural processes involved in decision-making, such as 
silent vocalisation and the effect of familiarity on choice.  Other paradigms could be 
developed that present medical decisions, or decisions with several stages, such as planning a 
journey.  Development of more realistic paradigms may enable a better investigation of 
whether some of the difficulties reported by people with ASCs can be supported empirically. 
 
Another consideration for future research may be the effect of anxiety on decision-making in 
ASCs.  Anxiety was highlighted as an important factor in some of the results of the research.  
However, due to the difference in base levels of anxiety between the groups, it was not 
possible to establish whether underlying anxiety was the cause of group differences or 
whether decision-making heightens anxiety and exerts specific effects in ASCs.  Inclusion of 
a control group with high levels of anxiety may be able to address this issue.  However, this 
may not be straightforward as the nature of anxiety may differ between people in the general 
population with anxiety disorders and people with ASCs. 
 
Finally, interventions to assist with indecisiveness and avoidance of decision-making have 
been developed for use in Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (see Beck, 1995; Dugas & 
Ladouceur, 2000; Steketee, Frost, Wincze, Green & Douglass, 2000).  Future research could 
involve an evaluation of these decision-making ‘training’ interventions for improving 
confidence and reducing anxiety around decision-making in ASCs, which may be helpful for 
some individuals.   
 
12.5 Final conclusions 
Decision-making is an essential part of everyday life and the findings from this research 
suggest that decision-making can be particularly difficult for people with ASCs. The research 
has also identified some of the possible reasons for these difficulties.  The findings suggest 
that adults with ASCs, who have an intellectual ability in the normal range, may nevertheless 
benefit from support when making decisions.  Such support might include acknowledgement 
of particular strengths in decision-making that are associated with ASCs, allowing additional 
time to make decisions, and addressing issues of anxiety.  Previously, little was known about 
the impact of ASCs on decision-making, nor how people with ASCs might best be supported 
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to make decisions for themselves. These findings provide a scientific background to decision-
making in ASCs that can contribute to the development of appropriate guidance on how best 
to support this group of men and women in decision-making.   
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Appendix A: Survey questionnaire adults with an autism spectrum condition 
 
    
 
 
 
 
Survey 
 
FOR MEN AND WOMEN WITH AN AUTISM SPECTRUM CONDITION 
 
 
 
 
This survey is part of a research project being carried out by Miss Lydia Luke, Dr 
Isabel Clare, and Dr Howard Ring, who work in the Section of Developmental 
Psychiatry, University of Cambridge. 
 
This questionnaire will take approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
 
Please read the information about this project on the next page 
before beginning the questionnaire 
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Project information 
 
What is this research project about? 
This project is about decision-making in everyday life.  We are interested in the kinds of decisions that 
adult men and women (aged 16 years or more) with autism spectrum conditions face in their lives and 
why some decisions might be difficult.  This research is relevant to recent legislation (the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 and the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000) which seeks both to empower 
people who are able to make decisions for themselves, and protect those who are unable to make 
one or more decisions. At present, we know little about how people with autism spectrum conditions 
make every day decisions, or whether they face particular difficulties in decision-making. 
 
Who are we? 
We are clinicians and researchers who work in the Section of Developmental Psychiatry, University of 
Cambridge.  The research team are Miss Lydia Luke, Dr Isabel Clare and Dr Howard Ring. 
 
How long will it take to do this questionnaire? 
It will take approximately 30 minutes to complete this questionnaire. 
 
Do I have to answer all the questions? 
No.  We would like you to complete as much of the questionnaire as possible, but you do not have to 
answer any questions if you do not want to.  
 
Will my answers and information be kept confidential? 
Yes.  Your completed questionnaire will be anonymised by replacing your name with a code, which 
will be known only to members of the research team.  Your contact details will also be removed from 
the questionnaires and kept with your name and code in a locked filing cabinet in the Section of 
Developmental Psychiatry, University of Cambridge.  We will not give any of your personal details to 
other people.  We will keep this data for a minimum of 5 years, after which it will be destroyed in 
accordance with good research practice.   
 
What will happen to the study results? 
The results will form part of my Ph.D. thesis and will be presented at conferences and written up in 
journals.  If any of your individual answers are used, they will be totally anonymous and will not 
identify you in any way.   
 
Do I have to take part in this study? 
No.  It is up to you to decide whether or not you would like to take part.  You are free to withdraw at 
any time.  Please contact Lydia Luke if you wish to withdraw after sending us your completed 
questionnaire.   
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
This study has received ethical approval from the University of Cambridge Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee. 
 
What should I do if I have any questions about the research? 
Please contact Lydia Luke (lrl29@medschl.cam.ac.uk or on 01223 746100) if you have any questions 
about this research. 
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Consent form 
 
Project title: Decision-making by men and women with an autism spectrum condition 
Name of Researchers: Miss Lydia Luke, Dr Isabel Clare & Dr Howard Ring 
 
 
Before beginning the questionnaire, please demonstrate your understanding of the nature 
of this study by reading the statements and ticking the boxes below 
    
 
Please 
tick  
1.  I have read and understand the information about this study   
2.  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason and without my legal rights 
being affected. 
 
3.  I understand that my anonymised answers will be incorporated into an 
account of this research that will be presented at conferences and in 
journals and written up as part of a Ph.D. thesis. 
 
4.  I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
 
Please print your name and sign and date this page before 
beginning the questionnaire 
 
 
Name: _______________________  
 
Signature: ____________________  
 
Date: ________________________  
 
If you have any questions about this research please contact Lydia Luke by email 
lrl29@medschl.cam.ac.uk or by telephone on 01223 746100 
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SECTION 1: About you 
 
1.  Are you: 
 Male  
 Female   
 
2.  What is your age?  _______________________ 
 
3.  How would you describe your Ethnicity? 
White  British 
 Irish 
 Any Other White Background 
Mixed  White and Black Caribbean 
 White and Black African 
 White and Asian 
 Any Other Mixed Background 
Asian or Asian British  Indian 
 Pakistani 
 Bangladeshi 
 Any Other Asian Background 
Black or Black British  Caribbean 
 African 
 Any Other Black Background 
Chinese or Other Ethnic 
Group 
 Chinese 
 Any Other (please specify) 
 
 
4.  What is your nationality? ______________________________ 
 
5.  What is the first half of your postcode? 
(E.g. if your postcode is CB1 4DP, then just write CB1) 
_____________________________________ 
 
6.  Where do you live? 
 With your parents/ guardian 
 On your own 
 With a partner 
 Supported living arrangement 
 Hostel accommodation 
 In residential accommodation with support workers 
 In residential accommodation without support workers 
 Other ______________________ (please specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
   
197 
 
7.  What condition do you have? 
 Autism 
 High-functioning autism 
 Asperger syndrome 
 Autism Spectrum Condition 
 Other ______________________ (please specify) 
 
8.  How were you diagnosed? 
 A medical doctor or psychologist diagnosed you in childhood 
 A medical doctor or psychologist diagnosed you in adulthood 
 Self-recognised diagnosis 
 Other ______________________ (please specify) 
 
9.  Schools and colleges attended: 
 School up to age 16 
 School/ college up to age 18 
 Higher education after 18 (please specify course title) ____________________________ 
 Post-graduate qualification (please specify) ____________________________________  
 None of these 
 
10.  Employment: 
 Full or part-time employment (please specify your job) ____________________________ 
 Full or part-time voluntary work (please specify your job)___________________________ 
 Full or part-time work experience 
 Full-or part time government training scheme 
 Not in any form of paid or voluntary work, or work experience or training 
 
 Still in full or part-time education 
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SECTION 2: Different types of decisions 
 
There are different types of everyday decisions.  Some decisions are more difficult to make than 
others.  We would like you to think about how difficult some decisions are for you.    
 
1. How difficult might you find the following decisions? 
Please place a vertical mark on each line to indicate how difficult you might find the following 
decisions.  
 
Below is an example of how difficult somebody might find the decision of whether or not to go out 
with an umbrella or not. 
 
 Decision Difficulty 
Example 
Whether or not to go out with 
an umbrella or not 
 
Not difficult  |-----|-------------------|  Very difficult 
 
   
Now please answer these questions. 
     
 Decision Difficulty 
 
1 
 
How to spend my free time 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
2 What to wear for the day  
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
3 
What to order from a 
restaurant menu 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
4 
Whether to do something 
different from what I usually 
do 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
5 Whether to have my hair cut 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
6 How to spend my money 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
7 
Whether to spend money on 
something I am interested in 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
8 
Whether to see a doctor 
when I feel unwell 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
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 Decision Difficulty 
9 
Whether to agree to medical 
treatment that a doctor 
suggests 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
10 Where to live 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
11 Where to go on holiday 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
12 How often to see my family 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
13 
Whether to phone someone 
in your family who is having 
problems 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
14 
Whether to meet someone 
new this week 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
15 
Whether to help a stranger 
who asks you for directions 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
16 
Whether to ask a shop 
assistant where a particular 
item is 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
17 
Whether to ask a stranger for 
directions when you are lost 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
18 
Whether to phone the police 
if you see people vandalising 
a bus stop 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
19 
Which train or bus to catch to 
be somewhere on time 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
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SECTION 3: What makes decisions difficult? 
 
There are two kinds of things that might make decisions difficult.  The decision could be difficult 
because of the nature of the decision, or it could be difficult because of the way we think or feel.   
 
Things about the nature of the decision: 
 
1.  How much would the following make a decision hard for you? 
Please place a vertical mark on each line to indicate how difficult this would make the decision 
for you?   
 
  How much would this make a decision difficult for 
you? 
1 
The decision is about something 
trivial and it doesn’t matter what I 
choose  
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
2 
The decision has to be made 
quickly 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
3 
The decision involves changing my 
routine 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
4 
The decision is about a favourite 
activity or interest of mine 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
5 
The decision requires talking to 
another person 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
6 
The decision affects other people 
and not just me 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
7 The decision is about my health 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
8 
The decision will have a big effect 
on my future 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
9 
Other people have strong feelings 
about what I should choose 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
10 
The reasons for and against a 
decision are finely balanced 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
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Things about me: 
 
2.  How often do the following make decisions hard for you?   
Please tick the box that best fits your experience 
 
  This is 
never a 
problem 
This is 
rarely a 
problem 
This is 
sometimes 
a problem 
This is 
often a 
problem 
1 
I become concerned or worried 
about making the decision 
    
2 
I become concerned or worried 
about making the ‘wrong’ choice 
    
3 
I don’t know what the 
consequences of my choice will 
be 
    
4 
I don’t know what I should be 
thinking about to make the 
decision 
    
5 
I find it hard to remember all the 
things I need to think about 
before making a decision 
    
6 
I don’t know what the different 
choices are 
    
7 I keep changing my mind     
8 I find it difficult to ask for help     
 
 
3.  Can you think of any other things that might make a decision difficult for you? 
Please write your answer in the space below.  Your answer can include things about the 
decisions themselves or things about your decision-making. 
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SECTION 4 (optional): Autism and decision-making 
 
1.  Do you think that your autism spectrum condition helps you to make decisions? 
 No, or rarely (please go to question 3) 
 Sometimes 
 Often 
 Always 
 
2.  Can you give an example of a decision that your autism spectrum condition has helped 
you to make? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
3.  Do you think that your autism spectrum condition interferes with your ability to make 
decisions?  
 No, or rarely (please go on to the next page)  
 Sometimes 
 Often 
 Always 
 
4.  Can you give an example of a decision where your autism spectrum condition has 
interfered with your ability to make the decision? 
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SECTION 5: Interests and activities 
 
Sometimes things that people are particularly interested in can get in the way of making 
decisions, so we’d like to know what things really interest you or attract your attention.  
 
1. Please list any activities or interests that you are very interested in: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  If one of your interests or activities is your favourite, please write it here:  
___________________________ 
 
3.  How often is this interest or activity on your mind? 
 Less than 1 hour a day, or only occasionally  
 Between 1 and 3 hours a day 
 More than 3 hours a day 
 
 Not applicable 
 
4.  Do you think that your favourite interest or activity interferes with your ability to make 
some decisions?  
 Not at all (please turn over to the next page) 
 Mildly or slightly interferes with my decision-making 
 Moderately or definitely interferes with my decision-making 
 Severely interferes with my decision-making 
 Extremely severely interferes with my decision-making 
 
 Not applicable 
 
5.  Can you give an example from your own life where your favourite interest or activity 
has interfered with your ability to make a decision?  
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SECTION 6: Participating in future research 
 
We plan to conduct more studies of decision-making by people with autism spectrum conditions.  
These studies will be conducted in Cambridge during 2008 and 2009.   
 
If you are interested and would like to receive more information about participating in these 
studies, please provide your contact details on this page.  We may contact you with more 
information in the next few months.       
 
If you provide your contact details, you are not making any commitment to participate in 
these studies and you can withdraw at any time.   
 
 
Name: _____________________________________ 
 
Telephone number: __________________________ 
 
Email address: ______________________________ 
 
 
 I would prefer to be contacted by email 
 I would prefer to be contacted by telephone 
 I would prefer to be contacted by post 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire about decision-making 
 
 
 
PLEASE POST THIS QUESTIONNAIRE BACK TO US IN THE 
STAMPED ADDRESSED ENVELOPE PROVIDED.  
 
 
If you have any questions about this research, or at any time wish to withdraw, 
please contact Lydia Luke by email lrl29@medschl.cam.ac.uk or on 01223 746100
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Appendix B: Survey questionnaire for family members and support 
workers of adults with an autism spectrum condition 
 
    
 
 
 
Survey 
 
FOR FAMILY MEMBERS (OR SUPPORT WORKERS) OF PEOPLE 
WITH AN AUTISM SPECTRUM CONDITION 
 
 
 
This survey is part of a research project being carried out by Miss Lydia Luke, Dr 
Isabel Clare, and Dr Howard Ring, who work in the Section of Developmental 
Psychiatry, University of Cambridge. 
 
This questionnaire will take approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
 
 
Please read the information about this project on the next page 
before beginning the questionnaire 
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Project information 
 
What is this research project about? 
This project is about decision-making in everyday life.  We are interested in the kinds of 
decisions that adult men and women (aged 16 years or more) with autism spectrum conditions 
face in their lives and why some decisions might be difficult.  This research is relevant to recent 
legislation (the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000) 
which seeks both to empower people who are able to make decisions for themselves, and 
protect those who are unable to make one or more decisions. At present, we know little about 
how people with autism spectrum conditions make every day decisions, or whether they face 
particular difficulties in decision-making. 
 
Who are we? 
We are clinicians and researchers who work in the Section of Developmental Psychiatry, 
University of Cambridge.  The research team are Miss Lydia Luke, Dr Isabel Clare and Dr 
Howard Ring. 
 
How long will it take to do this questionnaire? 
It will take approximately 30 minutes to complete this questionnaire. 
 
Do I have to answer all the questions? 
No.  We would like you to complete as much of the questionnaire as possible, but you do not 
have to answer any questions if you do not want to.  
 
Will my answers and information be kept confidential? 
Yes.  We will not ask you to give your name or any other personal details.  We will keep the 
questionnaire data for a minimum of 5 years, after which it will be destroyed in accordance with 
good research practice.   
 
What will happen to the study results? 
The results will form part of my Ph.D. thesis and will be presented at conferences and written up 
in journals.  If any of your individual answers are used, they will be totally anonymous and will not 
identify you in any way.   
 
Do I have to take part in this study? 
No.  It is up to you to decide whether or not you would like to take part.  You are free to withdraw 
at any time.  Please contact Lydia Luke if you wish to withdraw after sending us your completed 
questionnaire.   
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
This study has received ethical approval from the University of Cambridge Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee. 
 
What should I do if I have any questions about the research? 
Please contact Lydia Luke (lrl29@medschl.cam.ac.uk or on 01223 746100) if you have any 
questions about this research. 
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Consent form 
 
Project title: Decision-making by men and women with an autism spectrum condition 
Name of Researchers: Miss Lydia Luke, Dr Isabel Clare & Dr Howard Ring 
 
 
Before beginning the questionnaire, please demonstrate your understanding of the nature 
of this study by reading the statements and ticking the boxes below 
    
 
Please 
tick  
1.  I have read and understand the information about this study     
2.  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason and without my legal rights 
being affected. 
 
3.  I understand that my anonymised answers will be incorporated into an 
account of this research that will be presented at conferences and in 
journals and written up as part of a Ph.D. thesis. 
 
4.  I am aged 18 years or older  
5.  I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
Please print your name and sign and date this page before 
beginning the questionnaire 
 
 
Name: _______________________  
 
Signature: ____________________  
 
Date: ________________________  
 
If you have any questions about this research please contact Lydia Luke by email 
lrl29@medschl.cam.ac.uk or by telephone on 01223 746100 
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SECTION 1: About you and the person you are related to or support 
 
 
1.  What is your relationship to an adult with an autism spectrum condition? 
 Parent 
 Parent and main carer 
 Paid support worker 
 Other ______________________ (please specify) 
 
2.  Is this person: 
 Male 
 Female 
 
3.  How old is he or she? ________________________ 
 
4.  How would you describe his or her background? 
White  British 
 Irish 
 Any Other White Background 
Mixed  White and Black Caribbean 
 White and Black African 
 White and Asian 
 Any Other Mixed Background 
Asian or Asian British  Indian 
 Pakistani 
 Bangladeshi 
 Any Other Asian Background 
Black or Black British  Caribbean 
 African 
 Any Other Black Background 
Chinese or Other Ethnic 
Group 
 Chinese 
 Any Other (please specify) 
 
5.  What is his or her nationality? ___________________________ 
 
6.  What is the first half of his or her postcode? 
(E.g. if your postcode is CB1 4DP, then just write CB1) 
_____________________________________ 
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7.  Where does he or she live? 
 With you in your home 
 On his or her own 
 With a partner 
 In residential accommodation with support workers 
 In residential accommodation without support workers 
 Other ______________________ (please specify) 
 
8.  What condition does he or she have? 
 Autism 
 High-functioning autism 
 Asperger’s syndrome 
 Autism Spectrum Condition 
 Other ______________________ (please specify) 
 
9.  How was he or she diagnosed? 
 A medical doctor or psychologist diagnosed him or her in childhood 
 A medical doctor or psychologist diagnosed him or her in adulthood 
 Self-recognised diagnosis 
 Other ______________________ (please specify) 
 
10.  What level of education has he or she reached? 
 School up to age 16 
 School/ college up to age 18 
 Higher education after 18 (please specify course title) ____________________________ 
 Post-graduate qualification (please specify) ____________________________________ 
 None of these 
 
11.  His or her employment: 
 Full or part-time employment (please specify job title) _____________________________ 
 Full or part-time voluntary work (please specify work type) _________________________ 
 Full or part-time work experience 
 Full or part-time government training scheme 
 Not in any form of paid or voluntary work, or experience or training  
 
 Still in full or part-time education 
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SECTION 2: Your concerns about the person’s decision-making 
 
 
1.  Do you have any of the following concerns about his or her decision-making? 
Please place a mark on each line to indicate how much the following are a concern for you 
 
 Concern How much does this concern you? 
1 
 
The person makes decisions that 
put his or her well-being and/or 
safety at risk 
 
 
Not concerned  |-------------------------|  Very concerned 
 
2 
 
The person makes decisions that  
put other peoples’ well-being 
and/or safety at risk 
 
 
Not concerned  |-------------------------|  Very concerned 
 
3 
 
The person makes decisions 
without really understanding the 
consequences 
 
 
Not concerned  |-------------------------|  Very concerned 
 
4 
 
The person is easily influenced  
by others 
 
 
Not concerned  |-------------------------|  Very concerned 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
211 
 
SECTION 3: Different types of decisions 
 
1.  How difficult would he or she generally find the following types decisions? 
Please place a mark on each line to indicate how difficult she or she would find the following 
decisions.  Please tick the box if the person would not be able to make the decision.  
 
 
Decision 
How much would this make the decision 
difficult? 
He or she 
would not be 
able to make 
this decision 
1 
How to spend his or her 
free time 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
2 What to wear the day 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
3 
What to order from a 
restaurant menu 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
4 
Whether to do something 
different from what he or 
she normally does 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
5 Whether to have a hair cut 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
6 
How to spend his or her 
money 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
7 
Whether to spend money 
on something that he or she 
is interested in 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
8 
Whether to see a doctor 
when he or she feels unwell 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
9 
Whether to agree to 
medical treatment that a 
doctor suggests 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
10 Where to live 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
 
 
Please continue to answer these questions on the next page 
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 Decision 
How much would this make the decision 
difficult? 
He or she 
would not be 
able to make 
this decision 
11 Where to go on holiday 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
12 How often to see family 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
13 
Whether to phone a 
relative who is having 
problems 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
14 
Whether to meet someone 
new  
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
15 
Whether to help a stranger 
who asks him or her for 
directions 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
16 
Whether to ask a shop 
assistant where a particular 
item is 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
17 
Whether to ask a stranger 
for directions when he or 
she is lost 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
18 
Whether to phone the 
police after witnessing a 
bus stop being vandalised 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
 
 
19 
Which train or bus to catch 
to be somewhere on time 
 
Not difficult  |----------------------| Very difficult 
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SECTION 4: What makes some decisions difficult? 
 
There are two kinds of things that might make decisions difficult. A decision could be difficult 
because of the nature of the decision, or it could be difficult because of personal factors affecting 
how we think or feel at the time.  The following questions ask you to think about why some 
decisions may be difficult for the person.     
 
The nature of decision: 
 
1.  How much would each of the following make a decision difficult for him or her? 
Please place a mark on each line to indicate how difficult the following would make a decision for 
the person. 
 
  How much would this make the decision 
difficult? 
1 
The decision is about something trivial  
and the actual choice doesn’t matter  
 
Not difficult  |------------------------| Very difficult 
 
2 The decision has to be made quickly 
 
Not difficult  |------------------------| Very difficult 
 
3 
The decision involves a change to his or 
her routine 
 
Not difficult  |------------------------| Very difficult 
 
4 
The decision is about his or her favourite 
activity or interest 
 
Not difficult  |------------------------| Very difficult 
 
5 
The decision requires talking to another 
person  
 
Not difficult  |------------------------| Very difficult 
 
6 
The decision affects other people besides 
him or her 
 
Not difficult  |------------------------| Very difficult 
 
7 The decision is about his or her health 
 
Not difficult  |------------------------| Very difficult 
 
8 
The decision will have a big effect on his 
or her future 
 
Not difficult  |------------------------| Very difficult 
 
9 
Another person has given them advice or 
an opinion about what they should 
choose 
 
Not difficult  |------------------------| Very difficult 
 
10 
The reasons for and against the decision 
are finely balanced 
 
Not difficult  |------------------------| Very difficult 
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Personal factors: 
 
2.  How often do the following make decisions difficult for him or her?   
Please tick the box that best fits your experience 
 
  This is 
never a 
problem 
This is 
rarely a 
problem 
This is 
sometimes 
a problem 
This is 
often a 
problem 
Don’t 
know 
1 
He or she becomes concerned 
or worried about making the 
decision 
     
2 
He or she is concerned or 
worried about making the 
‘wrong’ choice 
     
3 
He or she can’t think through 
the consequences of different 
choices  
     
4 
He or she finds it hard to 
remember all the information 
that is needed to make the 
decision 
     
5 
He or she doesn’t realise what 
the possible choices are 
     
6 
He or she doesn’t understand 
the information that is needed 
to make the decision  
     
7 
He or she keeps changing 
their mind 
     
8 
He or she finds it difficult to 
ask for help 
     
 
 
3.  Can you think of any other things that make some decisions difficult for him or her? 
Please write your answer in the space below.  Your answer can include things about the nature 
of decisions, or personal factors.   
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SECTION 5 (optional): Autism and decision-making 
 
1.  Do you think the person’s autism spectrum condition helps him or her to make decisions? 
 No, or rarely (please go to question 3) 
 Sometimes 
 Often 
 Always 
 
2.  Can you give an example of a decision that the person’s autism spectrum condition helped 
him or her to make?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
3.  Do you think that the person’s autism spectrum condition interferes with his or her ability 
to make decisions?  
 No, or rarely (please go on to the next page)  
 Sometimes 
 Often 
 Always 
 
4.  Can you give an example of a decision where the person’s autism spectrum condition has 
interfered with his or her ability to make the decision? 
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SECTION 6: His or her interests and activities 
 
Many people with autism spectrum conditions are very interested in a particular thing or an 
activity.  If the person you know has a particular interest in something, we would like to know if 
this ever interferes with their decision-making.     
 
2. Please list any activities or interests that the person you know is very interested in: 
 
 
 
 
2.  If he or she has one interest or activity that seems to be a particular favourite, please 
write it here:___________________________________ 
 
3.  How often do you think this interest(s) or activity(ies) is on his or her mind?  
 Less than 1 hour a day, or only occasionally 
 Between 1 and 3 hours a day 
 More than 3 hours a day 
 Don’t know 
 
4.  If a decision involves this interest(s) or activity(ies), do you think his or her ability to 
make the decision is affected? 
 Not at all 
 Mildly or slightly impairs his or her decision-making 
 Severely interferes impairs his or her decision-making  
 Extremely interferes impairs his or her decision-making 
 Don’t know 
 
5.  Can you give an example of a decision where this person’s favourite interest(s) or 
activity(ies) has interfered with his or her ability to make a decision?   
Please describe this decision  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire about decision-making 
 
PLEASE POST THIS QUESTIONNAIRE BACK TO US IN THE STAMPED 
ADDRESSED ENVELOPE PROVIDED.  
 
If you have any questions about this research, or at any time wish to withdraw, please 
contact Lydia Luke by email lrl29@medschl.cam.ac.uk or on 0122 3746100 
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Appendix C: Summary of findings from the preliminary survey of 
decision-making experiences 
 
1.  Frequency of problems experienced during decision-making 
 
Problem experienced 
during decision-making 
 
Response (% of participants) 
Unknown Never Rarely Sometimes Often 
Concern or worry about 
making the decision 
Participants 1 3 9 43 44 
Informants 8 2 6 25 60 
Concerned or worry about 
making the ‘wrong’ choice 
Participants 1 3 8 41 48 
Informants 8 10 8 25 50 
Uncertainty about the 
consequences 
Participants 1 3 13 35 48 
Informants 4 4 6 29 58 
Frequent changes of mind 
about the decision 
Participants 2 11 28 25 34 
Informants 6 8 31 25 31 
Difficulty asking for help 
Participants 0 7 8 50 55 
Informants 2 0 8 15 75 
No knowledge of the 
choices available  
Participants 3 12 27 36 23 
Informants 0 6 13 37 44 
Difficulty remembering all 
the relevant information 
Participants 2 13 14 28 43 
Informants 6 13 8 17 56 
Uncertainty about which 
factors are relevant 
(Participants only) 
Participants 2 8 18 37 36 
Difficulty understanding 
the relevant information 
(Informants only) 
Informants 0 10 15 29 46 
 
For all but one of the listed problems (frequent changes of mind), the responses of both 
groups are skewed towards more frequent experiences of problems in decision-making. 
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2.  The difficulty associated with different features of decisions 
 
Feature 
Rating of difficulty  
(mean proportion of the visual analogue line, SD) 
Participants with 
ASCs 
(n = 120)  
Family members and 
support workers 
(n = 52) 
The decision is about something trivial 0.47 (0.33) 0.61 (0.33) 
The decision has to be made quickly 0.74 (0.27) 0.79 (0.26) 
The decision involves a change of routine 0.76 (0.26) 0.83 (0.18) 
The decision is about a favourite interest or activity 0.29 (26.1) 0.36 (0.33) 
The decision requires talking to another person 0.67 (0.28) 0.75 (0.24) 
The decision affects others 0.67 (0.31) 0.67 (0.33) 
The decision is about health 0.46 (0.30) 0.64 (0.33) 
The decision will have a big effect on the future 0.74 (0.30) 0.75 (0.29) 
Other people have strong feelings about the choice 0.63 (0.33) 0.64 (0.32) 
The reasons for and against are finely balanced 0.69 (0.30) 0.76 (0.25) 
 
The decisions rated as most difficult by the participants with ASCs were decisions that: i) 
involved a change of routine; ii) needed to be made quickly; and iii) would have a big effect 
on the future.  The decisions rated as most difficult by the family members and support 
workers, on behalf of the person they knew, were decisions that: i) involved a change of 
routine, and ii) needed to be made quickly; and iii) that were finely balanced.  
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3.  Interference from special interests 
 
Extent to which a special interest is 
perceived to interfere with decision-
making  
Percentage of participants 
Participants with ASCs 
(n = 120) 
Family members and 
support workers 
(n = 52) 
Unknown/not applicable 12% 17% 
Not at all 40% 35% 
Mildly or slightly interferes 23% 21% 
Moderately or definitely interferes 17% * 
Severely interferes 5% 12% 
Extremely severely interferes 4% 15% 
 
*Due to an error, this response option was not available for the family members and support 
workers.  As a result the figures reported in the main text are the extreme response options. 
 
4.  Levels of concern reported by family members and support workers for specific 
problems in decision-making 
 
Concerns about the decision-making of the person they know 
Rating of concern 
Mean proportion of the visual 
analogue line (SD) 
Concern about the person’s own safety 0.52 (0.32) 
Concern about the safety of others 0.42 (0.34) 
Concern about the person making the decision without understanding the 
consequences 
0.68 (0.27) 
Concern about how easily influenced the person is 0.66 (0.30) 
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Appendix D: Adapted questionnaire of decision-making experiences 
 
Decision-making experiences 
 
There are different types of everyday decisions.  Some decisions are more difficult to make than 
others.  We would like you to think about how difficult some decisions are for you.    
 
1. How difficult might you find the following decisions? 
Please place a vertical mark on each line to indicate how difficult you might find the following 
decisions.  
 
Below is an example of how difficult somebody might find the decision of whether or not to go out 
with an umbrella or not. 
 
 Decision Difficulty 
Example 
Whether or not to go out with 
an umbrella or not 
 
Not difficult  |-----|-------------------|  Very difficult 
 
   
Now please answer these questions. 
     
 Decision Difficulty 
1 How to spend my free time 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
2 What to wear for the day  
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
3 
What to order from a 
restaurant menu 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
4 
Whether to do something 
different from what I usually 
do 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
5 Whether to have my hair cut 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
6 How to spend my money 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
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 Decision Difficulty 
7 
Whether to spend money on 
something I am interested in 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
8 
Whether to see a doctor when 
I feel unwell 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
9 
Whether to agree to medical 
treatment that a doctor 
suggests 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
10 Where to live 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
11 Where to go on holiday 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
12 How often to see my family 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
13 
Whether to phone someone in 
your family who is having 
problems 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
14 
Whether to meet someone 
new this week 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
15 
Whether to help a stranger 
who asks you for directions 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
16 
Whether to ask a shop 
assistant where a particular 
item is 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
17 
Whether to ask a stranger for 
directions when you are lost 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
18 
Whether to phone the police 
if you see people vandalising a 
bus stop 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
19 
Which train or bus to catch to 
be somewhere on time 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
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There are two kinds of things that might make decisions difficult.  The decision could be difficult 
because of the nature of the decision, or it could be difficult because of the way we think or feel.   
 
2.  How much would the following make a decision hard for you? 
Please place a vertical mark on each line to indicate how difficult this would make the decision for 
you?   
 
Features of decisions: 
 
  How much would this make a decision difficult for 
you? 
1 
The decision is about something trivial 
and it doesn’t matter what I choose  
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
2 The decision has to be made quickly 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
3 
The decision involves changing my 
routine 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
4 
The decision is about a favourite activity 
or interest of mine 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
5 
The decision requires talking to another 
person 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
6 
The decision affects other people and not 
just me 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
7 The decision is about my health 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
8 
The decision will have a big effect on my 
future 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
9 
Other people have strong feelings about 
what I should choose 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
 
10 
The reasons for and against a decision are 
finely balanced 
 
Not difficult  |-------------------------|  Very difficult 
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Things about me: 
 
3.  How often do the following make decisions hard for you?   
Please tick the box that best fits your experience 
 
  
This is never 
a problem 
This is rarely 
a problem 
This is 
sometimes a 
problem 
This is often 
a problem 
1 
I become concerned or worried 
about making the decision 
    
2 
I become concerned or worried 
about making the ‘wrong’ choice 
    
3 I lack confidence in my decisions     
4 
I don’t know what the 
consequences of my choice will be 
    
5 
I don’t know what I should be 
thinking about to make the decision 
    
6 
I find it hard to remember all the 
things I need to think about before 
making a decision 
    
7 
I don’t know what the different 
choices are 
    
8 I keep changing my mind     
9 I find it difficult to ask for help     
10 
My mind ‘freezes’ and I am unable 
to make the decision 
    
11 
I spend too much time thinking 
about the decision 
    
12 
I find making the decision 
exhausting 
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4.  Do you think that your autism spectrum condition helps you to make decisions? 
 No, or rarely  
 Sometimes 
 Often 
 Always 
 
 
5.  Do you think that your autism spectrum condition interferes with your ability to make 
decisions?  
 No, or rarely  
 Sometimes 
 Often 
 Always 
 
 
 
Thank you for completing these questions 
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Appendix E: Task instructions for the adapted Risky Choice Task 
 
The aim of this task is to win as many points as you can.  At the 
beginning of each round you will be given 100 points. 
A round consists of 20 trials; on each trial you will see two 
wheels.  On some trials, you must choose the wheel you think 
will give you the best chance of winning the most points.  On 
the other trials, the computer will make the decision for you.
You will see a message before every trial telling you whether 
you will take the next turn or whether the computer will take the 
next turn. 
 
 
Here is an example of two wheels.  The pink wedges on the right-hand wheel show the 
number of points you could win if you chose that wheel (10); the green wedges on the 
right-hand wheel show the number of points you could lose (15).  The blue wedges on 
the left-hand wheel show the number of points you could win (5); the yellow wedges on 
the right-hand wheel show the number of points you could lose (5). 
The proportion of blue:yellow and pink:green represent your chances of a win or a 
loss.  Take the right-hand wheel as an example: This wheel has 2 win wedges and 6 
loss wedges.  So if you chose this wheel you would have a greater chance of losing 
than winning. Take the left-hand wheel as another example: It has 4 win wedges and 4 
loss wedges therefore, if you chose this wheel you would have a 50:50 chance of 
winning (and a 50:50 chance of losing).  Do you have any questions so far?
-15
-15
-15
-15
-15 -15
+10 +10
-5
-5
-5-5
+5
+5
+5
+5
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Simply use the mouse to click on the wheel of your choice. The wheel you 
choose will appear in the centre of the screen. Just like in a game of wheel of 
fortune, a ticker will spin around the wheel and eventually land on one of the 8 
wedges. The wedge it lands on will tell you if you have won or lost that trial. 
Sometimes you will be presented with a wheel that has some blank wedges.  If 
the ticker lands on a blank wedge you neither win nor lose any points.
You must choose one wheel on each round where the computer is not making 
the decision for you
You must wait for the following message before making your choice: 
Please Choose Now
There will be a sound to tell you whether you have won or lost as well as a 
message at the bottom of the screen. The computer will add or subtract the 
points won or lost to your running points total at the top of the screen. Your 
score can go below zero if necessary.
At the end of 20 trials your score will be shown. Press the space bar when you 
are ready to start the next round. You will play a total of 4 rounds, which will take 
about 40 minutes.
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Appendix F: Visual analogue scales for the Risky Choice Task 
 
1. How anxious were you about making the decisions? 
Please place a mark on the line to indicate your answer 
 
Not at all anxious |-----------------------------------| Extremely anxious 
 
 
2. How much effort was required to think about the information and make the 
decisions? 
Please place a mark on the line to indicate your answer 
 
        No effort at all |-----------------------------------| A great deal of effort 
 
 
3. How anxious were you when the computer was making the decisions? 
Please place a mark on the line to indicate your answer 
 
Not at all anxious |-----------------------------------| Extremely anxious 
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Appendix G: Instructions for the Iowa Gambling Task 
 
1. In front of you on the screen, there are four decks of cards, A, B, C, and D. 
2. I want you to select one card at a time, by clicking on the card, from any deck you choose. 
3. Each time you select a card from a deck, the colour of the card turns red or black, and the 
computer will tell you that you won some pretend money in the form US dollars.  I won’t tell 
you how much money you will win.  You will find out along the way.  Every time you win, the 
green bar gets longer. 
4. Every so often, however, when you click on a card, the computer tells you that you won 
some money, but then it says that you also lost some money.  I won’t tell you when you will 
lose or how much you will lose.  You will find out along the way.  Every time you lose, the 
green bar gets shorter. 
5. You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to another any time you wish. 
6. The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible, and if you find yourself unable to 
win, make sure you avoid losing money as much as possible. 
7. We will give you some real money at the end of the game depending on how well you have 
scored. (added for the present study) 
8. I won’t tell you for how long the game will continue.  You must keep on playing until the 
computer stops. 
9. You will get 2000 dollars credit (see the green bar) to start the game.  At the end we will see 
how much you won or lost.  The red bar here is a reminder of how much money you 
borrowed to play the game. 
10. One last thing, it is important to know that the colours of the cards are irrelevant in this 
game.  The computer does not make you lose money at random.  However, there is no way 
to figure out when the computer will make you lose.  All I can say is that you may find 
yourself losing money on all of the decks, but some decks will make you lose more money 
than others.  You can win if you stay away from the worst decks. 
11. Do you have any questions? 
12. Good luck!    
 
 
Source: 
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Damasio, A.R. & Lee, G.P. (1999).  Different contributions of 
the human amygdala and ventromedial and prefrontal cortex to decision-making.  The 
Journal of Neuroscience, 19, 5473 – 5481. 
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Appendix H: Demonstrations of heuristics 
 
i) Birth order (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972) 
 
All families of six children in a city were surveyed.  In 72 families the exact order of births of boys and 
girls was G B G B B G.   
 
What is your estimate of the number of families surveyed in which the exact order of births was B G 
B B B B? 
 
ii) Hospital births (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972) 
 
A certain town is served by two hospitals.  In the larger hospital about 45 babies are born each day, 
and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born each day.  As you know, about 50 percent of all 
babies are boys.  However, the exact percentage varies from day to day.  Sometimes it may be 
higher than 50%, sometimes lower.   
 
For a period of 1 year, each hospital recorded the days on which more than 60 percent of the babies 
born were boys.  Which hospital do you think recorded more such days? 
 
A.  The larger hospital 
B.  The smaller hospital 
C.  About the same (that is, within 5% of each other) 
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iii) Path frequency (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) 
 
Consider the following diagram: 
X     X     O     X     X     X 
X     X     X     X     O     X 
X     O     X     X     X     X 
X     X     X     O     X     X 
X     X     X     X     X     O 
O     X     X     X     X     X 
 
A path in this diagram is any descending line which starts at the top row, ends and the bottom row, 
and passes though exactly one symbol (X or O) in each row. 
 
Are there more paths containing six X’s and no O’s, or more paths containing five X’s and one O? 
 
 
iv) ‘R’ position (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) 
 
The frequency of appearance of letters in the English language was studied.  A typical text was 
selected, and the relative frequency with which various letters of the alphabet appeared in the first 
and third positions in words was recorded.  Words of less than three letters were excluded from the 
count.   
 
Consider the letter R.  We would like you to judge whether this letter appear more often in the first 
or in the third position, and to estimate the ratio of the frequency with which it appears in these 
positions. 
 
Is R more likely to appear in: 
 the first position? 
 the third position? 
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v) Conjunctive vs Simple gambles (Bar-Hillel, 1973) 
 
Bag 1 – 20 marbles 
 10 red marbles, 10 white marbles 
 Chance of drawing a red marble is 50% 
 Pick a red marble 4 times in a row 
(replacing the marble each time) 
Bag 2 – 20 marbles 
 2 red marbles, 18 white marbles 
 Chance of drawing a red marble is 10% 
 Pick a red marble 
 
 
Bag 1 – 20 marbles 
 18 red marbles, 2 white marbles 
 Chance of drawing a red marble is 90% 
 Pick a red marble 7 times in a row 
(replacing the marble each time) 
Bag 2 – 20 marbles 
 10 red marbles, 10 white marbles 
 Chance of drawing a red marble is 50% 
 Pick a red marble 
 
 
Bag 1 – 20 marbles 
 12 red marbles, 8 white marbles 
 Chance of drawing a red marble is 60% 
 Pick a red marble 5 times in a row 
(replacing the marble each time) 
Bag 2 – 20 marbles 
 2 red marbles, 18 white marbles 
 Chance of drawing a red marble is 10% 
 Pick a red marble 
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vi) Disjunctive vs Simple gambles (Bar-Hillel, 1973) 
 
Bag 1 – 20 marbles 
 5 red marbles, 15 white marbles 
 Chance of drawing a red marble is 25% 
 Pick a red marble at least once in 8 
draws (replacing the marble each time) 
Bag 2 – 20 marbles 
 18 red marbles, 2 white marbles 
 Chance of drawing a red marble is 90% 
 Pick a red marble 
 
 
Bag 1 – 20 marbles 
 2 red marbles, 18 white marbles 
 Chance of drawing a red marble is 10% 
 Pick a red marble at least once in 9 
draws (replacing the marble each time) 
Bag 2 – 20 marbles 
 12 red marbles, 8 white marbles 
 Chance of drawing a red marble is 60% 
 Pick a red marble 
 
 
Bag 1 – 20 marbles 
 10 red marbles, 10 white marbles 
 Chance of drawing a red marble is 50% 
 Pick a red marble at least once in 4 
draws (replacing the marble each time) 
Bag 2 – 20 marbles 
 18 red marbles, 2 white marbles 
 Chance of drawing a red marble is 90% 
 Pick a red marble 
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vii) Asian flu (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) 
 
(Gain frame) 
Imagine that the UK is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to 
kill 600 people.  Two alternative programmes to combat the disease have been proposed.  Assume 
that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programmes are as follows: 
 
If Programme A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.  
 
If Programme B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 
probability that no people will be saved. 
 
Which of the two programmes would you favour? 
 
(Loss frame) 
Imagine that the UK is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to 
kill 600 people.  Two alternative programmes to combat the disease have been proposed.  Assume 
that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of the programmes are as follows: 
 
If Programme A is adopted, 400 people will die. 
 
If programme D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 
600 people will die. 
 
Which of these two programmes would you favour?  
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Appendix I : Information Sheets and Consent Forms for the experimental 
study 
 
i) Information Sheet for participants with autism spectrum conditions 
 
  
 
Lydia Luke 
Cambridge Intellectual & Developmental  
Disabilities Research Group (CIDDRG) 
Douglas House 
18b Trumpington Road 
Cambridge CB2 8AH 
Tel: 01223 746031 
Email: lrl29@medschl.cam.ac.uk 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Decision-making in Autism study 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study.  Before you decide you need to 
understand why this research is being done and what it would involve for you.  Please take time to 
read the following information carefully.  You can contact us if anything is not clear or you would like 
more information.   
 
What is this research study about? 
This study is about decision-making by people with autism spectrum conditions.  We are trying to 
find out if there are differences in the way that people with autism spectrum conditions make 
decisions, compared to people who do not have autism spectrum conditions. 
 
This research is relevant to recent legislation (such as the Mental Capacity Act (England & Wales) 
2005),  which currently provides very little guidance about how decision-making may be affected by 
autism spectrum conditions, or how some people with ASCs might best be supported with decision-
making.   
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Who are we? 
We are clinicians and researchers who work in the Department of Psychiatry, University of 
Cambridge.  The research team are Ms Lydia Luke, Dr Isabel Clare, and Dr Howard Ring. 
 
What will happen if I decide to take part? 
We will ask you to visit us at the University of Cambridge.  The visit will last about 6 hours and this 
includes breaks.  If you prefer, you can visit us twice and do the study over two sessions.  During 
your visit(s) we will:  
 Ask you some questions about your autism spectrum condition 
 Give you some puzzles to try that involve words, numbers and pictures 
 Ask you some questions about how you make decisions and how you think and feel 
 Ask you to do four different decision-making tasks on a computer.  For each one, we will ask 
you to make choices between different options and to try to win as many ‘points’ as 
possible. 
During one of the decision-making tasks, we will measure your heart rate and how much you sweat 
on your fingertips.  To do this we will place plastic sensors on your wrist, ankle, and two of your 
fingers.  This procedure is not unpleasant or painful.   
 
If you take part, you will be reimbursed for your travel expenses (2nd class rail fare, bus fare, or your 
own transport) and you will receive £30.00 to cover your time and subsistence costs. 
 
Other information we may ask you 
In order to understand more about your autism spectrum condition, we may ask you provide the 
contact details of a clinical or other service that can confirm your diagnosis.  This may include the 
Autism Research Centre in Cambridge if you have taken part in a study there.  You can choose not to 
provide this information and still take part in our study.  If you would be happy for us to contact a 
clinical or other service, we will ask you to sign a letter of authorisation. 
 
We may also ask if you would be happy for us to telephone one of your parents to ask for more 
information about your autism spectrum condition.  It is often helpful to find out information about 
what you were like when you were very young, before you started school.  We would arrange to talk 
to your mother or father at a time that suited them.  We would not speak to them for more than 
two hours, unless they would like to take more time to complete the interview.  Again, you can 
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choose for us not to contact one of your parents and still take part in the study.  We will not 
interview your parent if they do not want us to.          
 
Will my answers and information be kept confidential? 
Yes.  Your answers will be anonymised by replacing your name with a code, which will be known only 
to members of the research team.  Your contact details will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in the 
Cambridge Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities Research Group (CIDDRG) at the University of 
Cambridge.  We will not give any of your personal details to other people.  We will keep this 
information for a maximum of 5 years, after which it will be destroyed in accordance with good 
research practice.     
 
Will any video tapes be used? 
Yes.  We would like to video you for one of the tasks.  A small proportion of the films will be looked 
at by another researcher in the Department of Psychiatry to confirm my assessment.  The video 
recording will be stored electronically on a DVD and the original tape will be destroyed.  The DVD 
will be anonymised by replacing your name with a code, and kept in a locked filing cabinet in the 
CIDDRG at the University of Cambridge.  The recording will be kept for a maximum of 5 years from 
the start of my PhD (October 2007), after which it will be destroyed in accordance with good 
research practice.  Copies of the recording will not be made.  The recording will not be made 
available for any purposes other than the research project.  We will ask you if you are happy to be 
videotaped before starting the study.  You can choose not to be videotaped and still take part in 
the study.  
 
What will happen to the study results? 
The results will form part of a Ph.D. thesis and will be presented at conferences and written up in 
journals.  If any of your individual answers are used, they will be completely anonymised and it will 
not be possible for you to be identified in any way.   
 
Do I have to take part in this study? 
No.  You do not have to take part and you are free to withdraw at any time without explanation. 
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What if there is a problem? 
If you are worried about anything to do with the research you can ask to speak to one of the 
researchers.  The person will do their best to answer your questions.  They can be contacted on 
01223 746031.  If you are still unhappy and want to complain formally you can do this through the 
University of Cambridge Research Services on 01223 333543. 
 
The research only involves asking some questions and doing some tasks on the computer while your 
heart rate and fingertip sweating are recorded, so we think it is unlikely that you will have any 
problems.  If however, during the course of the study, something goes wrong that hurts you and may 
be due to someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for legal action for compensation 
against the University of Cambridge.  You may have to pay your own legal costs in any legal action.   
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
This study has received ethical approval from the University of Cambridge Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee. 
 
What should I do if I have any questions, concerns, or would just like more information? 
Please contact Lydia Luke (lrl29@medschl.cam.ac.uk or 01223 746031) or the project supervisor, Dr 
Isabel Clare (on 01223 746100), if you have any questions or concerns about this research.  You can 
also write to Ms Lydia Luke or Dr Isabel Clare using the address at the top of this letter. 
If you are aged 16 – 18 years and would like to take part, you should discuss this with your 
parents/guardians before contacting the research team. 
 
28/08/2009 – Information Sheet for people with autism spectrum conditions (Version 6) 
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ii) Consent Form for participants with autism spectrum conditions 
 
  
 Lydia Luke (PhD Student) 
CIDDRG, Douglas House 
18b Trumpington Road 
Cambridge CB2 8AH 
01223 746100 or lrl29@medschl.cam.ac.uk 
Consent form 
 
Project title: Decision-making by men and women with an autism spectrum condition 
Name of Researchers: Ms Lydia Luke, Dr Isabel Clare & Dr Howard Ring 
 
Please demonstrate your understanding of the nature of this study by reading the statements and ticking the boxes 
below: 
 
 
    
Please 
tick  
1 I have read and understand the information about this study     
2 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason and without my legal rights being affected. 
 
3 
I understand that my anonymised answers will be incorporated into an account of this 
research that will be presented at conferences and in journals and written up as part of a 
Ph.D. thesis. 
 
4 
I understand that if something goes wrong or I am hurt as a result of someone’s 
negligence, then I may have grounds for a legal action for compensation against the 
University of Cambridge but I may have to pay my legal costs.  
 
5 
I am happy to be videotaped and understand that the recording will be anonymised and 
identified only by a code and will not be used for any purpose other than the research project. 
( ) 
6 
I am happy to provide the contact details of a clinical or other service that can confirm my 
diagnosis. 
( ) 
7 
I am happy to provide the contact details of one of my parents (if available) for them to be asked 
to be interviewed. 
( ) 
8 I agree to take part in the above study.  
Please print your name and sign and date this page 
 
Name: ___________________            Signature: ___________________            Date:  ___________________ 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research, please contact Ms Lydia Luke or  
Dr Isabel Clare by telephone or post at the above address 
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iii) Information Sheet for participants in the control group 
 
  
Lydia Luke 
Cambridge Intellectual & Developmental  
Disabilities Research Group (CIDDRG) 
Douglas House  
18b Trumpington Road 
Cambridge CB2 8AH 
Tel: 01223 746031 
Email: lrl29@medschl.cam.ac.uk 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet for Healthy Volunteers 
Decision-making in Autism study 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research study.  Before you decide you need to 
understand why this research is being done and what it would involve for you.  Please take time to 
read the following information carefully.  You can contact us if anything is not clear or you would like 
more information.   
 
What is this research study about? 
This study is about decision-making by people with autism spectrum conditions.  We are trying to 
find out if there are differences in the way that people with autism spectrum conditions make 
decisions, compared to people who do not have autism spectrum conditions. 
 
This research is relevant to recent legislation (such as the Mental Capacity Act 2005),  which 
currently provides very little guidance about how decision-making may be affected by autism 
spectrum conditions, or how people with ASCs might best be supported with decision-making.   
 
Who are we? 
We are clinicians and researchers who work in the Department of Psychiatry, University of 
Cambridge.  The research team are Ms Lydia Luke, Dr Isabel Clare, and Dr Howard Ring. 
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What will happen if I decide to take part? 
We will ask you to visit us at the University of Cambridge.  The visit will last about 5¼ hours and this 
includes breaks.  If you prefer, you can visit us twice and do the study over two sessions.   
During your visit(s) we will:  
 Give you some puzzles to try that involve words, numbers and pictures 
 Ask you some questions about how you make decisions and how you think and feel 
 Ask you to do four different decision-making tasks on a computer.  For each one, we will ask 
you to make choices between different options and to try to win as many ‘points’ as 
possible. 
 
During one of the decision-making tasks, we will measure your heart rate and how much you sweat 
on your fingertips.  To do this we will place plastic sensors on your wrist, ankle, and two of your 
fingers.  This procedure is not unpleasant or painful.   
 
If you take part, you will be reimbursed for your travel expenses (2nd class rail fare, bus fare, or you 
own transport) and you will receive £30.00 to cover your time and subsistence costs. 
 
Will my answers and information be kept confidential? 
Yes.  Your answers will be anonymised by replacing your name with a code, which will be known only 
to members of the research team.  Your contact details will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in the 
Department of Psychiatry, University of Cambridge.  We will not give any of your personal details to 
other people.  We will keep this information for a maximum of 5 years, after which it will be 
destroyed in accordance with good research practice.       
 
What will happen to the study results? 
The results will form part of my Ph.D. thesis and will be presented at conferences and written up in 
journals.  If any of your individual answers are used, they will be completely anonymised and it will 
not be possible for you to be identified in any way.   
 
Do I have to take part in this study? 
No.  You do not have to take part and you are free to withdraw at any time without explanation.   
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you are worried about anything to do with the research you can ask to speak to one of the 
researchers.  The person will do their best to answer your questions.  They can be contacted on 
01223 746031.  If you are still unhappy and want to complain formally you can do this through the 
University of Cambridge Research Services on 01223 333543. 
 
The research only involves asking some questions and doing some tasks on the computer while your 
heart rate and fingertip sweating are recorded, so we think it is unlikely that you will have any 
problems.  If however, during the course of the study, something goes wrong that hurts you and may 
be due to someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for legal action for compensation 
against the University of Cambridge.  You may have to pay your own legal costs in any legal action.   
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Who has reviewed this study? 
This study has received ethical approval from the University of Cambridge Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee. 
 
What should I do if I have any questions, concerns, or would just like more information? 
Please contact Lydia Luke (lrl29@medschl.cam.ac.uk or on 01223 746031) or the project supervisor, 
Dr Isabel Clare (on 01223 746100), if you have any questions or concerns about this research.  You 
can also write to Lydia Luke or Dr Isabel Clare using the address at the top of this letter.   
 
If you are aged 16 – 18 years and would like to take part, you should discuss this with your 
parents/guardians before contacting the research team. 
 
If you would like to participate, please contact Lydia Luke 
(lrl29@medschl.cam.ac.uk or 01223 746031) 
 
28/08/2009 – Information sheet for participants in the control group (Version 3) 
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iv) Consent Form for participants in the control group 
 
  
 Lydia Luke 
PhD Student 
CIDDRG, Douglas House 
18b Trumpington Road 
Cambridge CB2 8AH 
Tel: 01223 746031 
 
Consent form 
 
Project title: Decision-making by men and women with an autism spectrum condition 
Name of Researchers: Ms Lydia Luke, Dr Isabel Clare & Dr Howard Ring 
 
Please demonstrate your understanding of the nature of this study by reading the statements and 
ticking the boxes below: 
 
 
Please 
tick  
1 I have read and understand the information about this study     
2 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason and without my legal rights being affected. 
 
3 
I understand that my anonymised answers will be incorporated into an account of this 
research that will be presented at conferences and in journals and written up as part of a 
Ph.D. thesis. 
 
4 
I understand that if something goes wrong or I am hurt as a result of someone’s 
negligence, then I may have grounds for a legal action for compensation against the 
University of Cambridge but I may have to pay my legal costs. 
 
5 I agree to take part in the above study.  
 
Please print your name and sign and date this page 
 
Name: __________________            Signature: _______________            Date: ___________________  
 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this research, please contact Ms Lydia Luke or  
Dr Isabel Clare by telephone or post at the above address 
 
 
